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Summary 
This thesis examines rights of the dead, a subject on which there has been little 
previous research. Three predominant themes are explored in our endeavour, 
contrary to current philosophical and legal discourse, to argue for "rights of the 
dead". 
First, we utilise several approaches to both clarify the interests of the dead 
and then the argument for rights of the dead, rights which are in any case 
immanent in contemporary human rights and other established general rights, 
e.g., a right to succession. We argue that the dead have an interest and, in 
limited cases, for example defamation of the dead, rights can be ascribed to the 
dead. 
Second, in the process of examining the first theme, we analyse the 
arguments for and against whether interests of or rights of the dead can be 
justified and identify which current legal systems they are imbedded in. 
Comparing the situation involved by the living with that by the dead, we attempt 
to establish a new perspective of rights of the dead based upon the "social 
characteristics" . 
Third, we attempt to interpret rights of the dead from a point of view based 
upon the duties that the living are purported to hold with respect to the dead. 
Whilst we present a view which supports some previously under-valued 
perspectives of rights and duties, we moreover seek the possibility of establishing 
rights of the dead on the basis of these duties. 
We do not argue that all rights the living hold are applicable to the dead. 
We merely maintain that there are some rights which can be ascribed to the 
dead, rights which are particular to the dead because of the succession of the 
dead person to some of the social characteristics they held whilst they were 
living. 
Masayuki Yoshida 
PhD Thesis 
Department of Law 
University of Sheffield 
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Preface 
Practical considerations have limited the scope of this study. It is devoted to a 
conceptual analysis of rights of the dead and an evaluation of the rights as 
employed by substantial law, judgements and analytical arguments. 
Initially It was intended to develop an analysis based upon philosophical 
justification, but in the process of the research, it became obvious that the project 
required instead a broader multi-disciplinary analytical approach. Moreover, in 
order to explicate the concept of rights of the dead, it was felt necessary for 
reasons of clarity and edification to compare English law, which disregards such 
rights, to Japanese law in which such rights are in rare cases embedded, to an 
historical approach where such an approach appears useful. 
The approaches employed in this thesis therefore, seek neither to reflect 
any specific movement of thought nor any practice of a systematic logic in a strict 
sense. We strive for success in this project through an overall avoidance of 
metaphysical debate, whilst making use of analytiC strategies, specifying issues 
and, where appropriate sometimes, nullifying issues. 
Financial assistance by both the ORS and the University of Sheffield 
made possible the pursuance of this study,' undertaken largely in the UK culture 
and is gratefully acknowledged. 
This thesis was completed under the supervision of Professor Deryck 
Beyleveld, with the assistance of Dr Maria Leitner, Humphrey Pullar, Dr Peter 
Matanle, Henning Swabey, John Harney, Dr Richard Kirkham, Susan Wallace 
and David Patton, my close friends or colleagues. If it were not for their kind 
advice and helpful criticism, this study would have been given up well before 
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completion. Finally, Professor Roger Brownsword, my previous supervisor of my 
MA thesis provided pertinent advice and guidance for the long journey 
undertaken here. To them all, and all the others whom I have not acknowledged 
for their support in my undertaking, I should like to express my sincerest 
appreciation for their able and honest assistance and guid.ance. 
It was fourteen years ago when I instinctively gained the main idea for this 
thesis. At that time I was desolately observing a line of smoke issuing from a 
crematorium chimney where Masanari, my father-in-law, was being cremated. I 
have to confess his spirit ubiquitously yet anonymously pervades the pages and 
arguments below and provides the support to and my initial justification for my 
search and work to attempt to establish rights of the dead as embedded in this 
thesis. 
Finally, I should like to express my deepest gratitude to Chizuko, my wife 
and Masanari's daughter, who has shared with me this entire journey supporting 
me patiently and lovingly throughout its course. 
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Chapter 1 
Rights regarding the dead 
1.1 Introduction 
In this introductory chapter we sketch not only some of the principal ideas of 
rights of the dead which we wish to examine and develop, but also present some 
approaches to examining diverse theories for explaining and developing these 
ideas. First, we view how the concept has been dealt with in English, Japanese 
and American discourse. Second, we argue that rights of the dead is historically 
a concept worthy of review, and point out that the concept is worth reviewing as 
the basis of a new framework of rights debate within legal discourse. This thesis 
examines a matter which is highly relevant to contemporary society. We 
undertake a thorough analytical debate, avoiding however the entanglements of 
metaphysics. Therefore, debate is conducted from multi-disciplinary 
perspectives including moral, philosophical, legal, sociological and 
anthropological levels. 
This chapter provides the benchmark by which rights of the dead is 
discussed in this thesis. Some of the questions to be resolved include: "What is 
meant by and who are we intending to identify when we use the term rights the 
dead?"; "How different are the dead from the living?"; and "What, if any, shared 
attributes do the dead and the living possess?" Based upon discussion of these 
1 
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fundamental, and other, questions, we will provide a schema of six approaches 
for the explication of rights of the dead reinforced by additional relevant 
explanations. Guided by these approaches, we aim to unravel the substance of 
the concept of rights of the dead. 
1.2 Rights of the dead is historically a concept worthy to be reviewed 
1.2.1 Historical grounds for rights of the dead 
This thesis will interrogate a fundamental question-rights of the dead 1: This 
interrogation will examine such intriguing and difficult questions as 1) "Can a 
deceased person be harmed2 or have an interese?" 2) "What is a right of the 
dead?" 3) "Is a right of the dead embedded in substantial law?" 4) "Is intention4 
as expressed in a will that of the living or the dead person?" 5) "Who owns my 
dead body?" 6) "Is a promisor obliged to a deceased promisee by the promise 
that the pro.misor made with the promisee before the promisee's death?" 
Through comparison between Japanese and English law, this thesis will examine 
the possibility of establishing an interest for the deceased, or rights of the dead. 
In order to answer these questions, we have to transfer between levels of 
fundamental arguments when dealing with each question. In so doing 
orientations of moral philosophical debate and legal, social and anthropological 
1 Logically speaking, the expression rights of the dead is bizarre. For "an inert hunk 
of matter thoroughly removed from the realm of moral significance" (Lomasky 1987, 213) 
cannot hold any rights. The reason why we dare to use the seemingly inconsistent words 
rights of the dead would be that we can embed in the expression the implication that, if an 
antemortem right can survive death, the posthumous right can be attributed to a living 
person. Nevertheless what we argue in this thesis will be more than that implication, i.e., 
that there is a right which can be attributed to a deceased person. 
2 Following Feinberg (1984), we can assume that "harms" are what occurs not when 
we are merely hurt or offended but when our "interests" are frustrated, defeated or set back. 
3 It is acceptable to define, as Feinberg (ibid.) does, interests as something in which 
we have a stake. 
4 In general intention can be defined as a power to determine a motive and a reason. 
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discourse are all taken into consideration. Legal debate mainly explores a 
comparison between Japanese and English law and court decisions. Social and 
anthropological debate furnishes the most significant concepts to develop the 
theme of "social characteristics" in this thesis. 
The question of "whether the dead possess rights" cannot be considered 
to be irrelevant if we conduct a historical review. The question could however, be 
rephrased so as to ask "whether the dead can be considered to have a legal 
capacity". A brief review of history shows that non-humans have been 
considered to hold rights in the past. It is a truism that diverse legal systems 
have at different times and for diverse reasons guaranteed legal capacities to 
various "things" which could not be considered to be living human beings. In 
addition, there was a time when humans were not entitled to hold rights that are 
today considered self-evident and supposed to be guaranteed for all human 
beings. For example, in the Hammurabi Code, the oldest known Code of Law, 
"those who set slaves free or protect escaped slaves" were prescribed to be 
sentenced to death.5 The code regarded slaves as property and disregarded the 
dignity of human life. In ancient Greece, the idea of human rights for slaves was 
also not recognised (Oakes 1990, 5). This was an historical phenomenon at the 
legal level but it does not follow that the slaves of the time had no human rights 
as derived from natural rights .. However, interesting as a review of this history is, 
this thesis nevertheless does not rely on the past for its substance. 
5 See Article 15 of The Oldest Code of Laws in the World: The Code of Laws 
Promulgated by Hammurabi, King of Babylon, B.C. 2285-2242, (1911), translated by C. H. 
W. Johns. 
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Certain social orders have at certain times denied6 the legal subject of 
slaves and sometimes even that of foreigners.7 Not only did this allow for the 
exclusion of certain human agents at various times in history, but in addition 
given the contingent nature of beliefs at times non-human "things" were actually 
vested with rights. The significant point here is that law is justified according to 
people's beliefs at a particular time. Therefore, it is equally feasible given the 
changing nature of beliefs that something other than a living human being might 
be vested with the capacity to hold rights, perform duties, and incur liabilities. 
This can be proven by examining the many lawsuits8 against animals and even 
non-living objects, or the diverse contracts with God (Lumia 1975 [1973]). 
Roscoe Pound pedantically introduced an appeal case from India, a case in 
which the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council adjudged that an idol should be 
regarded as a legal person under the specific customs of India: 
"When, however, legal rights are attributed to an idol and the Judicial . 
Committee of the Privy Council can tell us that "the will of the idol9 in regard to 
location must be res~ected"10 and can appoint a "disinterested next friend" to 
represent it in court1 " (Pound 1959 vol. 5, 201-2). 
In modern times Capitalist nations, such as Japan and Britain, have awarded 
legal status to collective entities, e.g., corporations, which by themselves cannot 
be considered to be a human being. On this basis, is it therefore implausible to 
posit that an entity which similarly cannot walk, eat, and sleep in the same way 
6 Of course, ipso facto there can be no logical grounds on the basis of these 
precedents to refuse rights of the dead. Our point here is that rights depended upon the 
prevailing legal systems. 
7 Sir Henry Maine (1912) remarks that, in the early Roman republic the principle of 
the absolute exclusion of foreigners pervaded the civil law and that the alien or denizen could 
have no share in any initiation supposed to be coeval with the state. 
8 See E. P. Evans (1884), "Medieval and modern punishment". 
9 See Pramatha Nath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, L. R. 52 Ind. App. 245 
(1925). 
10 Ibid. 259. 
11 Ibid. 261. 
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that humans do, is legally capable of enjoying rights and undertaking duties in a 
manner equal to ourselves qua the living human beings? 
1.2.2 Modern legal conflict 
Courts in modern society frequently have to deal with a conflict between the living 
and the non-living. In an American case where a claim was made against a 
resort development in the Mineral King Valley of California, the United States, the 
appellants, Sierra, sought to reverse the appeal court's decision overturning the 
district court's preliminary injunction. 12 The Supreme Court agreed with the 
appellate court that Sierra did not have standing to sue, because it lacked any 
personal interest in the matter. However, Justice Douglas dissented on the 
ground that it should be possible to litigate in regard to environmental issues in 
the name of the despoiled inanimate object where the injury is the subject of 
public outrage. Despite the difficulty of moral justification in that case he made a 
unique remark which implies that, although it was a civilian group that brought 
this action, the Valley per se should have been considered to be the plaintiff. His 
theoretical ground for dissent was based upon a challenging work "Should Trees 
Have Standing?" (1996, original in 1975), which Christopher D. Stones, Professor 
of the South California University, had written in preparation for the court dispute. 
In the work he suggested the possibility that even environmental objects, that are 
assumed to have no rights, have new rights on the ground of the historical facts 
that rights rendered to children, prisoners, aliens, women, the insane, Blacks, 
foetuses and Indians were ones of extension and furthermore that inanimate 
objects such as corporations, local offices and nations have been regarded as 
5 
right-holders. In fact, there are, in the United States, other such cases 13_ 
hearings have been conducted in which the plaintiff has been a wild animal. 
The American statutory authority may explicitly grant or implicitly confer 
standing upon governmental entities to sue on behalf of wild animals, but unless 
the plaintiff has a personal interest or "injury in fact", private citizens, classes, 
associations, and special interest groups cannot sue under Article III of the 
Constitution. Sierra's case was fatally flawed because it lacked this element. 
However, in an appellant case 14 regarding the Palila, an endangered species, the 
court decided as follows: 
"As an endangered species under the Endangered Species Act ("Act"), 16 
U.S.C. §§ 1531-43 (1982), the bird (Loxioides bail/eUf), a member of the 
Hawaiian honey-creeper family, also has legal status and wings its way into 
federal court as a plaintiff in its own right. The Palila (which has earned the 
right to be capitalized since it is a party to this proceeding) is represented by 
attorneys for the Sierra Club, Audubon Society, and other environmental parties 
who obtained an order directing the Hawaii Department of Land and Natural 
Resources ("Department") to remove mouflon sheep from its critical habitat" .15 
Also in Japan, attempts to determine which rights should be rendered to natural 
objects which have been merely administered and protected by human beings 
have been practiced in some lawsuits.16 Their theoretical grounds come from 
Professor Stone's perspective and some American winning cases such as the 
Palila example. On 23 February, 1995, a lawsuit was brought to court arguing for 
the "rights of nature", with the Amami Black Rabbit as one of four wildlife 
plaintiffs, although human plaintiffs joined in court proceedings. The claim was 
12 Sierra Club v. Morton No. 70-34, 405 U. S. 727 (April 19, 1972). Also see < 
http://www.elr.info/litigation/voI2/2.20192.htm> available. 
13 E.g., see Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (1992). Also see < 
http://supcUaw.comell.edu/supcUhtml/90-1424.ZS.html> available. 
14 Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F 2d 1106, 1107 
(9th Cir. 1988). 
15 852 F 2d 1107. 
16 See <http://www.nifty.ne.jp/forum/fenv/prweb/press05/00305.htm> (in Japanese) 
which provides with the details on several Japanese "Rights of Nature" lawsuits. 
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made against a resort development by which much of the island's wildlife had 
been on the verge of extinction. On 22 January, 2001, the court held that the 
four types of wildlife had no standing to sue, and it rejected their demand. The 
court also understood that environmental value Can be protected by Forest Law 
(Law 249 of 26 July, 1951) and the diversity of wildlife can be enhanced as a 
legal value. However, it suggests that this diversity still remains at an abstract 
level but does not reach the level of the individual's concrete interests. 
Nevertheless Takaaki Kagohashi (2002), a leading lawyer in this case, invited the 
court to understand nature's value from the viewpoint of the diversity of living 
creatures and considered that the Japanese policy for forests includes the 
protection of the diversity of the creatures whilst the traditional policy regards the 
nature as a mere resource. After the Miyazaki branch of the Fukuoka High Court 
affirmed the first instant judgement on 19 March, 2002, the appeal to the 
Supreme Court was given Up.17 
American case law, which includes cases where civil groups have brought 
an action in which wild animals were considered to be the plaintiff, and the 
Japanese legal reality of actions recently brought based on the above American 
perspectives demonstrate that it is not implausible to talk of entities other than 
live human beings having rights which are protected by and within the law. 
Adherents of the radical ecology movements speak of rights of animals 
and plants and present moral arguments against the prevailing orthodoxy of 
morals, i.e., that humans are the measure of all values, including rights, in the 
natural world. The question therefore of whether the dead possess rights; is 
17 For a detailed explanation see 
<http://member.nifty.ne.jp/sizennokenri/AM020401.html> (in Japanese). 
7 
neither blunt nor bizarre. We can see from historical research that such a 
question and furthermore the study of such a question is both totally reasonable 
and feasible. Moreover, the finding that non-humans have, in the past, been 
considered to be entitled to be vested with rights and duties lends additional 
support to the thesis. As a matter of fact, there was a time when the dead did 
hold legal rights. 
1.2.3 Old Germanic law accepts rights of the dead 
A good example for the introduction of rights of the dead into a legal system is 
that of old Germanic law. Under the law the dead were vested with the same 
rights as the living, although it is unknown whether this law was universal 
throughout ancient Europe. According to Heinrich Mitteis, 
"Germanic folk religion is a belief in demons; natural forces are seen as 
being endowed with souls and able to be controlled by magic. This was 
significant for jurisprudence, which punished magic that caused harm 
and utilised the magic of runes in casting lots. An oath was also deemed 
a magic act (compare Chapter 10-111). The dead person lives on as a 
demon and can become a ghost. He demands victims (source of the law 
of inheritance), and can himself complain as well as be the object of a 
complaint and even deliver up a murderer to justice (court of justice held 
at the bier of a dead person)" (1968, 11) [my translation] 
The court held at the bier was called Bahrgericht, a legal procedure of evidence 
based upon a sorcery belief that the dead hold a power by which they can prove 
their murderer's guilt. The murder suspect, nuded or wearing only a shirt, 
approaches the dead body and touches or kisses it. If the suspect is the real 
murderer, it is said that blood spurts from the wound of the dead body. This 
accounts for the belief that the physical phenomenon of the dead was regarded 
as a piece of evidence for proof of guilt (Brockhaus 1986). 
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According to Mitteis (1968, 12-14), the old Germanic law closely related to 
this magical religion of the commoners in these days was based on a distinctive 
community named Sippe (kinship) amongst the common folk. Sippe was a sort 
of collective law. It states that the community not only existed before individuals 
existed but also existed on, within and as part of the individuals. Sippe played an 
important role in introducing individuals into legal life and making them involved 
with the legal matters. Thus to understand law assumed the existence of the 
community. In this way we have substance for a theory that says that the dead 
and the living were considered to co-habit in old Germanic society.18 In this old 
society the dead were incorporated into the legal system to a somewhat similar 
degree as the living. This sort of legal system, which stemmed from a very close 
relationship between the dead and the living, can be found in a society in which 
the idea and the worship of ancestors (A hnenkult) , plays a vital role in unifying 
clans and families, and strengthening their communal bonds 19 (Abe 1989). The 
idea of rights of the dead has been accepted at the historical, legal and social 
levels. 
1.2.4 A background of Japanese history in support of the idea of rights of 
the dead 
The connection between ancient Japanese laws and religious ideas is, as in the 
case of old Germanic states above, a key for observing a basis of the notion of 
rights of the dead in Japan. To explore this connection we will briefly investigate 
several historical epochs throughout which the relationship between the dead 
18 For details on dealing with the dead from the viewpoint of the. change of the old 
Germanic tombs and ways of funerals, see U. Taniguch (1987). 
19 The idea of Annenkult of the old German distinguishes worshipped deceased 
persons from others who are feared and excluded (Abe 1989). 
9 
and the living has been strengthened by social institutions and systems. In so 
doing it should be possible to understand the power of presence within society of 
the deceased (Le., here, rights of the dead) based on these relations. For 
instance, even with a brief historical review of burial modes,2o it is possible to 
grasp the import and substance of the relation between the dead and the living. 
We will recall historically that there were five epochal dimensions closely related 
to the involvement of the developing relationship between the living and the 
dead. 
A style of interment, called kusso, brings this relationship into focus. 
Diverse figures bending the arms and legs of the dead have been found in the 
kusso style21 (Fujimoto 1964; Togashi 1985, etc.). One version of kusso, which 
refers to a burial figure of a dead person holding large stones by his/her arms, 
may suggest that those who feared ghosts or spirits of the dead attempted to 
imprison ghosts or spirits within the dead bodies. Furthermore evidence of clay 
items such as human-figured or animal-figured figurines, masks, boards, and 
stone tools, probably for use in magic rituals, were found buried alongside the 
body mainly in eastern Japan. This could suggest that the border of the worlds 
of the living and the dead was extremely vague in terms of people's religious 
consciousness. The kusso burial style prevailed during the Jomon heyday period 
(c.5,000-500 B.C.). From this specific custom, it can be surmised that a religious 
belief, of whatever form, broadly and commonly dominated the consciousness of 
the people of that epoch. Apart from burial grounds where individuals were 
20 <http://web.sfc.keio.ac.jp/-s01480ks/chousa/projectlnenpyo/nenpyo.htm> (in 
Japanese) compactly explains the history on disposing of the dead. 
21 <http://www.museum.tohoku.ac.jp/1998SE/PHOTOJPEG/Photo14.html> provides 
with a picture of kussO. 
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respectfully buried in shared haioku-bo (grave pits)22, dilapidated house graves, 
made under the grounds of pit dwellings were used for collective burial of 
, 
community members. It seems there hardly existed in people's minds and 
consciousness any separation between burial grounds and living places or 
between the domain of the dead and the living. 
The first epoch was the period from the Kofun (gigantic burial mounds) era 
up to the genesis of the Ritsuryo state. During this period, the burials of nobles 
and commoners appeared to differ considerably in style and form. Strong 
cultural inferences from other countries, such as Paekche (Kudara), in the 
Korean Peninsula led the upper classes to, by building the Kofun mounds in a 
diversity of modes, to socially and politically display power with their ante-mortem 
and post-mortem presence. The enormous size of the burial mounds and the 
proliferation of grave goods, as found buried in and around the tombs of nobles, 
such as clay dolls, combs, earrings and other body ornaments, points to a 
tendency, amongst the clans and nobles of the times, of respecting dead persons 
and their bodies. On the other hand the methods of burial for commoners were 
coarse. As far as we observe the promulgation of several official orders, such as 
Hakuso-no-mikotonori Order (646) and Soso-ryO Order (701), in contrast with the 
fact that the common people ubiquitously left dead bodies unburied, the upper 
classes seem to have had a consciousness of specified contaminations, known 
as kegare, in regard to the dead and their bodies. They preferred purity, and 
regarded dead bodies as obnoxious to their religious beliefs. Since the national 
acceptance of Buddhism in the mid-sixth century, cremation, introduced by the 
elite of the society, gradually spread amongst the common classes. At that time 
22 See a fugure of haiokubo in http://kaizuka.tripod.co.jp/abs0702.html#muko pit. 
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a dead person referred to an entity representing the kegare. Excluded from the 
urban living space, therefore, dead bodies were buried outside the cities. 
Generally people lacked any moral consciousness that bodies and ashes should 
be respectfully disposed of. Bodies were abandoned in dumping grounds and 
bones were broken into pieces.23 In times of the existence of a social aristocracy 
such as the Heian period (792-1182) social classes were divided according to 
family status or origins. People found the inevitable resignation and fatalism in 
the stagnant and closed society influenced by the webs of the elite's connections. 
There were few opportunities for self-advancement. Fortune-tellers (Onmyo-shl) 
dominated and controlled the minds of nobles within the Imperial Court. The 
Heian nobles considered burial grounds and tombs as symbolic objects of 
unluckiness, taboo, and detestation, not as places of worship. Otten occurring 
cataclysm and epidemics frequently compelled people to experience the events 
of other people's death. Therefore people's experience of another's death did 
not arrive at considering the dead as an obnoxious impurity which should be kept 
away from their life. In order for burial grounds and dead persons to be regarded 
as objects of worship and a symbolic part of life, the grounds and deceased 
persons had to be incorporated into society vested with a special value or 
interest. This incorporation indicated that the burial grounds were conversely 
signified with a place of two contradicting values, i.e., impurity and sacredness. 
The burial grounds reasoned by these incompatible values implied a fruit of the 
people's mixed consciousness of death and the dead in those times. 
23 A will in which Emperor Junna ordered to scatter his ashes in a mountain in 840 
exists. Two elegies regarding scattering human ashes can be found in the Many(5sha (an 
anthology of 4.516 poems made between the beginning of fifth century and 759 and 
compiled shortly after 759). 
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The second epoch was from the last years of the Heian period to the 
Kamakura period. Jodo-shinshu, the idea of the Pure Land, shifted the social 
perception of graves from impurity to sacredness. Buddhist thought held a tenet 
of salvation of the dead. Jado refers to the purest world for Buddhists (Le., the 
equivalent of the Western paradise), where Amida was said to reside and his 
ultimate enlightenment was assured. The Jado sect established as its tenet the 
Amida teachings, for example, that Amida and his host descend from paradise to 
receive their believers and escort them to paradise. After the upper-classes 
believed in and supported the tenets, because of the Amidism's exceptional 
simplicity and attractive narrative, the canon rapidly and steadily penetrated the 
daily life of the commoners. In addition proponents of the Jado movement 
implanted the idea of respecting human ashes into the minds of both the classes 
of warriors and those of common people. 
Buddhism became closely related to funeral rites under the name of the 
salvation of the dead, in the posthumous world, where the dead were said to 
arrive at an ultimately peaceful place with Buddha's help. The fact that the dead 
were again buried in the urban space and place indicated that Buddhist temples 
were increasingly established, maintained the space of burial and took the 
initiative in supervising funeral rites. It gave birth to the idea of worshipping the 
memory of a deceased person. 
The permeation of the idea throughout society illustrated that the custom 
of family tombs being inherited under the traditional Ie, family lineage group, was 
in accordance with the trend that family tombs functioned as an object for 
worshipping ancestors. These customs or trends meant, moreover, that family 
graves were regarded not only as the extension of the living's life where the dead 
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were grieved and given a peaceful place, but also as the burgeon of the social 
function that the nation controlled its people by taking advantage of the normative 
ideas of Buddhism, the dead and their graves. 
During the third epoch, the early Edo times, Buddhism permeated 
throughout the whole country. The diverse sects of Buddhism proved particularly 
successful at promoting and strengthening the relation between temples and 
their believers mainly by making considerable use of funeral rituals. The key 
terms, here, are the funeralisation of Buddhism and political control through the 
registration of the dead. In his essay Soshiki Bukkyo (Funeral Buddhism), 
Tamamuro (1963) contends that the main reasons why Buddhist funerals were 
accepted among the commoners are threefold: 
1. there already existed in daily life a funeral custom interwoven with both 
affection and fear; 
2. there evidently existed religious beliefs that fear the evil consequences; and 
3. Buddhists and their sects propagandised Buddhism's imaginative ideas and 
thoughts of jigoku (the Hell) and gokuraku (the Paradise). 
For purposes of social monitoring and control, the Tokugawa government 
established, as a specified social institution, terauke seido, the compulsory 
registration of all Japanese citizens as parishioners of Buddhist temples. The 
establishment of this social institution was an anti-Christian policy, closely related 
to· abusing and suppressing domestic Christians. The Tokugawa Shogunate 
could not tolerate the explicit and implicit influence of an ideology that asserted 
loyalty to an overseas power more ultimate than its own, because power would 
exist in Rome or in Heaven, both of which cannot be controlled or governed by 
the government. The Shogunate often ordered bans on the involvement of 
Christianity from 1613, succeeded in quashing major Christian rebellions on 
Shimabara Peninsula in Kyushu in 1671, and required everyone to register at 
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local Buddhist temples as well as demonstrate a disavowal of Christianity by 
stepping on a fumie board on which was drawn a picture of Jesus. 
This blasphemous prac!ice, shumon aratame, was a yearly scrutiny and 
purge of Christians. Human birth and death were required to be reported to 
Buddhist temples and to verify death Buddhist monks were present at burials and 
funerals. There were throughout the Edo period (1603-1867) conflicts between 
intellectuals of both political Buddhism and political Confucianism. The latter 
criticised the crematory practice adopted by Buddhists. The assumption that 
cremation was a cruel practice opposed to humanity was widespread amongst 
the Shogunate and daimy6s. Yet the diffusion of interment at the level of 
commoners was not only due to the influence of Confucianism, but also to the 
connection with indigenous religious beliefs that had existed before the import of 
Confucianism. The extreme political conflict between Buddhism and Shintoism I 
Confucianism led the latter to haibutsu kishaku or the radical political anti-
Buddhist movement for abandoning and abusing Buddhism. As for this 
movement against Buddhism, Tsuji (1960), a leading Japanese historian, 
precisely points out that Shintoists, who had been subordinate to Buddhists, 
incorporated in the Bakuhan taisei, a single governing system in the Edo Era, 
and intended, on their own position, to claim to widely practice Shintoist rites of 
funerals and thus emancipate themselves from the subordinated relation to 
Buddhism and Buddhist temples. 
The fourth epoch was characterised by the Meiji Restoration, a Japanese 
revolution to topple the Tokugawa Shogunate, restore imperial rule and transform 
the country from a federal to a modern nation. The new government grounded 
its fundamental policy on the restoration of the imperial regime and the unity of 
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religion, i.e., Shintoism, and politics. It espoused the "restored" Shintoism based 
upon a position and justification stemming from anti-Buddhist and nativist 
(kokugaku) perspectives, with the intention of the nationalisation of Shintoism. 
When observing the policy for nationalising Shintoism, we will pay heed to 
the following three points. The first point is to understand how the rites of funeral 
were promoted by Shintoism. The Shintoism which the new government 
identified the "restored" Shntoism with, was distinct from the ancient Shintoism 
(Murakami 1982). 
Murakami (ibid.) argues that the history of Shintoism formed and 
developed its own tenets through unification with imported religions. This 
suggests that the "restored" Shintoism of the Meiji Restoration is a peculiarly 
nativist one and, furthermore that its absolutism of the restored Shintoism and its 
exclusion ism are clearly far from the orthodox Shintoism. 
In this sense, the restored Shintonism of the Meiji Restoration had distinct 
political characteristics. Old Japan as a Ritsury6 nation exhibited a dislike of the 
impurity of the dead and formed the political system of saisei itchi, the unity of 
worship and rule, by excluding the impurity. In the Heian period, as mentioned 
above, nobles expressed extreme hatred of the impurity of the dead. If the Meiji 
Restoration Government had aimed at ruling the nation by the revised orthodox 
of Shintoism, this idea of hatred of the impurity would have been trivialized. Yet 
the government really evinced an opposite attitude toward the dead. For 
example they built the Higashiyama-sh6kon-sha in Kyoto, a shrine for the spirits 
of the dead, to officially worship many of the pro-Meiji Revolutionaries, the so-
called Kinn6-no-shishi, who were killed in Kyoto by the Bakufu. It is apparent that 
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this shrine was politically and ideologically built as one of the symbolic objects of 
national worship. 
The second point bearing on the argument of this thesis was a ban on 
cremation promulgated by the dajokan or Council of State on 18 July 1873. This 
measure, hastily taken was basically for the purpose of settling a problem of 
public health, that is, the smoke and smell created by the cremation process 
(Yamamoto 1982). However, the tendentious motive for this measure was that 
cremation itself was deeply related to Buddhism and from this viewpoint 
crematory practice is antithetical to Confucianism. The ban on cremation gave 
birth to much confusion in the centre of cities. There were not enough burial 
grounds in small scale Buddhist temples in the capital city Edo to bury dead 
bodies. Moreover, other temples that had been accepting interment failed to 
continue to do so due to their limited capacity. In submitting a paper called kaso-
ben-eki-ron detailing justification for their position, crematory temples and 
crematoriums argued that they were seriously worried about these problems 
concerning the capacity required of them due to the ban on cremation. Two 
years after the promulgation, the ban was abolished on 23 May 1875. The 
reasons were not only that the abolition of the ban could be justified by the 
inconvenience of interment, the economy of cremation, and the scarcity of 
ground for burying dead bodies, but also that it became apparent that 
interference with conventional customs as cremation and interment, i.e., things 
that cannot be rationally understood or resolved, is difficult, at least politically. 
The third point is that the Meiji government incorporated the idea of 
worshiping the ancestors into its national ideology. In order to resolve problems 
caused by the abolition of the ban on cremation, the government promulgated 
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kasoba-toriatsukai-kokoroe (Otsu 80 of the Ministry of Home Affairs), general 
directions for dealing with crematoria. 
After the political failure of the cremation ban, the administration of the 
Meiji Government for graves and burial rapidly reduced the religious 
characteristics. This was not only because the government failed to nationalise 
Shintoism as a Japanese religion, but also because it acknowledged that 
customs strongly reflected by commoners' perception, such as fu'neral rites, 
should not be interfered with by the state. Instead of nationalising Shintoism the 
government successfully incorporated the administration of graves and burial 
under the policy of forming a national ideology which strengthens bonds between 
the nation and its people. The establishment of national Shintoism as one of the 
national ideologies, which succeeded in establishing worship for ancestors, 
suggested that such worship was placed as a moral ground shared by the whole 
populace and thus that it enabled the Ie ideology to deeply link to the national 
ideology. At the legal level the Meiji civil law supported this national ideology and 
it regarded graves and burial grounds as an asset of worship which should be 
inherited in the same way as a house and estate. That is to say, graves and 
burial grounds were strengthened as a symbol for worship of family ancestors. In 
other words, what happened in the fourth epoch was neither an historical 
necessity nor a universal idea, but a form of the ideology inculcated and 
reformed by the nation. 
The fifth and last epoch occurred at the end of World War Two. Since the 
restoration in 1868 the Ie system based on worship of the ancestors had been 
functioning as an effective ideology for controlling the nation within the national 
policy under militarism and totalitarianism. This ideology could never be 
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accepted by Western values which espoused a rational civil family based on 
democracy and egalitarianism. On 15 August 1945, the end of World War Two, 
Japan initiated radical changes at such diverse levels as social, political and 
legal. For understanding the "role" and involvement in society of the deceased 
during the post-war period, we need to recognise three significant changes. 
First, a systematic change. Although a change in the first three books of 
the old Civil Code, namely General Provisions, Real Property, and Obligations 
was implemented during the American Occupation, fundamental changes were 
required, in the field of family and inheritance law covered in the fourth and fifth 
books, to have constitutional principles such as dignity of the individual, equality 
of sexes, free choice of marriage partner, and freedom of movement 
implemented (Oppler 1976). This revision illustrated the replacement of the Ie 
system by the "conjugal" Western family centred around father and mother with 
their unmarried young children (ibid.) The power of head of the house 
disappeared with the abolition of the Ie system regulated by the Meiji Civil Code 
(ibid.). However, the existing Civil Code which prescribes on Article 897 over 
succession of genealogical records, etc., has some sentimental remembrance of 
ancestor worship: "Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Articles, the 
ownership of genealogical records, of utensils of religious rites and of tombs and 
burial grounds is succeeded to the person who is, according to custom, to hold 
as president the worship to the memory of the ancestors". Insofar as we look at 
this provision and the remembrance of ancestor worship, we cannot recognise 
the complete abolition of the Ie system even at the level of law. 
The Meiji Civil Code provided the essence of succession of worship of the 
ancestors as a privilege of succession to the head of the house. In this aspect, it 
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seems that the present Civil Code abolished the privilege to the succession to the 
head of the house. We also appreciate despite Article 897 their democratic 
concept by which they reduced the concept of the Ie and aimed at democracy. 
For example, if we examine how the provision is generally understood as a norm 
of court decisions or alternatively what the provision is directed toward, the 
purpose of removing provisions on the Ie from the present Civil Code becomes 
realised. Yet Article 897 still remains to some extent unchanged when it comes 
to exercising the practical norms of court decisions and the interpretation of legal 
provisions. 
At the administrative level, the concept of Ie still survives within the 
framework of "worship for the ancestors and Ie". Mori (1993) points out that 
regulatory provisions on the succession of "the Tokyo metropolitan cemetery 
park, burial grounds and their users" interpret "custom" as succession to the 
headship of the house, insofar as the succession to the right to using the park 
and grounds is concerned. In terms of the succession entitlement order, the 
provisions prioritise relatives by blood rather than those by marriage, lineal ones 
rather than collateral ones, ascendants rather than descendants, and males 
rather than females (ibid., 218). The effectiveness of the regulation at the 
administrative level would suggest that there still exists a gap between a norm of 
court decisions and administrative norm o(practice in some cases. 
Second, the change in the family structure, particularly the family model in 
Japan. During the high-growth post-war period, it was the lineal family that 
characterised the involvement of the pre-war Ie system, but a civil family that 
characterised democracy and modernity. In other words, the family during the 
post-war period was a nuclear family composed of husband and wife and their 
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unmarried children. It is, however, doubtful whether the family model completely 
erases the characteristics of the Ie system, because, whereas the Japanese 
post-war family modelled that of the Western families, there is a difference 
between them in terms of context. The Western family model refers to a family 
where couples marry on the grounds of the individual's autonomy, are 
independent from the family which raised them, and form another new biological 
family. Namely, the model is not only composed of a couple and their unmarried 
children but also has a form of independent residence rather than the traditional 
extended family model. Whilst similarly the Western model is separate from the 
family framework of blood, the Japanese nuclear family model nevertheless 
cannot separate itself from the lineal relations of blood and the idea of worship of 
the ancestors. We can understand from a typical model of graves that the 
Japanese family model is not emancipated from the Ie idea but maintains the 
idea of these worships. A husband as the head of a nuclear family that live 
particularly in cities tends to establish a new family tomb and burial ground in the 
newly developed suburbs and desires to be buried there even with his children 
after thei,r own death. The husband purchases a tomb and its ground before his 
death and wishes his children to succeed to the tomb and ground. The tomb he 
purchased is inscribed with his family name and with the word no-haka (Tomb 
for). Recently such tombs have steadily increased in number. This trend would 
suggest that the continuity of the family is maintained and subdivided within the 
. framework of the Ie system. Although it is a distinct mode in the katoku system, 
a pre-war one, it is not yet emancipated from the idea of the continuity of Ie. 
Thus it can be said that, although its structure is changed, the Japanese family 
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still embodies part of the old house system where the provision of worship for the 
ancestors is in effect. 
Third is the change in Japanese ideas and consciousness of life and 
death. Western ideas such as liberty, individualism, equality, rationality, etc., all 
of which have been substantially imported since the end of World War Two, have 
dramatically influenced the traditional Japanese ideas and values of life and 
death. The change of attitudes toward death, for example, relates to complex 
issues on the donation of one's body after death, organ transplantation, 
judgement of brain death, the scattering of ashes, etc. Therefore it is important 
for an understanding of the post-war position on presence of the dead to view 
how the general Japanese consciousness of death based upon the conventional 
custom is moving towards the Western-model ideas and values. Reviewing 
briefly Japanese history by using key terms such as graves, funerals, dead 
persons and religion, we find throughout the distinguished presence of the dead 
who have been closely involved with the living in ordinary life and sometimes the 
presence of the dead as a national ideology. Especially in times of war, for 
example, deceased military persons who contributed to war battles were praised 
publicly as national heroes and functioned as a sort of strong social norm 
determining peoples' actions and thoughts. Thus, through Japanese history, it 
can be argued that Japanese dead persons have been related to religion and 
obtain a sort of social status as a social norm. The idea of the defamation of the 
dead that can be traced back to the Criminal Code of 1881 can be reduced to the 
dead regarded as a norm of ancestor worship or as a national symbol of religious 
and political ideology, as described in the third epoch. 
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1.2.5 Japanese legalization of defamation of the dead 
There were the following two prescriptions set up in the Japanese Criminal Code 
of 1881: "Article 359: A person who defames a dead person shall not be 
punished in the consideration of the previous two articles unless the defamation 
is based on a falsehood" (my translation); "Article 361: The crimes of this section 
may not be prosecuted until the complaint is filed by a victim24 or a relative of the 
deceased person" (my translation). 
The former Criminal Code, based upon the draft by Gustave Boissonade, 
a French legal advisor, was in general influenced by the French Criminal 
Code. However, so far as defamation of the dead is concerned, the proscription 
was an indigenous one different to the French version. It is because Article 400 
of G. Boissonade's draft prescribed "Although defamation of the dead shall be 
punished under Article 398, it shall be punished only if those who defamed had 
an intention to defame the bereaved of the deceased and it represented a 
falsehood to do so" (my translation). Although the draft mentioned in direct acts 
of defamation and falsehood against the bereaved of the deceased, the former 
Criminal Code highlighted defamation of the dead. There we would say that in 
the times when the Criminal Code was drafted and made up, the notion of 
defamation of the dead was accepted amongst the people of these times, 
because these times, as mentioned above, were understood to be when Japan 
set up its new government and the national Shinto placed worship for ancestors 
on the basis of its tenet. After revision, the present Criminal Code came into force 
in 1908. It prescribes defamation of the dead in paragraph II of Article 230. We 
can see little difference in contents between the present Criminal Code and the 
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previous one except in the change of the expressions used for defaming. The 
present Code was heavily influenced by the German one, except for the provision 
on defamation of the dead, because Article 189 of the German Code does not 
punish an act of defaming the memory of the dead. 
In the same way, the previous Japanese Criminal Code was substantially 
influenced by the French excepting the provision on defamation of the dead. The 
previous Civil Code in 1896 prescribed katoku sozoku (the succession to the 
house) as an asset of tombs and grave grounds in order to strongly symbolise 
worship for the ancestors of the Ie. We can easily imagine that the ideology of 
the worship was rooted in the society of 1907 when the transfer was made from 
the previous to the present Criminal Code. Thus as far as Japan is concerned it 
is possible to justify the rights of character of the dead at the historical, legal and 
sociological levels (the relation between the character right of the dead and the 
worship of the ancestors will be explicated further in Chapter 2.). 
1.3 Advocates and opponents 
1.3.1 Western discourse 
Whilst Japan and Germany can justify grounds for rights of the dead, Britain and 
the United States have no such grounds. However, the rights have been 
discussed on the fringe of philosophical debate. Very few lawyers can be 
identified in English and American legal praxis and discourse who pay attention 
to the concept of rights of the dead. In comparison with the volume and numbers 
of literature on rights of the living, essays concerned with rights of the dead are 
24 "Victim" is a direct translation of giseisha. Here giseisha refers to a dead person 
defamed. However, because the dead have no legal capacity to sue someone, the term 
"victim" used in this context is not logical. 
few. However, applying rights principles to nonhuman entities has been for over 
two decades attempted as a challenge against the prevailing orthodox moral 
theories of rights. The orthodoxy of morals assumes that humans are the 
measure of all value, but the orthodoxy in question is of meta-ethics. Christopher 
Stone points out that the ethicist's task is widely presumed "to put forward and 
defend a single overarching principle (or coherent body of principles), such as 
utilitarianism's "greatest good for the greatest number" or Kant's categorical 
imperative, and to demonstrate how it (the one correct viewpoint) guides us 
through all moral dilemmas to the one right solution" (1988, 143). This attitude, 
which Stone calls moral monism, takes the application of the orthodox moral 
principles for granted. The orthodox ethics tend to identify all ethics with "a 
relatively narrow and uncontroversial band of morally salient qualities" (ibid., 144) 
and properties of humanity. 
However the position based on the conventional predominant ethics 
cannot provide any independent moral significance or standing. Stone contends 
that "monism's ambitions, to unify all ethics with a single frame work capable of 
yielding the one right answer to all our quandaries, are simply quixotic" (ibid., 
145). 
In contrast, the alternative conception, which Stone calls moral pluralism, 
refuses to reduce ethical activities to one principle. In order to extend and apply 
the concept of rights to nonhuman existence, it would be necessary to find and 
justify other attributes with human and nonhuman shares. In fact, modern laws 
show negative attitudes toward the "moral extensionism", the strategy of which is 
to apply a right to non human entity, based on moral pluralism arguments. The 
reason, it can be presumed for this situation is that, in democratic societies, when 
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we reflect on human rights, these rights are, in principle, in relation to those 
human beings alive at that time in contraposition to those who are dead.25 Still 
moral monism has its seat in the mainstream of moral philosophy. Most 
democratic states, such as Japan and Britain, reject introducing the concept of 
rights of the dead into their present legal system,26 not least because it might be 
presumed that the introduction would result in social political confusion over the 
ideology of fundamental human rights.27 Moreover, when non-agents, such as 
land and animals, suffer damages, vicarious legal protection 28 is available in 
substantial law, a good example of which is The Animal Scientific Procedure Act 
1986. One obstacle that the moral argument on nonhuman entities faces is, for 
example, to inject non-homocentric considerations into moral reasoning (Stone 
25 Although we can identify juridical entities that are not human beings yet do have 
guaranteed legal rights, these entities have rights because they can be justified by an 
assumption that the artificial entities are composed of real human beings. The definitions of 
a right, the spectrum of which is broad and illuminating in its different implications and 
ideological positions, can be lucidly explained by the following four approaches by M. 
Freeden (1991,6; footnotes omitted): 
(1) that sees rights as ""normative attributes" that belong to persons-the term philosophers 
use for self-conscious human beings, conceiving of themselves as initiators of purposive 
action"; (2) that regards rights as entitlement to choose; (3) that regards rights "positively as 
entitlements to do, have, enjoy or have done"; and (4) that contends that rights "always and 
necessarily concern human goods, that is, concern what it is, at least in normal 
circumstances, good for a person to have." What the four approaches share is an agency, as 
a subject of rights, whose rights are "possessed, enjoyed, exercised" (Feinberg 1980, 239) 
and "claimed, demanded, asserted" (White 1984, 17). On the other hand, using the supreme 
principle of morality, i.e., the "Principle of Generic Consistency· (PGC), A. Gewirth (1978) 
dialectically establishes both a right to freedom and a right to well-being. Gewirth found in 
the PGC the conditions "without which rational autonomy is impossible and without which 
human agency cannot be realized" (Freeden 1991, 45). A conclusion Gewirth logically 
deduced from the PGC is that since rational agencies have an entitlement to the freedom to 
pursue their good, all human beings have an entitlement to do the same thing for themselves 
(Gewirth 1982; Beyleveld and Brownsword 1994). Rational ability by which logical 
inconsistency is avoided, and humans who have abilities for choosing purposes and 
measures and control their own action, are assumed. Gewirth's argument regarding a right 
has at its onset a pre:.theoretical concept of agency and succeeded in providing what can be 
called the essence of transcendental agency (ibid.). 
26 For details on the legal movement of extensionism in Japan and the United States, 
see 1.2.2). 
27 Especially, since the concept of a right in a narrow sense assumed an individual as 
a subject of intention who was emancipated from the ancient regime and an autonomous 
individual who can determine by themselves and can endure what they determined seems to 
have formed a prevailing framework of human rights. 
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1988, 140). Even if nonhuman entities have value, it is only humans who do the 
valuing but not trees or mountains. We also have to resolve a problem on 
whether or not justification for the moral argument can possibly rest on rational 
foundations. Supporters for the taking into consideration of an inanimate object 
are required to provide "some comparable basis, some "intrinsic worth" of 
something that cannot be killed, frustrated, or pained" (ibid., 141). Moreover, 
obstacles on obligations have to be resolved. Even if moral obligations to a 
nonhuman entity are conceded to exist in principle, how can they be discharged? 
Thus these difficult problems are directed at the dead, a theme of this 
dissertation. 
But, is conjecture of political or legal confusion raised by moral debate of 
extensionism axiomatic? Put another way, if there were a legal device on the 
basis of which the living do, or are necessitated to do, something for the sake of 
non-agents, then would the assumption that they, the non-agents, do not hold 
rights be self-evident? This line of reasoning suggests a way to circumvent 
potential confusion and has attracted the attention of some lawyers in an 
examination of the idea of fringe rights. 
1.3.2 Advocates of rights of the dead 
Using the expression rights of the dead, Lomasky (1987, 212) addressed the 
justification of such rights. Lomasky identified and discussed these rights as 
ones of fringe rights on the same level as rights of a fetus, defective [Lomasky's 
term] human beings and animals.29 However, his discussion does not seem to 
28 Although the availability is just a presumed need for rights of the dead. 
29 In this thesis, we oppose a right of animals. We never attempt to explain rights of 
the dead by taking advantage of the grounds for animal rights, in which, because animals 
partly share their attributes with human beings' (e.g., high intelligence), it is argued that rights 
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be successful. The dead are a psychological, physical reality which people 
personally and publicly wish to deny (Aries 1981; Becker 1973). But they are 
also a sociological and legal fact very relevant to us from the perspectives of 
rites, inheritance and throughout the course of our lives (Finch and Wallis 1993). 
Lomasky is one of the pioneers who, in conflating the two terms "the dead" with 
its various shades of meanings and connotations at the various levels together 
with "rights", establishes and starts to explain a new concept in relation to rights. 
However, in substance his work, rather than resolving confusions and clarifying 
concepts, merely serves to map out some possible pathways into a deeper 
discussion of rights of the dead. 
The main reason why Lomasky (1987) left the question unresolved is 
probably due to the conceptually difficult fact that the dead have, by definition, no 
life. When we review perspectives based on natural rights,3D we recognise that 
they offered the prospect of a law of action which could be applied to any live 
beings, including humans, in the natural world. Moreover, it required a cognitive 
presupposition that the greatest value is life as opposed to death (Strauss 1953). 
Lomasky did not make a breakthrough in resolving this strict dichotomy between 
the living and the dead. In particular the following proved something of a 
conceptual obstacle: 
"It is nonsensical to suppose that corpses are the sort of thing that can have 
interests or rights. To attribute rights to one who has died must be to attribute 
them to the antemortem person he once was. " ... person he once was"; the 
phrase expresses the crux of the difficulty. One who was once a person is no 
should be also vested in animals. Although we take the remark into account, we will not 
pursue this line in this thesis. If, as we intend to do, we can demonstrate interests or rights 
can be attributed to a deceased, then by explaining that the attributes of a living person can 
survive his/her death, we shall therefore present an argument for the interests and rights. 
What makes the attributes continue after death are the social characteristics of a person 
which can survive death (see Chapter 4). 
30 For example, Hobbes's concept of rights was in fact based on further assumptions 
about human attributes and the quintessence of human relationships (Freeden 1991, 14). 
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longer a person and thus is not a potential repository of current harms and 
benefits. Indeed, one who was once a person is no longer anything at all; he 
has simply ceased to be. Left behind are his "remains," but the decaying body 
is not identical to the antemortem person whose body it was. If there is no 
subject who has rights, then there simp~ can be no rights" (Lomasky 1987, 
218; footnotes omitted) [original italics]. 1 
Reasoning "[w]hat I wish to maintain is that there "is" a subject of rights, though 
the one whose rights they are "is" no more. The seeming inconsistency is due to 
the grammatical usage in which the present tense is employed to refer timelessly 
to an entity" (ibid.), Lomasky attempts to resolve this obstacle by trying to deal 
with the issue of tense. But this strategy seems nevertheless to leave the 
dilemma posed by the obstacle unresolved. 
The assertion that "[t]o attribute rights to one who has died must be to 
attribute them to the antemortem person he once was" can be rephrased by 
"although rights cannot be attributed to one who has died, they can be attributed 
to the antemortem person he once was", Namely, it is that, although the subject 
of rights does not exist at the present time, the subject existed in the past and 
therefore rights are now in the situation where they are attributed to the subject 
who existed in the past. According to Lomasky's explanation, rights that are 
attributed to "the antemortem person he once was" exist at the present time, 
whilst rights that are attributed to the posthumous person who is dead also exist 
at the present time. If this is correct, then in terms of the tense, rights of the 
dead does not refer to the dead person's rights but to the antemortem person's 
rights. If, when Lomasky uses the term "the living's rights", it means the rights 
that are attributed to the living, then he would fail to justify rights of the dead, i.e., 
rights that are attributed to the dead at the present time. Thus he demonstrates 
31 We will argue that the non-existence of a subject of a right does not necessarily 
mean non-existence of a right. See the discussion on defamation of the dead in Chapter 2. 
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at best his own desires and closes his discussion. They would be a sort of 
declaration of frustration at the level of moral debate: 
"Reference to the dead is a semantic mine field that always threatens to 
explode the unwary, and it is doubtlessly the case that there remain potentially 
damaging devices that this section has not defused. Whatever the logical 
pitfalls that remain, it seems unlikely that any are unavoidable. We can, then, 
with some confidence, continue to attribute to the dead interests, harms, and 
. rights" (ibid., 221). 
Although Joel Feinberg (1974; 1977) did not use the term rights of the dead, he 
argued, carefully and persuasively, a puzzling hypothesis that "a person is still 
harmed or his/her interest invaded after his/her death". Some pros and cons on 
the notion of harms to the dead and interests in dead were provided.32 Those 
who considered the notion as paradoxical and wrong pointed out the dead 
person's lack of attributes as subjects for harming themselves.33 For example, J. 
C. Callahan claims "[w]hat I want to suggest is that the reason that all argument 
for harm and wrong to the dead must fail is that there simply is no subject to 
suffer the harm or wrong" (1987,347). 
1.3.3 Opponents of rights of the dead 
Like Lomasky, H. Steiner actually used the expression rights of the dead in An 
essay on rights (1994). Steiner completely rejects the notion of these rights: 
32 The pros and cons are reviewed in 2.2. 
33 Joel Feinberg recognised the difficulty in ascribing rights and interests to the dead, 
and expresses this thus: 
"[t]he case against ascribing rights to dead men can be made very simple: a dead 
man is a mere corpse, a piece of decaying organic matter. Mere inanimate things 
can have no interests, and what is incapable of having interests is incapable of 
having rights. If, nevertheless, we grant dead men rights against us, we should seem 
to be treating the interests they had while alive as somehow surviving their deaths. 
There is the sound of paradox in this way of talking, but it may be the least 
paradoxical way of describing our moral relations to our predecessors. And if the 
idea of an interest's surviving its possessor's death is a kind of fiction, it is a fiction 
that most living men have a real interest in preserving" (Feinberg 1974, 57). 
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"I want to argue that these views are mistaken. For, although we undoubtedly 
do have serious moral duties with regard to dead and future persons, these are 
not correlative ones. Dead and future persons have no rights" (ibid., 250). 
Similarly, Thomas Paine, whose political remarks are quoted by Steiner, also 
rejects outright the concept of any such rights: 
"When man [sic] ceases to be, his power and his wants cease with him; and 
having no longer any participation in the concerns of this world, he has no 
longer any authority in directing who shall be its governors, or how its 
government shall be organised, or how administered" (ibid.). 
To justify the assertion that, despite a subject of rights not being at the present 
time, the rights per se exist, J. W. Salmond (Williams 1957) counts on the 
concept of necessity based on a legal fiction. Being a corpse means not being a 
subject that can be harmed. However, lawyers fully accept that rights, duties and 
powers associated with testamentary succession are valid after the extinction of 
the subject. J. W. Salmond explains: 
"[t]he rights which a dead man thus leaves behind him vest in his 
representative. They pass to some person whom the dead man, or the law on 
his behalf, has appointed to represent him in the world of the living. This 
representative bears the person of the deceased ... lnheritance is in some sort a 
legal and fictitious continuation of the personality of the dead man, for the 
representative is in some sort identified by the law with him whom he 
represents ... To this extent, and in this fashion, it may be said that the legal 
personality of a man survives his natural personality ... Although a dead man has 
no rights, a man while yet alive has the right, or speaking more exactly, the 
power, to determine the disposition after his dead of the property which he 
leaves behind him ... This power of the dead hand (mortua manus) is so familiar 
a feature in the law that we accept it as a matter of course, and have some 
difficulty in realising what a singular phenomenon it in reality is" (Quoted in 
Williams 1957,482-4). 
As Callahan, Steiner and Paine criticise and Lomasky accepts the criticism, the 
refutation "there is no right where there is no subject" is the toughest obstacle for 
claimants of posthumous harms to overcome. 
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1.3.4 Japanese controversy: possession of the dead 
The term rights of the dead has been traditionally customary in Japanese legal 
discourse in substantial law and case law, because there have been long-term 
discussions on "defamation of the dead" (see 2.7.3 and 2.7.4) and "the dead's 
possession".34 
The debate on "possession of the dead" cannot be, in a sense, 
understood if we do not take into account Japanese attitudes toward death and 
the dead persons, attitudes which have persisted through the ages. As we 
conceive from the term, the debate is very relevant to whether a living person can 
possess his/her property even after his/her death. The law which covers 
"possession of the dead" is largely found in two articles of the Japanese Criminal 
Code: 
Article 235 [Theft] 
"A person who steals the property of another shall be guilty of the crime of theft 
and be punished with penal servitude for not more than ten years". 
Article 254 [Embezzlement of lost articles, etc.] 
"A person who wrongfully appropriates a lost article, driftage, or other property 
of which another person no longer has possession shall be punished with penal 
servitude for not more than one year or a fine of not more that one hundred 
thousand yen or a minor fine". 
Issues concerning "possession of the dead" arise where after a person causes 
another person to die, the former deliberately attempts to obtain any property that 
the latter physically possessed at the time of death and actually succeeds in 
34 The discussion on whether, at same time as when a subject of a right is 
extinguished from the dead, the right of its possession is extinguished is quite relevant to the 
following court decisions: Judgement of the Supreme Tribunal, 16 April 1906 (Keiroku 12, 
472); Judgement of the Supreme Tribunal, 21 October 1913 (Keiroku 19,982); Judgement of 
the Supreme Tribunal, 28 March 1923 (Horitsushinbun 2247, 22); Judgement of the 
Supreme Tribunal, 11 November 1941 (KeishO 20, 598); Judgement of the Tokyo District 
Court, 3 December 1962 (Hanrei-jiho 323, 33); Judgement of the Tokyo High Court, 8 June 
1964 (KokeishO 17-5, 446); Judgement of the Supreme Court, 8 April 1966 (KeishO 20-4, 
207); Judgement of the Fukuoka High Court, 26 February 1975 (keigetsu 7-2, 84); 
Judgement of the Tokyo High Court, 13 September 1978 (Hanrei-jiho 916,104); Judgement 
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obtaining it. The question is which crime should be applicable to this act, the 
"crime of theft" (Art. 235) or the "crime of embezzlement of lost articles, etc." (Art. 
254). Apart from "robbery theory", which argues that such an offence amounts to 
robbery because the property was obtained by taking advantage of a situation in 
which the victim obviously could not defend him/herself, the decisive difference 
between the crimes of "theft" and "embezzlement" lies in whether or not the 
deceased should be considered to be in possession of the property at the time 
the property was taken. 
The outline of this debate in Japan is as follows. 
The concept "possession" in the Criminal Code is identified with the 
incorporation of two requirements: the will of possession and the fact of 
possession. The concept refers to the exclusive factual control over property, 
based upon the subjectivity of the former and the objectivity of the latter. It 
follows therefore, that if we highlight the dominance and the exclusion, then we 
have to accept the "embezzlement theory". This perspective interprets the case 
thus: as the original agent of possession is no longer alive-the subject of both 
"dominance" and "exclusion" simultaneously disappears-s/he can no longer be 
considered to be in possession of the property (Machino 1979, 190). As a result 
the property comes to be regarded as an article without a possessor-Le., 
without a legal owner. The death of the agent of possession therefore renders it 
impossible to consider this a matter of straightforward theft. 
By contrast, the idea of theft would be justified by the protection of the 
original possessory right. This perspective can be divided into three sub-
theories: (1) that the possessory rights of the dead per se can be protected (Ono 
of the Tokyo High Court, 18 January 1982 (keigetsu 14-1/2, 1); and Judgement of the Nigata 
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1970); (2) that possessory rights of the dead can be protected for a certain 
limited time and include only a limited amount of property rights (Dando 1990); 
and (3) that whether a case is one of embezzlement depends on the 
circumstances (Koke 1963). In theory (1) it is argued that after death the 
possessory right of the victim continues. That is to say in terms of possession 
the situation is the same as it was before the victim died. On the other hand, 
theory (2) contends that the dead hold possession only because of the relations 
amongst the dead, time and space. Finally, for those that are less certain that 
the dead do hold rights, theory (3) argues, that by using a form of "common-
sense" social awareness, we should judge on a case by case basis whether or 
not a particular situation should be regarded as being one where the original 
possessory right should be considered superior. However, when we review the 
three theories from the viewpoint of "embezzlement theory", the review suggests 
that embezzlement occurs irrespective of the length of time after the death of the 
original owner by virtue of the fact that another person illegally removed from the 
deceased the property that the deceased had formerly possessed; in so far as 
there is no evidence that the property involved was possessed by another living 
person, these actions establish the crime of embezzlement. In other words, this 
theory contends that in so far as the subject of possession (Le., the deceased) 
has passed away, then the possessory right to the property has also 
disappeared. However we argue this argument is far too strict and fails to 
comprehend the full meaning of the situation. 
Also this view rests on the understanding that, whilst a natural person and 
juridical objects can be agents of possession, the dead cannot. Therefore, if we 
District Court, 2 July 1985 (Keigetsu 17-7/8, 663). 
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emphasise this concept of who can and cannot be an agent of possession, it 
follows that, because the property of the dead cannot be truly said to be the 
property of any particular individual, it cannot therefore be an object of the crime 
of theft. However, applying this theory of embezzlement to the problem of the 
rights of the dead would be to jump to conclusions. The issue considered in 
Article 254 is the property that is "ishitsu-butsu", "hyoryO-butsu" and "sonata 
senyO wo hanaretaru mono". "Ishitsu-butsu" refers to lost articles, "hyoryO-butsu" 
. 
to driftage, and "sonata senyO wo hanaretaru mono" to "articles which are 
wrongly possessed" in Article 12 of the Lost Articles Law. Thus Article 254 is 
concerned with situations where an article is too distant from its possessor to be 
considered to be possessed by others, or where it is next to impossible to return 
it to the owner of the property. Hence, where mail is wrongly delivered by a 
postman, this can be considered an example of "sonata senyO wo hanaretaru 
mono", in that the property concerned cannot be returned immediately to the real 
owner of the mail.35 With this in mind, let us review the case where a person who 
caused another person to die with the intention of obtaining the dead person's 
property, and having committed the crime actually obtains it. Here we can 
recognise, by observing the situation, that the property concerned belonged 
originally to the deceased. Also the person who caused the victim's death can 
recognise that the property belonged to the victim. Therefore, the argument that 
regards the property as being too distant from possession cannot be valid here in 
the sense that it cannot satisfy the physical difference of time and distance. In 
other words for Article 254 to be of any use we would have to regard this property 
as property which is too distant from immediate possession to be considered to 
3S See Judgement of the Supreme Tribunal, 15 October 1917 (Keiroku 23, 11). 
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be physically possessed by the deceased. Here we encounter difficulties in filling 
in the physical gaps, such as distance and time, between the "senyO wo 
hanaretaru mono" and the "seeming" possession of the dead. 
This is to say, that employing Article 254 alone, a rigorous interpretation of 
the law may lead to the conclusion that we should consider this case as one of "a 
crime of embezzlement of lost articles". However, it is suggested here that we 
should take into consideration the cause which leads to the possession of an 
article becoming distant from ownership. Evidently, the event that resulted in the 
removal of the dead's possession from him/her, was that another person caused 
the victim to die. Hence the argument put forward by the judgement that "the 
accused's acts allowed him to obtain the said article by taking advantage of his 
own act so as to remove the possession of the article from the victim, should be 
as a whole treated as the act that infringed the possession of the other person".36 
By way of example: suppose that A died with a watch on his wrist. After B, 
who had killed A, had run away, he became aware that A possessed a watch. As 
a result, he returned to the place where the dead body lay, and took the watch. 
Using a strict interpretation of property ownership, we would be obliged to 
conclude that the person who holds the watch is A's rightful successor. If this is 
the case, therefore, this kind of embezzlement may be treated in the same way 
as if the article that A's successor recovered was lost or misplaced. However, let 
us note how this watch is understood by B. What there exists in front of B is A's 
dead body and the watch is physically attached to A's body.37 Believing that the 
watch must be A's watCh, B takes it. This case is not a case in which the watch 
36 Judgement of the Supreme Court, 8 April 1966 (KeishO 20-4, 207). 
37 A case that causes a problem on possession is one where others infringe the 
possession of a subject who is presumed to hold a possessory right. In this case the dead 
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is distant from the body, say five hundred metres away. The difference is that in 
the latter case, B cannot necessarily recognise that the watch belongs to A, 
whilst in the former case B can and must recognise A as the rightful owner. In 
order to resolve this "conundrum" we have to espouse a view in which the pre-
mortal possession of the dead can be protected under the condition of a certain 
time and distance. 
Another point that we must note from the previous section can be 
illustrated by a further example.38 Professor Ohya (1990, 193) argues that "if in 
the example the accused returned and obtained the property after a full nine 
hours had passed from the time that he had killed the victim, we have to also 
argue that the possessory right of the deceased must continue for some period of 
time after death". If this is the case then the continuity of pre-mortem possession 
cannot be accepted, i.e. this is the case for the "crime of embezzlement". This 
argument is dubious. One could say that the judgement could treat the dead as a 
"fictitious" living entity in this case. The rationales for this kind of interpretation 
may be twofold: (1) the imbalance of punishment between Article 235 and Article 
254; and (2) the emphasis on the time and space relationships between the 
accused and the victim. 
Professor Ohya (ibid.), an advocate of the "embezzlement theory", argues 
that, since in "theft theory" whether an action is theft depends on the situation 
over time after the death and the nature of the act, this is not a proper standard 
for judging (see Ohnuma 1992). However, it could be legitimate to apply larceny 
to the case in which, even if one year has passed, the fact that the property is the 
possession of the dead person is self-evident. The application is useful for the 
physically cannot protect the right, but as will be mentioned in Chapter 4, the appearance of 
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resolution of cases in which a person other than the accused is concerned. Take 
for example a crime in which a third person takes the property of the victim. Here 
we cannot accept a consideration of the connection between the accused and 
the victim, (as argued by the judgement and the dominant theory) as the 
important factor. Instead we need to concentrate on the association between the 
victim and his/her property. It is, to reiterate an earlier point, precisely because 
for the third party it is self-evident that the property in this case prima facie 
belongs to the dead, that this event should be considered a crime. Yet this 
interpretation cannot meet with the stipulations laid down in Article 254. 
However, in Article 235 it is legitimate to treat the possession of the dead 
fictionally as that of the dead. 
Examining the concept of "possession of the dead" by the way of 
Japanese discourse, we would acknowledge that the discussion on it is rooted in 
Japanese attitudes towards death and corpses. It is peculiar that "theft theory" 
assumes that even after death a dead person continues to hold possession as a 
right and that the illegality of theft can be grounded by the assumption. Also it is 
lack of logic to argue that, although within the context of the whole situation the 
possession of the dead is possible after the homicide, if nine hours had passed 
from the time of the homicide, then the continuity of the possession is not 
acknowledged. It is because the boundary of life and death is so fine that the 
separation of being a dead person and being a living one becomes vague, and 
interchangeable from one moment to the next. 
Through the impression that Japanese legal discourse takes the debate 
on "possession of the dead" seriously, we would say that it may be a piece of 
the body tells as a strong impression that the body holds the possession. 
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evidence that the border line between the dead and the living is contemporarily 
vague even to Japanese. Mita (1992), a sociologist, provides us with the 
perspective that, whilst the culture of Christianity has an orientation toward the 
severe separation of the living and the dead, the Japanese traditional culture 
rejects such separation. It seems that such a Japanese sentiment is based on a 
human religion which does not know the world a transcendental god rules (ibid.). 
This Japanese religious belief can be placed in the "dialogue" between the dead 
and the living, the dialogue which is made by the regret, which the dead left in the 
living's world, and other regret, to which the living feel. This perspective is going 
to be related to an example pointed out by another scholar. 
Namihira (1990) points out that the Japanese have a way of thinking by 
which they identify themselves with the dead and possess a tendency to convert 
their feelings into the deceased person's words. She draws attention to a 
Japanese jetliner crash on the Osutaka-Yama mountain, Gunma Prefecture, in 
August 1985. By due process the bereaved identified the victims' bodies that 
were collected at the scene of the crash. The relative's attitudes of identifying 
the bodies drew attention. When we read a collection of the relative's memoirs 
(8.12 Renraku-kai, 1987), we find that there were many expressions that the 
bereaved voiced about the dead, for example: "Father must have felt frustrated 
very much!" or "When I think about the regret that the victims have". These 
expressions suggest that the bereaved reconfirm that the dead persons can feel, 
think and suppose despite not being alive. Namihira understands that the 
bereaved, in a sense, put themselves and the victims in the same category. In 
other words it may be understood that the attitude is linked to the way by which 
38 Judgement of the Tokyo District Court, 3 December 1962 (Hanrei-jiho 323, 33). 
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the bereaved reconfirm their identity of themselves which is a sort of reflection 
within others -that is, the dead. 
The way by which we understand the dead, in the relationship between 
the living and the dead, enables us to think that the dead can remain in the 
living's world in a similar existence to the living for a while after death, although 
that is a physically impossible understanding. This vagueness between the world 
of the living and that of the dead is a sort of myth and can be regarded as an 
approach to rights of the dead. As previously mentioned, the Western concepts 
of liberty, individualism, equality and rationality have had an influence. 
Nevertheless, the way of thinking that makes the Japanese create the boundary 
between being alive and being dead vague, at a certain level, is still found as a 
value which continues even in the 1990s. However, the Nihonjin-ron approach 
which accepts Japanese uniqueness of attitude towards death and corpses has 
not been adequately examined and holds diverse problems. We shall discuss 
the problems in the discussion related to rights of the dead (see 5.6). 
1.3.5 Defamation of the dead 
The controversy on defamation of the dead is, in Japan, one of significant legal 
ones regarding rights of the dead, but perhaps this easy embedding of the term 
rights of the dead in the discourse is based upon Japanese religious beliefs 
and/or traditional customs. However, this situation is not unique to Japan. As 
mentioned before, the history of defamation of the dead is very old, and can be 
traced back to Germanic times. In valuing ancestor worship (Ahnenkultus), 
ancient Germans considered defamation of the dead as punishable (Mori 1993, 
72). It was assumed that successors had a duty to protect their ancestor's 
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reputation and/or honour. Thus, recently in Germany a view has been expressed 
that regards the honour of the dead as an interest worthy of protection and which 
claims that defamation of the dead should be treated equally to that of the 
Iiving.39 Details on the German cases will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
Whilst the dead are not regarded as agents (Kimura 1948), there is in 
Japan a common view that regards the dead as "quasi-subjects"-Le., whereby 
although the dead are treated in a very different way to the living, it is recognised 
that as an entity they do have a value over and above. other non-human entities. 
Consequently we find a specific prescription regarding "defamation of the dead" 
in Article 230 of the Criminal Code (Ashitomi 1990). Also some judgements 
suggest that cases can be identified concerning the defamation of the dead 
where the concept is developed as a matter of general principle (Inoue and Etc 
1994). There are several competing views in relation to defamation of the dead 
in Japan. For example, what is the object or purpose of law regarding the 
defamation of the dead? This object or purpose might include: The honour of the 
bereaved or ttieir family; the feelings of devotion the bereaved hold toward their 
deceased; the public legal interest in the social reputation of the dead; and the 
honour of the dead per se (Japanese common theory) (Ashitomi 1990). 
The social reputation of the dead can remain in people's memory. But 
even if this reputation can be regarded as a legal interest worthy of protection, 
how is the subject of the interest (see 2.2) to be explained? There are several 
views (ibid.): (1) although the dead are not the subject of defamation, the law can 
work so as to accommodate this problem; (2) the honour of the dead can be 
regarded as an interest which lacks a subject; (3) the dead are subjects of legal 
39 See BGHZ, Bd., 15, S.249; BGHZ, Bd., 50, S. 133. 
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interests and we can regard them as legally fictitious persons; and (4) a view that 
explains the honour of the dead through relationship with rights of character. In 
the last view, which emphasises the relation of rights of character to the honour 
of the dead, the rights of character are considered to endure beyond death, and 
therefore can become rights without a live recipient of the right (Igarashi 1977, 
57-58). It should be noted however that the strength of this right holds only in 
criminal disputes, and not in civil cases. That this is so is due to the significance 
of the interest which requires protection and which overrides the otherwise 
essential need for a living recipient of the interest (Ashitomi 1990). In this thesis, 
we shall argue that a right of character can, as an example of rights of the dead, 
survive the right-holder's death and be regarded as a "right without subject". 
With regard to English law the common law rule was expressed by the 
maxim "actio personalis moritur cum persona" ("a personal action dies with the 
litigant"). That is, when either the plaintiff or the defendant died, the right of 
action was thereby extinguished. The Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act 1934 totally overhauled this rule. However, by this Act defam~tion is now the 
only tort to which the Act does not apply. Since there is no common case law 
available, it is presumed that cases i,n other common law nations can be applied. 
On the strength of the precedents established in these cases wherein a person 
defamed does not bring a file or die during the proceeding, the claim thereby 
becomes extinct and the succession of the claim is not admitted. 40 This 
precedent exists precisely because defamation claims are of a peculiarly 
personal nature, and it may be very difficult to achieve justice in the case where 
40 E.g., see an American case, James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 344 p. 2d 799 (1957). 
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one of the parties is unable to give evidence (Stanton 1994, 442). Defamation of 
the dead in England will be discussed in detail in the latter part of Chapter 2. 
1.3.6 Buddhists after death: kaimyo discrimination 
The history of outcasts in Japan, although poorly documented, indicates that a 
minority of the lowest social class existed, which had been severely discriminated 
against ever since medieval times and that they still remain, to some extent, 
discriminated against in contemporary Japan.41 They have been called diverse 
terms such as eta, yotsu, and burakumin, which are still in use today. After the 
Meiji government's reluctant policy for the emancipation of the burakumin, the 
National Levellers Association founded in 1922 (Zenkoku Suiheisha), gradually 
improved the burakumin's social status and situations by the steady endeavour 
of the buraku liberation movement, although events in World War Two 
suppressed the movements. A new constitution was, as a basis of Japan, 
established in 1947. Article 14 of the Constitution prescribes "All people are 
equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or 
social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin". 
Registration caused and passed by liberal movements of the re-instituted 
National Committee for Buraku Liberation has dramatically bettered mainly 
education and housing conditions for Burakumin. However, researching the 
41 The history of Burakumin up to the modern times is compacted in "A History of the 
Outcast: Untouchability in Japan" (Price 1966, 6-30). Regarding the political movement of 
the emancipation of the burakumin up to 1960s, see" Japan's Invisible Race: Caste in culture 
and personality" (De Vos and Wagatsuma 1966). L. Clear explains especially the 
educational movement regarding Buraku amongst the Buraku liberation movements in detail 
in his PhD thesis "Education for social change: The case of Japan's Buraku Liberation 
Movemenf (1991). For general questions and answers on the Buraku problems before and 
after 1990, see "An Introduction of the Buraku Issue: Questions and Answers" (Kitaguchi 
1999). Also for the details on the situation of Buraku people who lived in pre-war, particularly 
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present society involved in Buraku issues suggests that the Buraku discrimination 
still remains unsolved, and that there are many cases of discrimination in terms 
of job opportunities, marriage and social relations. Such discrimination is against 
living people, but we have to discuss, in light of a posthumous discrimination 
against Buraku people, some issues on kaimyo or homyo of Buraku people, the 
issues that are deeply related to this thesis. 
A religious custom prevails even in contemporary Japan. The custom is 
that Buddhists are given another name, called kaimyo or homyo, by monks 
whose temple the dead are/were once registered to. Generally different sects of 
Buddhism provide different posthumous names to their deceased believers. A 
Kaimyo is composed of eleven or twelve words of Chinese characters, each of 
which has explicit or implicit meanings. The bereaved of the dead are required to 
pay money as a fee for being given kaimyo according to the dead or family's 
social status. Originally, kaimyo referred to a religious name given to those who 
entered the Buddhist priesthood. In contemporary Japan, however, kaimyo 
refers to the posthumous name of the deceased. Kaimyo is an institution which 
exists within the frame of the family's religion which roots in the system of terauke 
but not in individuals. In reality, it not only implies the degree of the ante mortem 
contributions to the Buddhist temple made by the deceased, i.e., the amount of 
monetary offerings but also the deceased's ante mortem social status or the 
reflection of the degree of the bereaved's contributions to the temple. 
Historically, Buddhist temples were, in the Edo period, firmly incorporated 
into the administrative system of the Buraku by the establishment, and 
enactment of the shumon aratame system (see 1.2.4). The Buraku system 
in the times of the Suiheisha Movement, "Political protest and social control in pre-war 
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reinforced the control and status quo of the society by intentionally making class 
discrimination. Maki (1985) argues that the practice of discriminatory kaimyo 
should not be considered a product of uniform compulsion by the Buraku. 
Copies of a guidebook of how to name discriminatory kaimyo were already 
distributed amongst Buddhist monks in the late Muromachi Period (1338-1573). 
The book42 had diverse flaws in its context. Without criticism and examination, 
however, it was cited by a variety of documents that were made by diverse 
Buddhist sects in the early Edo period. Apparently it played a significant role in 
maintaining social discrimination and segregation. Maki concludes that the 
kaimyo discrimination did not necessarily indicate the government's compulsion 
but the temples' intentional and autonomous action that meant an expression of 
espousing the feudal regime of discrimination (ibid.). 
Hikoichi Yamamoto brought up an issue over the discrimination of kaimyo 
for discussion when the fifth convention at Zenkoku Suiheisha took place in 
Fukuoka City in 1926 (Kobayashi 1987). Yamamoto condemned the fact that 
one of the lowest Buddhist temples in Fukuoka Prefecture, under the supervision 
of Kyoto Chion-in Temple, confined the kaimyo given to registered Burakumin 
believers to four letters of Chinese characters, and that the reason for the 
discriminative manner was that the Buraku people were regarded as creatures 
inferior to human beings. The head temple of Chion-in rejected its own 
involvement and responsibility to the discrimination because the practice had 
been made by the autonomy of the temple that practiced the discrimination. Up 
to the 1980s, however, the issue over kaimyo discrimination had been regarded 
Japan: The origins of Buraku Liberation" (Neary 1989) provides with an excellent research. 
42 This is a reference called Jy()gan-seiy()-kaku-shikimoku. 
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as a minor issue through pre-/post-war Buraku liberal movements, and that there 
was not sufficient examination of the issue related to fundamental human rights. 
According to a record of the Buraku liberal movement, Shinano Dojinkai (a 
Buraku association that was in activity in Ueda City of Nagano Prefecture), it is 
mentioned that the association ordered an inquiry into the registration books of 
two temples in 1936. These temples had had special registration books for 
Burakumin ever since the Edo period. The association made an issue of 
discriminatory kaimyo that were registered in the kakocho (listing book of 
kaimyo). 
Taking some examples from kakocho books kept by Gangyo-ji Temple in 
Ueda City, Kobayashi (1987) found that amongst the kaimyo kept in the books, 
all words implying discrimination had been completely wiped out by black ink. 
Moreover, on the ihai (a small wooden "memorial tablet" kept in the temple), 
words implying vocational discrimination such as leather (kawa or kaku) had 
been shaven out. After World War Two, the investigation of discriminatory 
kaimyo has developed to some extent. In 1954, investigating Buraku villages in 
Komuro City of Nagano Prefecture, Keio University found some burial grounds 
where plenty of discriminatory Chinese words equivalent to "servant" or "maid" as 
epitaphs on their faces of tomb stones could be found (ibid., 13). The September 
issue (1960) of monthly magazine Buraku revealed the fact that a young monk 
who was hardly able to chant even a simple sutra came over to the bereaved for 
memorial services, and gave the awfully discriminatory kaimyo composed of 
Chinese characters such as literally "beast man" or "beast woman". Shibata 
(1972) researched the prevailing existence of discriminatory kaimyo at tombs with 
discriminatory epitaphs. In 1973 Y. Wakamiya (1988), staff writer of Asahi 
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Shinbun (a Japanese quality newspaper), started by covering the sufferings of 
Buraku people in a series titled Gendai no buraku (Contemporary Buraku). 
Matsune (1990), researcher with the Buraku Liberal League, published Sabetsu 
kaimyo towa? (What is discriminatory kaimyo?). It is a booklet for enlightenment 
on Buraku issues, and answers the question of "Why are there less cases of 
discriminatory kaimyo in ShinshO sect, which the majority of the Burakumin are 
registered to, than other Buddhist sects?" Using a survey, Matsune compared 
Buddhist sects that the Burakumin were registered to, with the number of the 
reported cases where discriminatory kaimyo were found. He found that there 
were fewer cases in the ShinshO sect than other sects. The reason for the 
difference was the existence of Eta-dera temples. The Eta-dera temples that 
administrated Burakumin with a discriminatory policy by the Bakufu existed in the 
lowest of the hierarchy of temples (ibid., 48-53). Monks in Eta-dera temples 
themselves suffered from severe discriminatory treatment at the stage of entering 
priesthood. Matsune also points out that, even in the 1980s, some executives of 
Buddhist sects still repeated discriminatory comments against Burakumin (ibid., 
58-63). The Burakumin who have suffered discrimination throughout their life will 
die the same as any other. The dead persons are an entity who is different from 
the living and from the bodies that are "things". The dead persons are an 
existence that has a base of symbol, so that people have been taking special 
consideration to the dead. Therefore, the dead are given the category of 
"person" even if physically they are "things". That is why the dead are served as 
a special entity for the respectable treatment such as burial or worship. On the 
other hand, Burakumin have been posthumously discriminated against as 
Burakumin Buddhists by discriminatory kaimyo and tomb stones with 
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discriminatory epitaphs as well as having been antemortemly discriminated 
against. Discriminatory kaimyo should be viewed as a new discriminatory 
treatment that death of a Buddhist gives. Thus we can say that it is the 
infringement of the deceased's human dignity. 
There are two reasons why the issue of discriminatory kaimyo is deeply 
related to the scheme of this thesis. One is, as mentioned in the previous 
section, that discriminatory kaimyo is a discriminatory practice given directly 
against the dead and an infringement of the dignity of the dead. Whilst 
discrimination infringes against the rights of character, the infringement of 
character by discriminatory kaimyo is directly against the dead person as it is a 
phenomenon that occurs after a person's death. The other point is that which is 
related to the grounds for being given kaimyo. As discussed in detail later, the 
ante mortem social status or reputation of a person, i.e., social characteristics 
explained ubiquitously in this thesis; for example, here the social characteristics 
of Burakumin survives death, and therefore the Burakumin were discriminated 
against after their death. However, although there are legal difficulties to 
overcome, there was no case brought into action in light of rights of the dead of 
defaming the dead by discriminatory kaimyo or tombs, or of recovering 
posthumous disgrace. 
1.4 What shall be discussed in this thesis? 
It was shown earlier that historically rights of the dead has existed: in other 
words, there have been times during which rights of the dead, currently not 
accepted by modern lawyers and legal philosophers, were actually accepted. In 
Japan and European countries, their substantial laws actually prescribe the 
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concept of "defamation of the dead". Especially in Japan, its legal discourse has 
been through the debate on "possession of the dead", examining the concept of 
rights of the dead. The debate is influenced by people's attitude towards death 
and corpses. The attitude which is cultivated by their own religious traditions. 
Moreover the scope and influence of rights-holders is increasingly being 
accepted and expanded upon both in philosophical debate and in the Law Courts 
(see 1.2.2 on "Modern legal conflict"). At present, there is a situation where old 
values have been modified in the moral debate of the non-human. Whilst all of 
the issues are not necessarily grasped as issues on rights of the dead, the 
Japanese historical fact of kaimyo discrimination would draw attention to the 
necessity of further examining and establishing rights of the dead. 
Following this review of historical and present facts, we will address three 
crucial questions: first, "What is meant by and who are we intending to identify 
when we use the term "the dead?''''; second, "How different are the dead from the 
living?"; third, "what, if any, shared attributes do the dead and the living 
possess?". A successful identification and elucidation of the concept of "the 
dead" as used in this thesis, hinges on the answers to these questions. 
However, in this quest we shall almost not deal with either the body of literature 
on the anatomical findings of corpses, nor on the philosophical meanings of 
death and death rites, notwithstanding that they are also to a great extent integral 
to an understanding of "the dead". Rather for the purposes of this thesis it will 
suffice to focus on three points. First, the sorting out of issues on rights of the 
dead at the levels of moral, law, sociology and anthropology; second, the 
relationship between the attributes of deceased persons and their corpses and 
the law with regard to deceased persons; third, with the relationship between two 
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opposites, i.e., the dead and the living. It is part of our argument that an 
understanding of these relationships is integral to establishing and explaining 
interests in "the dead" and their rights, because they are expressed in and 
through these relationships. Therefore, in the rest of this chapter, we will seek 
and examine forms of approaches appropriate to explicate these relationships. 
1.4.1 What is "the dead"? 
First, we will examine the question "What is "the dead"?", or put another way 
what we will do first is to set forth clearly both what we mean and to what or 
whom we refer to in this thesis when we use the term "the dead". A review of the 
literature on death evinces a considerable dispute over an exact definition of 
death (Evans 1994). Defining death per se is in reality a troublesome task. 
In a section of Death, Dying and the Biological Revolution (1976), a 
stimulating book, Veatch analyses the debate over the definition of death. To 
define the death of a human being, Veatch argues that the answer to the 
discussion is not a single one but should be fourfold. First, the discussion on a 
pure formal analysis of the term "death"; second, the discussion on the concept 
of death, which satisfies the first one in terms of its content rather than the 
definition of death; third, the discussion on the position of death in society as a 
whole; and fourth, the discussion on the standard for determining death. The 
most significant discussions in this section are the first and the second. Veatch 
argues that "[t]he direct link of a word death to what is "essentia"y significant" 
means that the task of defining it in this sense is first and foremost a 
philosophical, theological and ethical task" (Veatch 1993 [1976], 604) [original 
italics] and that of other values. 
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"Many elements make human beings unique-their opposing thumbs, their 
possession of rational souls, their ability to form cultures and manipulate symbol 
systems, their upright postures, their being created in the image of God, and so 
on. Any concept of death will depend directly upon how one evaluates these 
qualities" (ibid., 605). 
For the second discussion on death, Veatch provides us with four approaches as 
the most plausible one. All of them are understood as the irreversible loss of a 
human: first, irreversible loss of flow of vital fluids; second, that of the soul from 
the body; that of the capacity for bodily integration; and fourth, that of the 
capacity for social interaction. 
As understood as the first discussion by Veatch, many dictionaries 
formally illustrate that death is defined as "the extinction or cessation of life' or as 
"ceasing to be" and although life per se is difficult to define, most definitions of 
life whether at the level of physiology, molecular biology and biochemistry, or 
genetic potential lay stress on 'functional capacity". Death, thus, can be defined 
as the irreversible loss of "functional capacity". This formal definition of death is 
broadly applicable not only to human beings but to non-human animals, plants, 
etc. However if it is a case of defining human death, we have to recognise 
characteristics that are essentially significant to a human being. Therefore, we 
here define death simply as "the final and irreversible cessation of a person's 
life". Based upon both the definition and the four categories of the definition of 
death that Veatch mentioned in the second discussion, human death can be 
defined as a process in which a person's dead body becomes vested with the 
status of a vessel that both signifies his/her death and objectifies the concept of 
death. Our major concern here thus is with the blunt fact that the difference 
between the living and the dead is based on the fundamental existence or 
absence of life (Chadwick 1994). The dead by our definition are therefore those 
who formerly lived but who no longer have life. 
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An absence of life can be illustrated by the empirically recognised 
character of life, such as a lack of autonomy, self-constraint, reproduction, 
contra-action or adaptation. Lifeless beings are understood to move only in 
reaction to an external action, where they lack any determinant functions for their 
own motion. Conversely, something that is alive has, at least to some extent, a 
cause for determining its own motion, Le., the capacity to function. If the 
principle of the potential to determine motion, whether or not a person is 
autonomous, can be identified as one of the defining characteristics of something 
said to be alive, then the significance of the dead, because they lack this defining 
characteristic, depends upon the living in every respect. Surely, therefore any 
purposeful attributes of the dead stem from this fact (Le., no-life). 
If the principle established above holds true then it is evident on account 
of the principle's logic that a chair and a desk have no life. Can we therefore 
treat dead human bodies that by definition have no life as if they were a chair and 
a desk? No, we cannot. Equally we can ask whether we can treat a chair and a 
desk as if they were analogous to a gravestone and an ihai, a sort of small 
wooden "memorial tablet" available to the bereaved and their families to hold 
daily services for the dead person? Yes, because a chair and a desk, a 
gravestone and an ihai are all items available for ordinary trading. However, 
what if a gravestone and an ihai are already located in a graveyard or a worship 
altar? We assume then that we cannot put them in the same category as a chair 
and a desk. The difference established here between'a chair/desk and a corpse, 
or between a chair/desk and a gravestone/memorial tablet suggests the following 
three points: 
(1) A deceased person was a person previously living; 
(2) Any dead person has diverse characteristics or attributes; 
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(3) A deceased person should be extended different values to those which we 
extend to a chair or a desk. 
In other words a dead body whilst being an object or vessel is nevertheless, ipso 
facto of what it signifies, more than an object or vessel and it is this signification 
which demands we extend to it values greater than and different to the values we 
extend to inanimate43 objects or vessels. 
1.4.2 Presupposition 1: A deceased person was a person previously living . 
. 
The first presupposition would suggest that a dead person is both that part of the 
person which continues to exist and that part which is changed in and through 
the process of death. What continues to exist first and most obviously is a body, 
unless of course it has been "blown to pieces", eaten by an animal or 
disappeared without trace. Whilst we can distinguish between a living and a 
dead body, both in reality form a continuum in that if it were not for a living body 
then the dead one could not exist. This continuum furnishes grounds for the 
continuation of a partial identity into death predicated in the presupposition that 
the right to control or govern44 one's own body can and does survive death. The 
feasibility and importance of this continuation is, in this thesis, argued to be due 
to the presupposition that the continuation of a person's intention can survive 
death. This idea and the associated argument will be explored below. 
In order to examine the continuation of the partial identity and the similarity 
between a person's living and dead body, we will focus on the effects and 
function of intention. This will illustrate that, in the legal process of a will and 
43 The question "what is the distinction between human bodies and animal bodies" 
will not be discussed in this thesis because of its indirect relevance to this thesis. However, 
the distinction is derived from the distinction between the attribute's of living humans and 
living animals. Part of these attributes are respectively transferred to the dead bodies. This 
distinction is also a product of human sentiments and interpretation. 
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succession, some significant and difficult problems arise. Whilst an ante mortem 
intention can survive, we will explore whether the intention of a will that actually 
takes effect after death is that of a living or dead person's.45 A further important 
point is that, apart from such legally authorised intention as exemplified in a will, 
ordinary ante mortem intention can also survive death despite neither legal 
obligation nor legal enforcement. In the light of this we will also examine the 
question "How can a promise bind the parties to it?" 
1.4.3 Presupposition 2: Any dead person has diverse characteristics or 
attributes. 
For example, since a dead person who died a couple of minutes earlier still 
retains something in his/her body,46 which is derived from the previous living 
body, s/he and a fossil of human bones cannot be placed in the same category 
even though they are both "the dead". This distinction serves the purpose of 
permitting the concept of "the dead" to be roughly divided into three distinct but 
overlapping categories: 
(A) The dead with existing corpses; 
(8) the dead who are alive in the sense of being symbolised by their ashes or 
an ihai; and 
(C) those who are both dead physically and forgotten by the living. 
It may not be difficult to recognise that there is an important difference between 
your parent, who died a few minutes earlier; their ashes that, for instance, on 
their wishes might have been scattered at sea; and an ancestor who died in the 
44 E.g., see Stephen R. Munzer 1990, Chapter 3; Alan Gewirth 1996, Chapter 5. 
45 The expression "the intention of a dead person's" per se is bizarre in terms of not 
only logic but also physics. Since a dead body is not a living human, s/he has neither a 
power to have a will nor an ability to express an intention. However, the meaning of "the 
dead's intention" is no less than a connotation that, since an intention can survive, the 
intention that still exists in a space and time, called "after death", separated from the living is, 
for a convenient reason, ascribed to the dead. 
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battle of Hastings in 1066. We cannot deal equally with these three categories of 
the dead. In particular, substantial law does not treat them equally. It may be 
also held that the differences between the three categories point to the 
differences between "what death is imbedded in" and "what death is symbolised 
by". 
(A) The dead with their corpses 
Dead bodies symbolise and objectify the concept of death. A dead body shortly 
after death is almost the same as the living body except that by definition it is 
lifeless. At death there is no immediate transition to a state where the dead are 
symbolised, for instance, by a gravestone, or in some cases recognised as a 
dead warrior of an ancient war. Rather it can be held that it is the relationship 
between death and the subsequent period of time which defines their attributes, 
i.e., what happens in this time with regard to the livings' interpretation of the way 
the person died and the accomplishments and/or glory that they were perceived 
or recognised to have achieved in their lifetime. The meanings and significance 
attributed to the dead are by virtue of the dead's relation to their previous 
existence as a living person. 
Although diverse values are generated about and around a corpse, all 
these values are the product of the conceptions, recognition and relationships of 
the living towards the dead person. Nevertheless, in modern societies the 
handling and preservation of corpses are regulated by diverse laws which 
effectively require no act of interpretation, but rather adherence to specified rules 
and regulations, for example, those dealing with disposal. In practice, how a 
46 This may be conceived on the basis of a sort of moral conviction based on our 
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corpse is dealt with is contingent on its characteristics, in conjunction with the 
appropriate regulations. Procedures for post-mortem examinations and the 
disposal of corpses, burial ceremonies, etc. are for almost all nations prescribed 
in relevant laws,47 but to what degree is the legal legitimacy48 of these laws 
based on the actual characteristics of the dead? The procedures for dealing with 
corpses and hence the values thus evinced may well be the result of the living's 
consciousness towards the dead (e.g., respect or fear) (Polson and Marshall, 
1975) in tandem with considerations of sanitation. If it were not for the living's 
consciousness toward the dead, the corpse would merely be a physical, lifeless 
vessel or object which merited no special relationship, based on symbolism, with 
the living and had few social meanings regarding the living. It may therefore be 
held that insofar as the corpse exists and has social relevance, it exists within the 
prevailing framework of laws, consciousness and values of the day. 
In many old laws religious institutions such as churches, temples and 
shrines took advantage of the values of the dead to maintain their own power of 
authority on a daily basis. The most effective general way for them to do this was 
to establish the rites of death, to sophisticate them and to express their authority 
pretheoretic intuitions. 
47 In England and Wales, the meaning of the corpse is reflected in the diverse laws 
relating to burial, cremation and exhumation. These include, for example, the Anatomy Act 
1984; the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984; The Registration of Births and Deaths 
Regulations 1987; the Coroners Act 1988; the Environmental Protection Act 1990; the 
Criminal Justice Act 1991; the Church of England (Miscellaneous Provisions) Measure 1992 
and Amending Canon No. 15; and the Still-Birth (Definition) Act 1992 (Smale, 1994). 
Likewise, in Japan, the following examples are pertinent to dead bodies: Criminal Code 
1907; Family Registration Law (Law No. 224., 1947); Code of Criminal Procedure 1948; Law 
on the anatomy and preservation of corpses (Law No. 204., 1949); Law on Organ 
Transplantation 1997, etc. 
48 For example sanitary considerations. On investigating the scandalous condition of 
burials and burial grounds in England, Dr Walker proposed in the 1940s the complete 
abolition of inter-mural burial, with the establishment of cemeteries for rich and poor, 
because the smell that emanated from the graveyards was poisonous and sapped the 
general health and physique of those who lived and slept nearby (Jupp 1990, 6-7). As a 
result, the law regarding disposal of corpses was established. 
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through the rites. It could be argued that the religious institutions, and even 
states, took much use of the events of death to enforce and maintain their own 
political power. In the religious and social sense different from those connoted 
by Egyptian mummies, there are, in Japan, 19 mummies in existence (Sakurai et 
a/ 1998, 308-328). Some priest mummies are preserved at some Buddhist 
temples at the foot of Mt. Yudono-san49 located in Yamagata Prefecture, and 
support local religious authority and influence. For example, the mummy of 
priest Tetsumonkai preserved at ChOren-ji Temple,50 Asahi village, abstained 
from gokoku (or the five cereals: rice, barly, corn, millet and beans) for his desire 
or hope for human peace (ibid., 311). The fasting practice led him to approach 
the condition of a mummy, and at last his attainment of nyOjo (death of a revered 
priest) in 1829. Sakurai describes: U[P]riests surrounded his body with numerous 
candles, drying it out by means of the candles' heat" (ibid). Thus mummies of 
Buddhist priests played a significant role in enforcing the bond of the community 
and religious beliefs of the commoners through such religious attainment. 
Recently, values of dead bodies have dramatically changed. Whilst 
corpses have traditionally been objects of rituals and cadaveric specimens, they 
have also served a very important social function as an invaluable source for 
organ transplants and as a resource to further medical development. It may be a 
fact that, although the dead with existing corpses and the dead without corpses 
are both categorised as the dead, the former in particular point to the significant 
difference of values in terms of the relationship between the dead and the living. 
This relationship between the dead and the living will be explicated in Chapter 5. 
49 See <http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/-yuko2000/shonai-r/asahi/sh/yudono-san.html>. 
50 See <http://www4.ocn.ne.jp/-yuko2000/shonai-r/asahi/sh/churen-ji.html>. 
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In light of both the utilisation and the recycling of corpses, our discussion 
will also focus on the recent heated arguments over organ removal and 
transplants, and reflect on some fundamental issues such as proprietary rights 
over human tissue. Our inquiry will be developed to consider "whether or not a 
corpse is or can be property" and "what legal interests of the dead are 
protected?" These two questions will be linked to a further discussion on "how is 
a corpse dealt with in the case of organ transplants?" Given that a person's 
corpse is effectively their successor, how therefore a corpse is dealt with can 
have been previously directed by the intention of that person when living as 
stated in either their will, or through the possession of an organ donor card. If 
this line of reasoning is accepted, then even the intention of the dead, although 
the relation with the dead will make things complicated, can influence the 
disposal of corpses. Therefore, we will examine the intention expressed by the 
living that, on or after death, their corpse can be used as a resource for organ 
transplants. 
(8) The dead who are alive in the sense of being symbolised by their ashes 
or by their tablets 
The dead as symbolised by gravestones, for example, may remain alive in the 
living's memories. The dead who through the necessary social and natural 
processes and law have been divested of their bodies and resultantly are either 
buried, cremated and therefore as ashes,51 or symbolised by an ihai are logically 
and necessarily dealt with by the different rules and regulations governing the 
51 In general ashes are,' in Japan, regarded as a memorial symbol or something 
beyond it, but, in Britain, as a by-product of a disposal process which most people then 
scatter. 
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disposal of corpses. This transformation of the dead's attributes requires further 
and different legal treatment. 52 Even though the symbols commemorating the 
dead may have religious significance, they are, in terms of the bodies of the 
dead, less significant.53 For example, in Japanese law an indignity against an 
ihai or a gravestone is dealt with differently from an infringement against a body 
per se (see 5.2.3). The former indignity is considered to be equivalent to an 
abuse of the bereaved's sentiments; hence it is not a direct infringement against 
the dead. Conversely, direct and invasive action against a dead body is an 
action directly against the dead, although there is a discussion on whether the 
dead can be harmed (see 2.2). In short, the dead as symbolised by a 
gravestone or an ihai are those recognised by the living. This recognition is 
dependant upon the mutual relationships of society, community and social 
groups. 54 This notion of relationship 55 is a key term that this thesis has to 
explain. 
52 See Chapter 24 of the Japanese Criminal Code "Crimes Concerning Places of 
Worship and Graves". The chapter prescribes "Indecency Against Places of Worship and 
Obstruction of Sermons, etc." (Art. 188.), "Excavation of a Grave" (Art. 189.), "Damage, etc. 
of Dead Body, etc." (Art. 190.), "Damage, etc. of Dead Body, etc. by Excavation of Grave" 
(Art. 191.) and "Secret Burial of Person Whose Cause of Death Is Unknown" (Art. 192.). The 
respective penalty and fine are dependant upon the content of the crime. 
53 Of course the symbols are, to some extent, representatives of the body-in effect 
they have replaced the body as the physical thing or object and provide a point of focus for 
respect and memory, certainly in the case of a gravestone, perhaps not the case with ashes. 
The point however at which the body was cremated and I or ashes were scattered or placed 
would be marked and this mark, whether a plaque, a rose-bush, a bench or an entry in a 
memorial book would thus become symbolic of the physical body. 
54 Simultaneously the values per se, of the dead should be reasonable and practical. 
55 As Durkheim (1915, 347) said " ... It is real only insofar as it has a place in human 
consciousness, and this place is whatever one we may give ... Society cannot do without 
individuals any more than these can do without society". This quote can be applied to the 
case of the dead. The dead remain a reality insofar as their social character exists in the 
living's perceptions and memories. As the dead cannot exist without the memory of the living 
(except they could exist in the pages of history books or archive records and yet not be in the 
conscious memory of those living at a particular time), so a society cannot exist without its 
dead. Needless to say, the relationship between the dead and society is different from that 
between the living and society. This difference stems from the difference between the 
attributes of the dead and the living. Insofar as the dead can no longer wield direct control 
over their own affairs, unlike the living, they cannot directly involve themselves in society. 
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Deepening the discussion on relationship may lead to an answer as to 
whether or not it is proper to argue that the dead discussed in (B) above can hold 
character (e.g., reputation) which is vested in the actions and memories inherited 
from when they were living. Deepening this discussion will further enable a 
discussion of the defamation of the dead; and moral rights in Japan, Germany 
and other European countries. This might include "copyrights of the dead",56 
which objectify moral rights. Although a moral right of a deceased person can, in 
Japan, be found in copyrights, justification for the moral right may require a 
development of the argument "Can a deceased person be defamed? Namely, 
can the reputation of a deceased person be harmed? Or can s/he be harmed?" 
(C) The dead who are both dead physically and forgotten by the living 
The dead who have been forgotten by the living, for instance unknown dead 
soldiers from the Battle of Hastings, 1066, can be contingently given a value by 
virtue of the living's imagination or through an evaluation of their archive records. 
The extended time period and the relationship between present persons and 
such dead ones may suggest any consideration of rights of the dead is not 
practical. Yet, importantly, this distance of years serves to highlight the need to 
consider and discuss issues surrounding "How many years copyright can be valid 
Their involvement is instead solely through the living, namely the living's perceptions and 
actions. This relationship can be considered to be a normative one. This means that the 
equivalent interaction to that which is generated between the living and the rest of society, is 
not generated between the dead and the living. Therefore, we can call the relationship a 
"quasi-interaction" because the relationship between the living and the dead takes place 
within the interaction between the living and the rest of society, all of who are conscious in 
some measure or form of the dead. It follows that some patterns of interaction, such as 
exchange, co-operation, sympathising, compulsion and conflict, can be considered feasible 
within the world of the living. 
56 See Article 60 of the Copyright Law (Law No. 48, Japan, 1970) regarding 
"Protection of Moral Interests after the Author's Death". 
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after the author's death" and "How many years after death can a claim for 
defamation be valid". 
1.4.4 Presupposition 3: The corpse of a deceased person should be 
extended different values to those which we extend to a chair or a desk. 
The third presupposition would suggest that we refrain, in most cases, from 
disposing of dead bodies as soon as they pass away in the way that we might 
dispose of a desk or a chair when they are no longer of any value to us. The 
self-evidence of this is based both on the bereaved's emotions toward the 
deceased person and prevailing social beliefs. The bereaved can recall from the 
dead body the past images of the dead person and the reminiscence of the 
experience with that person .. Through such an action they can understand the 
dead as an irreplaceable symbol which holds characteristics. Given our 
interpretation above regarding the relationship between the living and the dead, 
the reason why we cannot regard a dead body as a mere thing is, as argued in 
this thesis, both that the dead have social characteristics57 which' survive death 
and that the living recognise the function of these characteristics. Below we will 
explore and discuss what these social characteristics comprise and how the 
inherited social characteristics can give influence to rights of the dead. 
We have written and demonstrated above that questions regarding the 
dead are, at least in this thesis, diverse. In addition, further and fundamental 
questions related to presuppositions (1), (2) and (3) will also be explored, 
including "Do the dead have interests?" and "If they do, what kind of interests do 
57 Here suffice it to say that "social characteristics" refer to the roles that a person 
plays in society and as something from which it is justified to demand performance in certain 
circumstances, based on the stipulations of a moral "ought". Of course this definition can be 
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they have?" If it is argued that the dead have rights, then to assert that the dead 
have interests should also be justified (although not all those who have interests 
are right-holders). Put in that manner, in order to explain this thesis's most 
important hypothesis "Rights of the dead can be justified", some supportive sub-
hypothesises will be derived. These will be discussed under the following 
approaches in their respective chapters. 
1.5 Six approaches for explication 
1.5.1 Approach 1 (Chapter 2): Can the dead be harmed? 
To ask whether "the dead can be harmed" is to court controversy. Joan C. 
Callahan points up this potential when she suggests " ... the reason that all 
arguments for harm and wrong to the dead must fail is that there is simply no 
subject to suffer the harm or wrong" (1987, 347). Callahan's point here raises 
several questions which need to be addressed if such controversy is to be 
resolved. In particular, we need to examine first: what is meant by being 
harmed? Second: what or who is a subject who is harmed? Third: if the who or 
what which suffers loss is not a subject can they be harmed? Finally: is being 
harmed associated with the degree to which a subject is conscious of, or 
recognises the harm? These questions will be discussed in Chapter 2. Our 
response will be grounded in the following counter-argument to Callahan's 
position on the subject. 
applied only to a living person, because, apart from the dead, s/he has a good reason to 
expect some form of performance, interest, claim or duty. 
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Our response can best be presented and illustrated by the use of a 
theoretical case example58 in which contrary to their wishes both living person A 
and dead person B have their hair cut off. A, a person in a coma, wished to grow 
her attractive hair before she was involved in an accident. Her wishes are valid 
even given her present circumstance. However, her doctor requires that her hair 
be cut off for the convenience of brain surgery. Whilst cutting off her hair without 
consent would be an action against her wishes, the action can nevertheless be 
justified on the grounds of both the impossibility of obtaining her consent and the 
legitimacy of the medical aim. Yet regardless of this justification we can still 
maintain that the fact of this matter is that A would be harmed as a result of her 
hair being cut off. Counter to Callahan's position, the fact that A, the subject 
being harmed, is still alive, although in a coma, is sufficient justification in itself to 
justify the claim for harm. Therefore, insofar as the consciousness-lacking 
patient is a subject, a status gained by virtue of being a living person, a 
conclusion that she can be harmed and hence wronged is warranted. 
Now let us examine the situation in which contrary to her antemortem 
wishes and intention dead person 8 similarly had her hair cut off. Given that 8 is 
dead prior to having her hair cut off we can reasonably ask whether there is a 
difference between A and B in terms of being harmed? First, when it comes to 
being harmed, something has to happen to the party claiming or experiencing 
harm as a result of an action alleged to have caused the harm. In the case of A 
above, nothing except for the cutting off of her hair happens to her. Very 
similarly, in the case of B, the deceased person, nothing excepting for the cutting 
off of her hair happens to her. In short, in both cases the actual action of the 
58 In the discussion on "uneffecting harm" Feinberg (1977, 305) argues a similar 
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cutting off of hair is indistinguishable and therefore the action produces the same 
result in both cases. 80th A and 8 are harmed as a result of the action of the 
cutting off of their hair, against their wishes, by a third party. If it is possible to 
argue that A, despite being in a coma, is harmed by the action of the cutting off 
of her hair, then it should equally be possible to argue that 8, despite being dead, 
is also harmed by the action. In both cases neither person at the time their hair 
is actually cut has the capacity to know and recognise what is happening to them. 
In terms of the possession of such capacity, the circumstances for both A and 8 
are similar. 
Suppose that A had a definite intention up to the point when she lost 
consciousness to reject having her hair cut off. Likewise 8 had the same 
intention and expressed up to the time of her death the undesirability of losing 
her hair. In the case of A there is a characteristic to which intention can be 
attributed, ipso facto A is alive. Notwithstanding her lack of consciousness, she 
can be categorised as a living person. On the other hand, 8's death extinguishes 
8 as a subject. However, precedents established by virtue of the legal institution 
of a will or the binding of a promise would suggest that 8's intention can 
nevertheless survive death. Put that way, the emphasis placed on the import and 
effect of intention would suggest that the object of harm after death is, in the 
case of 8, in fact, 8 when 8 was still a living person. Given it is physically 
impossible for a living person to be harmed after his/her death, we would have to 
say that those harmed after death are the dead who succeed to the 
characteristics of their former living selves. This hypothesis will be discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
perspective to ours. He tries to apply the idea of "harming a living person" to that of dead 
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We can examine "posthumous reputation" similarly. When a living 
person's life is ended as in the circumstance of being killed, this harm is 
categorised as the killing of a person, i.e., murder or manslaughter. But the 
action of harming a corpse cannot be similarly categorised as the killing of a 
corpse, because it is impossible to kill someone twice. In terms of the form of 
being harmed, both offences have a difference which lies in the different 
attributes belonging to the living and the dead respectively. However, defamation 
is a rare example by which both the living and the dead can be harmed 
notwithstanding their different attributes. In this thesis we will justify defamation 
of the dead. Moreover, we will argue that it is possible to achieve this justification 
not by relying on the attributes of the living and the dead, but rather through an 
analysis of the very nature of defamation. 
In Chapter 2 we examine the harm thesis in the light of some specific 
questions: When a corpse is damaged or the reputation of a deceased person is 
sullied, what or who is actually being harmed? If the dead cannot be harmed, 
then is it possible for nobody to be harmed? If a living person is otherwise 
harmed, is the person a former living person of the damaged corpse? Any 
answer to this question is prima facie at least bizarre. It is difficult to justify the 
posthumous harm from a moral point of view, in particular because dead persons 
cannot perceive of damage or harm against them. If it should be possible for the 
formerly living person of a corpse to be harmed, then it would follow that time 
goes backward. We, despite the apparent bizarre nature of any answer, 
nevertheless will argue that the dead can be harmed both in the case of 
damaging a corpse and in the circumstance of defamation of a dead person. 
persons (see Chapter 2). 
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More precisely, this implies that any intention embedded in a dead person 
by virtue of succession to the characteristics they held as a living person can 
potentially be harmed. This kind of intention can be rephrased as the 
"expectation of a living person after death". However, expectation or intention of 
a living person cannot be embedded in a corpse or a dead person per se, 
because they are lifeless. Such expectation and intention are embedded in the 
legal instruments (e.g., the will) that belong both to the dead and the law which is 
established to deal with death. There is actually an expectation or intention that 
people desire their interests to be protected, that their interests be treated with 
respect and dignity in accordance with their beliefs they held whilst alive. 
Although these mental activities are not necessarily legally binding in the way that 
an authorised intention as expressed in a will would be, they are, nevertheless, in 
most societies, worthy of respect. Thus giving up the moral justification, we will 
justify legally and sociologically for the posthumous harm. Our theoretical 
grounds are what are relevant to the relation between the dead and the living and 
to social and psychological concepts based upon minds, beliefs and myth. 
On the basis of the harm thesis, we will conclude that the expectations or 
intentions of living persons, regarding their death, are embedded in the legal and 
personal instruments and that that which is harmed is the expectation or intention 
which survives death. Given the argument above which postulates expectation 
or intention is embedded in death and from the point of death cannot be 
regressed to the situation before death, we can logically argue a further step and 
claim the dead can be harmed. This further step permits us to challenge 
Callahan's claim: "I want to suggest that our pretheoretic intuitions regarding 
harm and wrong to the dead are not genuine moral convictions at all but are, 
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rather, judgments we are inclined to make simply because we think of the dead 
as the persons they were antemortem" (1987, 347) [original italics]. It is worth 
reiterating at this point that, since a subject which is harmed does not exist, it 
follows a dead person cannot be harmed. Rather, we are claiming that 
regardless of whether or not an actual harmed subject exists, if harm is done to a 
dead person then that harm is to a dead person regardless of whether their 
corpse is or is not physically present. 
1.5.2 Approach 2 (Chapter 3): Intention, 
This chapter examines a fundamental question: "why can the intention of a 
person survive his/her death?" To address this question our discussion will focus 
on some issues of intention raised by testate or intestate succession. The 
discussion then moves on to examine some controversial issues raised by the 
concept of intention. Based on the moral discussion about intention, this 
examination will develop to the legal discussion. 
A will gives legal effect to the final intention the deceased expressed 
before death, and constitutes a form of guarantee that the intention will be 
carried out. A person expresses his/her intention in documentary form; 
moreover, compliance with the relevant legal provisions triggers the institutional 
device that enables the appropriate actions to be taken after death. 
What should be noted here is, however, that it is not uncommon for there 
to be a considerable time lapse between the time of making a will and that of its 
execution. The subject of the will ceases to exist upon death. Still, despite the 
fact that a subject who autonomously made a will no longer exists, law regards 
the will as a living person's will. In this chapter, we shall examine the will's form 
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at two distinctive time periods, i.e., before and after death. We will attempt to 
answer whether the intention of a will that takes effect after death is that of a 
living or a dead person's. In so doing we will not resort to sophist methods, for 
instance the nominalism of medieval times. 
Such a question is very important. If a will belongs to its maker and is 
enforced on death, then law is faced with and has to justify a paradox. That is, 
law is granting a right to something without a subject. 59 If, a will's existence and 
its enforcement can be justified post-death, the acceptance of this notion, may 
provide support to the presupposition that there is a right of the dead. 
The approach taken in Chapter 3 would lead to this conclusion. Although, 
in testate succession which closely mirrors the deceased's intention, the 
succession commences on death, logically in both the Japanese and English 
systems of law, the right that is transferred from the dead who are succeeded by 
the living can be regarded as a "right of the dead".60 Logically a right of the dead 
can therefore exist in succession. Also, in intestate successions, although the 
intention used is different from the intention used for testacy, it can, as quasi-
intention, maintain the order of succession. Insofar as the quasi-intention is 
succeeded after death and the effect of the intention is implemented after death, 
we logically cannot but adopt the term "intention of the dead". Thus it follows 
59 E.g., one can understand that, in English law, the person having made their 
intentions and wishes clear is represented after death by their executors, who execute the 
will according to the intentions and wishes of its subject in accordance with the law, but this 
understanding is not clear in terms of identifying the jural or juridical status of the parties (see 
Steiner 1994, 254-5). 
60 If we view from the eyes of a living person, the subject of a will is a person who 
was once alive, i.e., the dead. On the other hand, at the time when the person expressed 
his/her intention in a written will, the intention will be expected to take effect after his/her 
death. This intention is a posthumous one but at the same time any posthumous events are 
future ones to the person who made a will. 
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that, in the same way as intention of a will, rights of the dead can logically exist in 
the legal principles of succession. 
1.5.3 Approach 3 (Chapter 4): The social characteristics of the dead 
Moral discussion shifts to legal and sociological justification. As a result legal 
and sociological terms will be necessarily used as key ones of this thesis. An 
important component of this thesis is the realisation that the primary justification 
for the right of succession lies not only in the intention of the dead, as Hugo 
Grotius (1950) argues, but also in the social character of the dead. The social 
characteristics of the dead include a proper expectation, interest, claim, and duty 
justified in terms of their particular social roles and situation within society (Nisbet 
1970). There is, therefore, a strong association between: the social 
characteristics of a dead person and the prevailing social climate; the availability 
and nature of different social roles and hierarchies; and the varying forms of 
social authority. It is worth noting that when it comes to succession in modern 
society, succession is usually considered to refer to property only. Historically, 
people in Japan and England succeeded not only to property but also to legal or 
social status and roles. In this construction, although the social character of the 
dead is not so complex or multi-faceted as that of the living, the dead do 
nevertheless maintain a distinct and stable character which is on a par with the 
living. The social character and significance of the dead are composed in and 
given relevance and meaning through the daily activities, needs and interests of 
the living. Namely, the explanation for moral justification shifts to an attempt for 
sociological justification. 
69 
Any human society is composed of diverse types of social roles, social 
status, and social interactions between different social members. Membership of 
any society places obligations on its members with regard not only to their 
relations with the living, but also to the way in which they deal with the dead. 
Broadly speaking there are four ways in which we can categorise the attributes of 
the dead with regard to the role they play in society and hence establish 
relationships between the living and the dead. First, the dead as an object for 
human action. A dead person, as an object and symbol, is one of things that can 
be used and manipulated by the living. Second, the dead as a catalyst for 
succession. This suggests that the dead are, under the regulations succession 
law prescribes, fundamentally treated equally. Third: the dead as a successor. 
This refers to the dead who on death then succeed to part of the character and 
status they held before death. Take for example two traffic victims. If the victims 
were an unemployed elderly woman and a president of a large conglomerate, the 
social treatment toward these two people would be different. The difference 
would involve not just the resultant financial compensation to the bereaved, but 
also the values attached to the victims as we" as the scale of their funerals. This 
difference potential implies a difference in the power succeeded from the pre-
death social character, former social authority, status, and roles. Fourth and 
finally, the dead as a symbol. This category refers to the dead who come to 
possess an historical status through memory and a celebration of their lives. 
What these four modes suggest is that when considering any SOCiety and 
its social norms, in the same way that we do not ignore the role of its constituent 
living members, we cannot ignore the role of the dead. We can therefore 
conclude from this that the living and the dead are equally significant social 
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components in any society. Social character refers to the substance of this 
social involvement and the symbol of the social relations. It is incorporated into 
the relation between the living and the dead, which have, in some cases, the 
impossibility of substitution but not in other cases. We would note that 
analogously to the living, the dead also possess a social character. Obviously, 
there are many similarities and yet also many differences between the character 
of the dead and that of the living. Needless to say, unlike the living, the dead 
cannot of themselves labour or act. Nevertheless, they do obtain a place, which 
does not have the possibility of substitution, in the meaning of the living through 
social associations. Character, meaning, and value exist in the social 
characteristics of the identities of the deceased, for instance as traffic victims, 
donors, or in social situations such as emergencies or festivals and public 
holidays. Death and the physical appearance of the dead do not necessarily 
determine the social character, meaning, and value of the dead, all of which 
would exist, as an irreplaceable symbol, behind the physical appearance. The 
distinguishing example for the irreplaceable symbol is a brain-dead body. In a 
work (Deguchi 2001) where the symbolism of inner organs is discussed from an 
anthropological point of view, Professor A. Deguchi strongly suggests not only 
that a brain-dead body is not a mere dead one but something which still retains 
the characteristics of the pre-death person, but also that the body reminds us of 
the irreplaceable relation between a deceased person and his surviving relatives 
(ibid., 57). In a case without recalling the past images of the dead and reflecting 
oneself one would treat a human body as a mere thing. However, as far as we 
live in society, we are necessarily involved in the relation between the dead and 
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the living and provide, within the relation, symbolic meanings and values to a 
deceased person and his/her body by the medium of the social characteristics. 
Understood in that way, the idea of "the characteristics of the dead" will be 
used, in this thesis, to explicate two presuppositions: first, "since persons can 
succeed to their former characteristics in the transition of death, dead persons 
cannot be regarded as mere things"; second, "if we can accept that dead persons 
have their characteristics and influence the living, then it follows that there are 
some cases in which we can regard the dead as right-holders". This would be an 
attempt to explicate a hypothesis based upon person's beliefs or a theology 
distant from moral debate. 
1.5.4 Approach 4 (ChapterS): Dead bodies 
This chapter first attends contemporary discussion on body and evolves it from 
the association with the debate over dead body. The main discussion here 
focuses on the following four points. The first bears the question: "what is a dead 
body?". With regard to what a dead body means and implies in society, the 
discussion will be influenced by interdisciplinary points of view such as 
philosophy, law, sociology and anthropology. Philosophically, on the application 
of some perspectives on self-ownership to the paradigm of a corpse; legally, on 
the dead body as a traditional object for burial and as a socially useful resource 
for medical use such as organ transplantation; sociologically and 
anthropologically, on the ambiguity between a living body and a dead one that 
arose from the concept of brain death. This ambiguity suggests that the concept 
of brain death altered the traditional definition of death and that, in a 
circumstance where the concept of brain death is against traditional culture and 
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attitudes toward death; the boundary of life and death becomes vague. This, 
entwined with organ transplantation, creates the ambiguity of death concerning 
organ transplant procedures. This ambiguity is not necessarily a Japanese 
phenomenon based upon Japanese culture but we· can find it even in the 
Western dualism of mind and body. In the process of developing a discussion on 
what constitutes a dead body, we will explicate that the ambiguity is in reality 
associated with the symbolisation of a dead body and its character of commodity 
under the market's logic. 
The second point is to discuss a question "Can a corpse be a 
commodity?", whose framework of discussion is offered in the debate on "What 
is a corpse?". Since a corpse is a symbol that lets us identify a dead person with 
his/her pre-death diverse attributes and characteristics, heated debate on 
regarding a corpse as a replaceable commodity will take place. When we accept 
a view that a corpse is one of commodities we will discuss it, regarding it as an 
object for a property or succession right. Therefore most discussion here will be 
provided at the legal level. 
The third point is that the discussion on rights of the dead will here focus 
on the right to dispose of a corpse. The discussion will be subdivided into three 
parts. The first one is on whether a right to dispose of a corpse is of the living or 
of the dead. Is it possible to ascribe a right, which survives death, to °a deceased 
person despite the rule that the deceased person is no longer a subject of rights? 
If such ascribing is possible, then how can we justify the retroaction to the past 
person? When an infringement against a person's right really takes place after 
his/her death, is it not impossible to retroactively ascribe the posthumous 
interests and protection to the pre-death person? The second discussion is on 
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whether perceptions of the concept of "rights" are different between Japan and 
Western nations, especially England in terms of a right to dispose of a corpse. 
The examination of the. concept "rights" per se leads us to explore a right to 
posthumously dispose of a body. In addition we will discuss the difference 
between Japanese and English positions regarding the consent of the removal of 
organs; and on how the difference, if any, affects that right. One of our 
arguments is that in the case where a will regarding posthumous disposition 
causes competition between a dead person and his/her surviving relatives in 
Japan, an individual's right often comes to be converted into a collective one. As 
the third discussion, making a careful comparison between Japan and England, 
we will examine why the Japanese are reluctant to accept organ transplantation 
as a standard form of treatment. We challenge the belief and assumption of the 
reluctance. In doing so, we will justify our position by using the argument of our 
own Nihonjin-ron (the discourses on the Japanese) whilst we refute the grounds 
from other Nihonjin-ron perspectives that the "reluctant" assumption is taken for 
granted. In the comparison between Japanese and English law, we will find that 
there is a considerable gap between them in terms of the practice of organ 
transplantation. We will argue that the difference can be identified with that of 
the concepts of "public interests" and "rights" and it can be beyond cultural 
justification. Based on the consideration of the sociological concepts of "social 
characteristics" and "relation", the difference of the concept of 'public' between 
the two nations' discourses will be articulated in the discussion. One example 
will be signified and suggested by the term "request" (see Section 1 of the 
Human Tissue Act 1961). "It will be argued, additionally, that the Japanese 
concept of "rights" includes connotations different from English ones, which affect 
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the Japanese perception of donating organs". In Japan the belief that a dead 
person is given "personhood" and can continue to be "alive" in society, namely 
when "a dead person has his/her inner organs" is not necessarily ridiculous; and 
another belief, that a dead person is as if he/she were still alive, is not in short 
supply. In terms of the strength of theological briefs, it is an actuality in Japan 
that the relationship between the living and the dead is significant, for example 
the legal fact that "possession of the dead" is conceded in Japanese legal 
discourse (see 1.3.4). 
The fourth discussion is on why it is possible in Japan to justify the 
concept of rights of the dead, but not necessarily in England. The main reason is 
explained by the argument that there is a difference of symbolising "social 
characteristics" between Japan and England. We ground rights of the dead on 
the posthumous social characteristics of the dead, based on the understanding 
that a corpse is a type of symbol which awakens a variety of attributes or 
characters. Logically, it is difficult that rights can survive death. However, once 
we have recognition that "a dead person has a right", then part of the 
contradiction connoted in legal systems will be resolved by an institution or 
devise of legal fiction despite the impossibility of, logically, surviving rights after 
death. 
1.5.5. Approach 5 (Chapter 6): An antemortem promise and its posthumous 
performance 
In this chapter, we will discuss, in light of morality, "how a promise can bind the 
related parties to it even after death". The reader might ask how the discussion 
on binding promises are related to the rights of the dead and why this chapter 
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requires the discussion? It is related to what we presuppose in Chapters 2, 3, 4, 
and 5. At the moral level we will argue here that a promise survives and binds its 
parties after death because the value of making and keeping a promise is 
significant to the parties concerned, and moreover, they value the fairness of a 
promise. We will also argue that promises are made and taken advantage of on 
a daily basis by parties, for the usefulness of a mere promise is often recognised. 
The promise is regarded as an institution that morally binds parties to it, even if 
subsequently either or both of the parties change their minds. In addition, we will 
explain the promise using the concept of "social person" (identified in Chapter 4), 
a role which all the parties of the promise possess and play out. This explication 
is based on the argument that a person's social characteristics can survive 
his/her death. 
Considered in this way, the surviving social characteristics of a person 
may bind his/her survivors in the same way as a living person's social 
characteristics can bind other persons to a particular course of action. Such 
characteristics of the dead function as a quasi-right via an impression. One 
reason why the living fulfil pre-death promises is that they might recognise that 
the dead person still "holds" a quasi-right. Thus, discussion of "how a promise 
can bind the living and the dead to an action or series of actions" is highly 
relevant to rights of the dead. 
1.5.6 Approach 6 (Chapter 7): more than traditional debate 
In the concluding chapter, using a different approach from the line pursued in the 
first five approaches, we will briefly answer the question: "Is the justification for 
rights of the dead based upon Will Theory or Interest Theory?". In order to 
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answer this question, the two traditional theories could have been employed to 
provide a framework for the examination of rights. Such theories are generally 
linked to the debate on "life" rather than that on "death". It may have been 
interesting to know how rights can be established when such competing theories 
are linked to the debate on "death" or how rights can be frustrated. If the term 
rights of the dead itself assumes the need to "hold aright", then it would seem 
any argument for rights of the dead is fundamentally flawed given it is absolutely 
impossible for a dead person to hold anything in that to hold requires an ability 
which a dead person quite clearly cannot possess. In the perspective based on 
the characteristics of the dead, we would have connected the dead to society or 
communities and derived some bases of rights from the position of Interest 
Theory. 
Thus re-examining whether it is possible to apply the traditional theories 
for establishing rights of the dead, we will discuss not only right-based 
perspectives but also duty-based ones, and furthermore develop to the debate 
on the association with the posthumous harm thesis and the social 
characteristics of the dead thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Can the dead be harmed? 
2.1 introduction 
This chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part we concentrate on 
discussing the philosophical questions: "can the dead be harmed?", and "does a 
dead person have an interest?" We will not adopt a metaphysical argument, 
rather we will claim the view that the dead can be harmed and that they have 
interests. We will highlight the argument regarding defamation of the dead and 
review the characteristics of reputation. In the second part of this chapter, by 
examining the attitudes of Japanese and English law toward defamation of the 
dead, we will argue that subjectless rights exist in Japanese substantive law; and 
that it would be possible to prescribe for "defamation of the dead" in English law. 
The reason that this chapter is composed of two parts is that we will attempt to 
justify our arguments not only through philosophical debate, which is provided in 
the first part on "can the dead be harmed?"; but also by the second part, which 
examines the legal or social examples of "defamation of the dead", a typical 
concept of "posthumous harm" thesis, provided by substantial law and court 
decisions. 
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2.2 At the outset of the discussion 
In his two elegant essays61 published in the 1970s, Joel Feinberg asserted both 
that the dead can be harmed and that the dead have an interest. Feinberg 
argued that a person can be defamed after his/her death and the presupposition 
that this could occur can be justified. According to Feinberg, harms are 
concerned with the "frustrating", "defeating" and "setting back" of interests that 
include possession, privacy, friendship, reputation, health, career, etc. Identifying 
interests in that manner, he addresses the relation between interests and harm: 
"Interests can be blocked or defeated by events in impersonal nature or by plain 
bad luck. But they can only be 'invaded' by human beings, either oneself, 
acting negligently or perversely, or by others, singly or in groups and 
organizations. It is only when an interest is invaded by self or others that its 
possessor is harmed in the usual legal sense, though obviously an earthquake 
or a plague can cause enormous harm in the ordinary sense" (1977, footnote 1 
in p. 283). 
Strictly speaking, the term "interests" that is used in this paragraph is not 
necessarily used in the same way as other uses of "interests". The change in 
terminology took place mainly because of traditionally different attempts to 
examine the connection between the law and the needs of man as a reasonable 
being. As a matter of fact, even Roscoe Pound (1959) pointed out that the 
concept of "interests" may be identified from many angles. Evaluating any 
available definitions that have been provided, we will adopt a pertinent 
classification of interests (Beyleveld and Brownsword 1994). The authors 
classify interests as: 
(a) Personal Interests. These divide into two categories: 
(i) Biological or Life Interests. This category includes interests in life, 
health, comfort, food, sex, fun, knowledge, and control of nature. Such 
interests are common to most human beings, and are functions of the fact 
that human beings are biological creatures. 
61 The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations (1974) and Harm and Self-Interest 
(1977). 
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(ii) Purely Individual Goals. These are interests which derive from 
differences between individuals, rather than from factors which human 
beings share in common. 
(b) Moral or Reciprocity Interests. This category includes interests in mutual 
accountability or responsibility for action, mutual care or concern for the welfare 
of persons, respect for persons, and empathic knowledge (ibid., 121). 
In the debate on the dead, evidently category (a) should be excluded because it 
assumes life. Also, even when we discuss category (b), the elements based 
upon being alive should be excluded. Therefore applying category (b), we can 
consider privacy, friendship, reputation, career, etc., which Feinberg took for 
example, as interests in which the dead would be posthumously harmed. 
In the most significant section of "Harm and Self-Interest", Feinberg (1977) 
argues the following four presuppositions: 
(1) To harm is to invade interests. 
(2) To have interests at a particular time, a person must have the capacity to 
experience "awareness, expectation, belief, desire, aim and purpose", but 
s/he does not have this capacity after death. 
(3) There is a difference between a person having an interest at a time and 
that interest's existence at that time. The person's interests, which might 
continue to exist independently after his/her death.62 . 
(4) These surviving interests may be harmed posthumously by being 
posthumously infringed. 
2.2.1 Presupposition 1: To harm is to invade interests. 
According to Feinberg (1984), harm occurs not when a person is merely hurt or 
offended. Rather, it occurs when a person's interest is frustrated, defeated or set 
back. What Feinberg means by interests is something in which we have a stake. 
Therefore, many of our inter~sts are obviously linked to our wants and desires, 
so that a mere want does not constitute an interest. Minor disappointment for 
instance is not a frustration, defeat or setback of an interest. Taking advantage 
of W. D. Ross's (1939) distinction between "want fulfilment" and "want 
62 Defamation is a good example provided by Feinberg. 
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satisfaction",63 Feinberg highlights the directional nature of interests and points· 
out that interests are "ongoing concerns" rather than temporary wants: 
"[H]arm to an interest is better defined in terms of the objective blocking of 
goals and thwarting of desires than in subjective terms; and the enhancement 
of benefiting of an interest is likewise best defined in terms of the objective 
fulfilment of well-considered wants than in terms of subjective states of 
pleasure" (Feinberg 1977, 303). 
The objective of an aim (Le., the basis of an interest) is "not simply satisfaction or 
contentment, and the defeat of an interest is not to be identified with 
disappointment or frustration" (ibid., 304). Although we can accept this 
explanation, it does not necessarily lead to the following claim: 
"[O]eath can be a thwarting of the interests of the person who dies, and must be 
the total defeat of most of his self-regarding interests, even though, as a dead 
man, he can feel no pain" (ibid.). 
This claim is logically incorrect. Since death is, before a thwarting of the dead's 
interests, a thwarting of the living's interests and the dead can feel no pain, the 
above quote should be corrected to read "death must be the total defeat of most 
of the living's self-regarding interests".64 
Feinberg defines the moment of death as, "the terminating boundary of 
one's biological life" (ibid.). It is itself an important event within the life of one's 
future-oriented interests (ibid.). In short, he grasps death as a cause of thwarting 
an interest. He argues that "[w]hen death thwarts an interest, the interest is 
harmed, and the harm can be ascribed to the man who is no more" (ibid.). 
However, there is no explanation of how and why the dead can have an interest, 
or how and why the thwarted interests of the previously living person can be 
63 These two concepts were developed in Foundations of Ethics (Ross 1939) and 
can be readily understood by the explanation that a person can be fulfilled without 
satisfaction and s/he can feel satisfaction without fulfilment. 
64 Our attempt at rephrasing this may be considered as being superficial or 
reiterative. However, the phrase in question should be changed into, at least, our 
rephrasing, because the wording of the original phrase is ambiguous in terms of the logical 
explanation of the living and the dead. 
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transferred to the now dead person. He likens the harm that can be ascribed to a 
dead person to the debts that can be charged to his estate (ibid.). This analogy 
is misplaced. The analogy means that a living person's debts are cleared after 
his/her death by being charged to his/her estate, but does not include any 
subsequent debts the dead person incurs after his/her death that are cleared by 
him/herself (Le., a dead person). In other words the living persons would clear 
any debts that can be incurred by death, e.g., the costs of funeral, probate, etc., 
either through the resources of the dead persons estate or from other monetary 
sources. 
2.2.2 Presupposition 2: To have interests at a particular time one must have 
the capacity to experience "awareness, expectation, belief, desire, aim and 
purpose", but one does not have this capacity after death. 
This presupposition raises the question: "can interests that we cannot hold 
unless we have the capacity to experience those things, be held by the dead who 
do not and cannot have the capacity?" As a matter of fact, Feinberg accepts that 
death extinguishes the relationship between a person and his/her interests 
(1984,248). He states that a necessary condition of the concepts of "harm" and 
"interest" is the capacity of the "person" to be affected. However, no events after 
death can change even a moment of a person's death. Nothing remains to be 
affected. Given this, we must wonder if the following passage is therefore 
compatible with his argument "the dead have interests": "without awareness, 
expectation, belief, desire, aim, and purpose, a being can have no interests" 
(Feinberg 1974, 61). This suggests that Feinberg explicitly claims that the 
extinction of a person's interests is concomitant with his/her death. 
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Nevertheless, Feinberg argues that interests do survive the death of the 
interest bearer so that the dead can be harmed by the invasion of their interests. 
However, as Earnest Partridge points out, "it would seem, by Feinberg's own 
rule, that if a person cannot be affected, he cannot be harmed" (1981, 249). 
Unless harmed, "he cannot be a relatum in the relationship of 'having an interest 
in V'"~ (ibid.). Partridge offers a pertinent analogy when he comments on this 
strand of Feinberg's argument, "posthumous interest" is paradoxically "the sound 
of one hand clapping" (ibid.). 
As for interests that die with a person, Feinberg would argue that these 
are the interests that "can no longer be helped or harmed by posthumous events" 
and include most of the person's self-regarding interests (Feinberg 1977, 304). 
He admits therefore that interests become extinct on the holder's death. Thus, 
two questions arise: first, why can interests that become extinct on death 
nevertheless survive death; and second, how can a dead person whose interests 
are extinguished on death be harmed by the invasion of the interests that survive 
his/her death? He attempts an answer to these questions in the discussion of 
the third presupposition. 
2.2.3 Presupposition 3: There is a difference between a person having an 
interest at a certain time and the existence of the interest at that same time. 
The person's interests might continue to exist independently after his/her 
death. 
The argument of "Unaffecting Harm" is, as Partridge suggests, Feinberg's most 
persuasive defence. Feinberg attempts to apply the concept of harm equally to 
the dead as to the living. In this application he answers our question. He argues: 
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"How can a man be harmed, it might be asked, by what he can't know? Dead 
men are permanently unconscious; hence they cannot be aware of events as 
they occur; hence (it will be said) they can have no stake one way or the other, 
in such events. That this argument employs a false premiss [sic] can be shown 
by a consideration of various interests of living persons that can be violated 
without them ever becoming aware of it" (1977,305) [original italics]. 
Examples proposed by Feinberg include "possessary interests" and legally 
recognised interests "in domestic relations", which are invaded when a person's 
spouse engages in secret adulterous activity (ibid.). In the former example, he 
pOints out that a landlord's interest in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of 
his land "can be invaded by an otherwise harmless trespasser who takes one 
unobserved step inside the entrance gates" (ibid.). In the latter case, the interest 
lies "in being the exclusive object of one's spouse's love" (ibid.). The interest can 
be harmed even if the spouse is unaware of the fact of the secret adulterous 
activity. However, he takes human reputation as being the best example of the 
argument of "unaffecting harms": 
"If someone spreads a libellous description of me, without my knowledge, 
among hundreds of persons in a remote part of the country, so that I am, still 
without my knowledge, an object of general scorn and mockery in that group, I 
have been injured in virtue of the harm done [to] my interest in a good 
reputation, even though I never learn what has happened. That is because I 
have an interest, so I believe, in having a good reputation as such, in addition to 
my interest in avoiding hurt feelings, embarrassment, and economic injury. And 
that interest can be seriously harmed without my ever learning of it" (ibid., 305-
6) [original italics]. 
According to this argument the subject of the libel can be harmed even if s/he 
does not hear/know of it and, in the above case, the subject's reputation per se is 
harmed: apparently the people did harm "my reputation". It seems that Feinberg 
puts "the reputation being harmed" and "the subject of the reputation being 
harmed" in the same category. He understands that if the interest known as "a 
good reputation" is, irre'spective of knowledge about the defamation, harmed, 
then it means that the reputation of the subject and the subject per se are 
harmed. In short, he argues that in addition to being able to distinguish between 
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a person's having an interest at a certain time and the existence of the interest at 
that same time; it is possible to argue that if the interest is harmed, then its 
subject can be harmed. If his argument is correct a further inference becomes 
logically valid, a mere feeling of insult that we hold towards someone in our 
minds means that we harm that person. We surely however cannot accept this 
ludicrous claim. 
Suppose that a thief stole the one and only draft of a novel that took me 
many years to write from my office cabinet, and tore it up. In applying the 
reasoning of Feinberg's "Unaffecting Harms" rule to this case, even though I am 
unaware of the damage, my interest is harmed at precisely the time when the 
draft is torn up. In applying this logic to the case of defamation, those who 
criticise Feinberg's perspective have to address the point that, although the draft 
was harmed, the person whose draft was harmed is not harmed insofar as s/he 
does not hear about it. However, this is bizarre. For, despite a lack of 
knowledge of the damage to the draft, any project or plan (e.g., publication) for 
the draft had already been frustrated at the very time when the draft was torn up. 
Therefore, the harming of the interest was, in this case, already complete 
before the knowledge of the harm. The time when the subject of the interest 
knew about the harm includes not only the time when the subject is harmed but 
also the time when the subject learned of the draft being torn up-his/her interest 
was harmed. Likewise, in the case of defamation, the act resulting in the harm to 
a person's reputation could have occurred at an earlier time unbeknown to the 
subject of the interest. If this explanation is correct, insofar as the interest is 
something that can be harmed, the interest can be harmed and the subject who 
holds it can be harmed, even if s/he is unaware of the fact of being harmed. 
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Extending the notion of "unaffecting" to posthumous harm, Feinberg 
questions: "If knowledge is not a necessary condition of harm before one's death 
why should it be necessary afterward?" (ibid., 306). His answer to this question, 
as we will recognise in the following passage, evades the most important 
question "why does the interest of reputation continue to exist after one's 
death?": 
"Can there be any doubt that I have been harmed by such libels? The 'self-
centred' interest I had at my death in the continued high regard of my fellows, in 
this example, was not thwarted by my death itself, but by events that occurred 
afterward. Similarly, my other-regarding interest in the well-being of my children 
could be defeated or harmed after my death by other parties overturning my 
will, or by thieves and swindlers who cheat my heirs of their inheritance. None 
of these events will embarrass or distress me, since dead men can have no 
feelings; but all of them can harm my interests by forcing non-fulfilment of goals 
in which I had placed a great stake" (ibid.). 
2.2.4 Presupposition 4: These surviving interests may be harmed 
posthumously by being posthumously infringed. 
Suppose again, only this time after my death, someone tore up the draft of my 
novel that had been kept in my cabinet. This action absolutely invaded the 
interest in my novel. However, after my death this interest is no longer mine. 
Rather on my death my interest was transferred to my successors and it became 
their interest. That is why the invasion against the interest does not harm me, as 
a dead person. 
Can the interest of reputation be transferred after death in the same way 
as the interest in the draft? By paying attention to the different attributes of 
reputation and the draft, we will find an answer. First, the draft is a proprietary 
object. It is also an object for trade so that it can be evaluated by a monetary 
standard. On the other hand, reputation as referred to here is the social 
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evaluation of a person's value. It is not an object for trade or for succession. 
Does a person's interest of reputation perish with the person on his/her death? 
We argue that the answer is no. The interest can survive his/her death. Since 
both the pre-death and the post-death reputation are a social evaluation, they 
can exist in an "alive" form in and through the living's memory and recollections. 
Since a person's reputation can survive his/her death, the posthumous reputation 
is, as that of the living, harmed. 
However, even though the claim "the posthumous reputation can be . 
harmed" is justified, the further claim "the reputation per se is harmed after death" 
does not lead to the conclusion that "the dead are defamed". Feinberg's "Interest 
Principle" suggests that to have an interest is to hold the capacity to experience a 
mental activity, such as awareness. Feinberg reiterates that a dead person does 
not have the capacity to be aware of being defamed. Feinberg does not 
therefore provide an explanation for the crucial question "how can the dead be 
harmed?". He concludes: 
"Events after death can thwart or promote those interests of a person which 
may have 'survived' his death. These include his publicly oriented and other-
regarding interests, and also his 'self-centred' interests in being thought of in 
certain ways by others. Posthumous harm occurs when the deceased's interest 
is thwarted at a time subsequent to his death. The awareness of the subject is 
no more necessary than it is for harm to occur to certain of his interests at or 
before death" (ibid., 308). 
It is correct to say that posthumous events can thwart or promote the surviving 
interests. Posthumous reputation is not only an interest of those who were once 
living persons, but also an interest of their family or friends. When, in this way, 
Feinberg's conclusion is translated into a model of reputation, we become aware 
of a question of whether a person can be posthumously harmed by defamation of 
him/herself. It is not denied that there are some cases in which the family, the 
nation and even the populace are harmed by the defamation of the person. 
87 
Family and friends are the living persons who, of course, have possession of a 
capacity to experience 'awareness of defamation. Given that such defamation 
can be conceived by the living after death, we have to accept that reputation can 
survive and its interest can be harmed posthumously. Yet, this explanation still 
leaves a most difficult question to be answered: "how can the dead be harmed by 
defamation?" Feinberg is very unlikely to have provided an answer to this 
question, which necessarily involves the harm of a dead person. 
2.3 Partridge's criticism of Feinberg's position 
In the paper Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect, Earnest Partridge 
(1981) has argued that "the dead ... have no interests and are beyond both harm 
or benefit" (ibid., 244). These arguments, in the first half of the paper, challenge 
Feinberg's perspective. In the second half of the paper Partridge argues, "an 
analysis of the conditions of moral agency may account for an individual's desire 
to affect events and to be well thought of after his death" (ibid.). He also 
attempts to claim that "warrant for respecting these desires, after a person's 
death, may be found in the traditional notion of 'the social contract'" (ibid.). His 
motivation for involvement in these debates is demonstrated as follows: 
"I will further argue that an examination of our personal and philosophical 
motives for believing in "posthumous harm and interest" may yield significant 
dividends for moral philosophy. In particular, this examination may provide 
clarification of, and warrant for, the fundamental concepts of moral agency and 
moral personality, and for the theory of the social contract. Through a utilisation 
of these concepts, I will argue, we may account for and justify posthumous 
respect for the reputation and wishes of the deceased" (ibid., 245). 
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2.3.1 Detachable interests 
Whilst his discourse over the social contract is carefully and persuasively argued, 
Partridge's criticism of Feinberg's position is not necessarily successful. 
Partridge divides Feinberg's basic argument into three separate arguments. 
First, in "the argument from detachable interests", Partridge points out the 
paradox in Feinberg's argument. Against Feinberg's proposal that posthumous 
interests may survive to be fulfilled only by the coming into existence of that 
which is desired (Feinberg 1977), he pitches the question "but "desired" by 
whom?". He states, "while we may casually talk 'elliptically' or figuratively about 
the 'interests of the dead', closer analysis seems to indicate that, without an 
interest bearer, such talk is senseless" (Partridge 1981, 247). Based on the 
acceptance of the distinction between "want fulfilment" and "want satisfaction", he 
develops his argument as follows: 
"[T]hus, while it is true that interests are, or may be, fulfilled by objective events 
and circumstances, these objective conditions are "interests" only insofar as 
they matter to someone. Take away the personal concern or "stake," say by 
death, and what remain are mere pointless happenings and conditions, not 
"interests"" (ibid., 247). 
However, his argument is incorrect. For death does not necessarily deprive the 
person of interests (e.g., posthumous reputation) fulfilled by objective events and 
circumstances. 
2.3.2 Life is relational 
Second, in the argument that "life is relational", Partridge pays heed to Feinberg's 
claim that an interest is responsive to "a person's desire to stand in certain 
relations to other people" (Feinberg 1977, 305). He argues further: 
"In truth, our lives are extended by our cognitive, emotive, and conative 
relationships with persons, places, plans, intentions, and so forth. In some 
cases, relations can obtain between persons and events that are not concurrent 
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with their lives ... in many cases, a person may correctly be said to be "related 
to" others even after his death" (Partridge 1981, 248). 
However, he denies Feinberg's argument by asserting that, the relation lip has an 
interest in Y" cannot survive the death of the interest bearer (ibid.). The reason 
for this denial is focused on the point that the dead have no capacity to be 
affected by someone (ibid.). He points out that in the circumstance of the dead, 
there are, after death, no events or any other thing that can either alter a moment 
of a person's life, or which remain to be affected. He argues that this is a 
decisive difference between the unborn and the dead. The reason why the 
former have an interest but the latter none, is: 
"[I]t is not the case, strictly speaking, that the lack of present desires and 
concerns, per se, disqualifies the dead from having present interests. Rather, 
they have no present desires because they are dead, and, more to the point, 
they have no interests now because, being dead, nothing that happens now can 
affect their final, immutable, and completed desires and prospects. In 
contradistinction, unborn persons, who likewise have no present desires and 
concerns, can be affected by what happens now, and thus can be said to "have 
an interest" in present policies (e.g., concerning resources and environmental 
preservation, etc.)" (ibid., 249). 
However, this claim courts controversy. According to Partridge, to have an 
interest or not is determined by whether the conditions of life can be affected at 
the present or in the future. The concept and the meaning and scope of "being 
affected" are not clear. If the concept of "interests being affected" is interpreted 
differently, it becomes possible for the dead to have interests. Presumably 
Partridge compares, as an example of interests "directly" affected, the dead with 
the unborn. But if the concept of "being affected" is considered more loosely and 
expanded to include that of "being indirectly affected", then the dead too can be 
affected by what happens now. 
The living can "indirectly" alter the completed lives of the dead. When 
posthumous reputation is defamed, the dead, Partridge argues, have no interests 
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in the reputation. As nothing can affect the dead person's final and immutable 
desires and prospects, the dead do not have an interest. Nevertheless, the 
interest must be that of the dead. Unless it is, the living cannot deal with a resort 
to posthumous insult against them using the same justification as that used to 
deal with insult against the living. Of course, we can have a way in which we 
could rely on the morality of the living to deal with the insult, but that is another 
matter. It is merely a resolution to stop immoral actions occurring to a person 
after their death. 
Can the living affect, whilst alive, their own posthumous interests? When 
a living person learns of the defamation of a dead person, does s/he consider the 
possibility of his/her defamation after his/her death? When person B defames A, 
we take action to enforce B to stop insulting A. This action can apparently affect 
both the subject of the defamation and B. It is possible that, when we ourselves 
are dead, this kind of action might indirectly affect our interests. What we mean 
by "being indirectly affected" is this: if the concept of "directly" can be possible, 
then through a complicated relationship in which the dead, after being observed 
and perhaps defended by living others, can hence affect the way in which other 
dead persons are treated, then so should the concept of "indirectly" be possible. 
The dead can therefore be involved in posthumous interests. Further discussion 
on this topic will be referred to later in the discussion on the idea of a "social 
contract", which Partridge argues for. 
2.3.3 Unaffecting harm 
Partridge asserts, in his third argument, that Feinberg's claim of "unaffecting 
harm" is senseless: 
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"Nothing happens to the dead. No posthumous events can in any way alter a 
single instant of the full scope of events that constitute a completed life. 
Accordingly, after death, with the removal of a subject of harms and a bearer of 
interests, it would seem that there can be neither "harm to" nor "interests of' the 
descendent. Because in such a context, these phrases (Le., "harm to" and 
"interests of') use prepositions with no objects, they are, strictly speaking, 
senseless" (ibid., 253). 
However, Feinberg's claim is not senseless. Let us demonstrate this by revisiting 
and developing the earlier discussion on "hair cutting" (see 1.5.1). We argue that 
a patient in an irreversible coma who has a stated wish not to have her hair cut 
off, is harmed, regardless of the present situation, i.e., her complete lack of 
awareness, if in fact her hair is cut off. She is so harmed because the relevant 
persons such as medical doctors, nurses and her family know "objectively" that 
cutting off her hair is an action against her wishes and therefore an action by 
which she is harmed. 
On the other hand, if a person has stated that their wish is that their hair is 
not to be cut off after their death and yet their hair is cut off after their death, then 
whom does the action harm? If Partridge is right it would be that no one is 
harmed. However, similarly to the case of the patient in an irreversible coma, . 
there is in this case, a relationship between the action of the harm and the object 
of harm, and between the object and the dead person. If Partridge accepts the 
premise that awareness is not the only necessary condition of the interest, then 
he logically should also accept the above relationship. Moreover, if the dead 
have no interests to be harmed by the action of the cutting of the hair, then who 
does have that kind of interest? Is it rather the living person who does not wish 
to have their hair cut off? But this surely could not be possible, the person is 
already dead. 
Considered in this way, we can understand how difficult it is to account for 
how and who does the harm. It has already been explained that there is a 
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particular attribute to cases of defamation of the dead: a person's reputation can 
survive death. The manner of this survival is somewhat different to the way in 
which property can survive death. Basically, property such as a desk and a chair 
can remain, after the owner's death, as they are. Since, however, reputation is a 
social evaluation of a person's personality, it is neither property nor has a visible, 
tangible existence. On or after death it may be modified. In terms of being 
affected, reputation can be altered or affected before death by the person or 
others. It may also be altered or affected after death by the living or the 
antemortem action of the person. Thus, reputation on or after death can be 
affected. 
Therefore, an interest is not relevant to whether the subject is living or 
dead, or whether the subject is aware or not of the interest being harmed. Both 
the patient in an irreversible coma and the dead person has an interest in the 
cutting off of their hair, and both the living and the dead have an interest in 
defamation. Given this, a somewhat ironic question arises: "can a desk or a chair 
have interests?" Needless to say, neither a desk nor a chair can be aware of 
being harmed, nor of being affected. What, therefore, is the difference between 
a desk/chair and a dead person? 
It should be recognised that the interest of a dead person is part of the 
interest that the person previously living possessed. This means that the main 
reason why we are struggling with the problem of the dead and their interests, is 
the fact that the dead person was a person who was previously alive. A desk 
and a chair could never have an interest because they are not and never could 
be living entities. In other words, conceiving whether the dead can have an 
interest relies on being able to identify what it is that the dead succeed to. 
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Whether, for instance, it is derived from what they used to be or whether it is in 
how the actual succession comes about. When we identify the principles of 
succession, we will recognise that an example of succession is reputation. 
Moreover, once the principles of succession are successfully identified, it is 
logical to think that interest in reputation can be succeeded to. 
2.3.4 Another perspective 
Dispensing with the issues of "posthumous interests" and "posthumous harm", 
Partridge, in the second half of his paper, deals with the analysis of cases of 
"posthumous defamation" and "the posthumous breaking of promise". His 
persuasive perspective to some extent resonates with our argument. Partridge 
suggests that "in our society the morally mature person perceives the "badness" 
of betrayal as a generic evil that can happen to, and be bad for, anyone who 
shares our moral conceptions" (ibid., 257). The shared concept of our moral 
conceptions means that, dispensing with the concept of "posthumous interests", 
we can understand that a good reputation is a fine thing to have. This is to say, 
we can have both the viewpoint of an observer: "it is good ... to have a good 
reputation, even though unknown to the subject thereof' (ibid.) and that of the 
subject: "it is good for him to have a good reputation, even though he is 
completely ignorant thereof' (ibid., 257-8). According to Partridge, one is morally 
persuaded that unaffecting and posthumous harms are invasions upon a 
person's interests (ibid., 258). Therefore, he argues that since we live in a moral 
society, we can think of ourselves after death as an object of our moral reflection 
during our lifetime (ibid.). Thus, Partridge argues that even if the dead have no 
interest and irrespective of whether we are concerned about the concept of the 
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posthumous interest, we do not care about anything that happens after death 
because our moral reflection in the living world will be applied to the posthumous 
situation. He claims: 
"Unaffecting and posthumous "harms," then, make sense only from the point of 
view of the objective observer detached from the personal, time- and space-
bound perspective of the immediate subject of experience. It is manifestly not 
from this latter (subjective) perspective that legal wills are drawn up, long-term 
promises given and accepted, and other such moral and legal transactions 
made. To be engaged in a moral enterprise is to treat oneself objectively, as a 
moral personality in a community of such personalities. From such a point of 
view, things and persons cared for are regarded for their own sakes, and thus 
one's concern extends beyond the limits of his own lifetime ... I have an interest 
in affecting events beyond my death because I can imagine, anticipate, and 
evaluate such events now, I can now perceive their impact upon things and 
persons I care for now" (ibid.). 
His above premise suggests that unaffecting and posthumous "harms" are 
senseless from the subject of experience. Who he regards as a subject of an 
interest must be a living person who can affect, as the subject of experience, 
something that happens after his/her death. The interest that a dead person has 
after his/her death is actually ascribed to the living person who has, 
"the abilities to transcend, through imagination, the bounds of one's immediate 
time and place, to consider oneself as an object of conscious reflection, to 
care for things, ideas, and persons beyond oneself, and to reflect in terms of 
abstract moral conceptions" (ibid.). 
Why, however, is it not acceptable to label this interest as "interests of the dead"? 
Partridge would respond to this question as follows: from the point of view 
of an objective observer of to-be-posthumous events and circumstances, a 
perspective necessarily adopted by a person when drawing up his/her will and 
making promises, etc., s/he can conceive of being potentially harmed, although 
some readers may wonder if many people ever do think they will be harmed. 
Partridge says "[o]ne can be quite validly concerned now about events in the 
future that, by hypothesis, one will not see, but can imagine seeing" (ibid., 259). 
We can wish anything well after our death. However, he points out that we must 
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acknowledge limits and draw the line because the well-wishing, i.e., the interests, 
ends with the agent's death. Beyond a person's death s/he cannot be harmed by 
events (ibid.). 
In order to clarify this difficult idea we must establish the difference 
between antemortem and posthumous interests, notwithstanding that they are 
very similar in attributes and character. Reputation per se, as an object for 
defamation, has almost the same attributes insofar as posthumous reputation is 
what is succeeded to from the antemortem reputation. Therefore, we must ask 
whether it is only if the subject is alive that matters? Partridge would not deny 
that interests can survive death and posthumous interests per se can be harmed. 
Again, the problem is whether the dead per se can be harmed. We concur with 
the assertion that the dead, who are not the subject of experience, cannot 
become the subject of harm. However, if interests harmed after death cannot be 
retroactively ascribed to the living, the view that ascribes posthumous interests to 
the dead who succeed to the interests is thwarted. He claims: 
" [8]ecause the living have expectations and concern for having their own wills 
respected, they also have an interest in respecting the will of the deceased. 
That is to say, it is in the interest of the living (out of concern for their own to-be-
posthumous "interests") that they maintain the stable and just institutions that 
secured the wishes expressed by the deceased during their lifetimes. The to-
be-posthumous "interests" of the living are protected by their resolution to 
respect, in their own time, the "quasi-interests" of the deceased" (ibid., 261). 
In short, the posthumous interest is an interest of the living. If a person violates 
this kind of interest of the living, s/he diminishes her/his own anticipation of 
favourably affecting the conditions of life beyond the time of her/his own life. 
This view is against the temporal direction of past to future. The person cannot 
confirm a person's antemortem interest such as expectations that a will he/she 
made will be legally exercised after his or her death. However, the person can 
expect, by observing the fact that other dead person's expectations are realised, 
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that his/her posthumous interests will be exercised upon or after his/her death. 
On the contrary, if the person becomes aware that their expectations will not be 
honoured after death, he/she must, whilst alive, seek a means by which the 
problem can be resolved. When said in that way, a person has no means by 
which they can confirm any posthumous infringement of his/her interest not only 
whist alive but whilst dead. All he/she can do is to imagine their own posthumous 
situation through his/her observation, whilst alive, of posthumous situations. 
Partridge's comments can be interpreted in this light. 
It seems, nonetheless, that Partridge is attempting, by observing one 
person's antemortem interest and another person's posthumous interest, to find 
a kind of continuation in both. If such a view were warranted, he would be 
attempting to attribute a person's interest to another subject. This is ridiculous. If 
we can acknowledge that one person's interest is distinct and separate from 
another person's interest and yet at the same time recognise that the person's 
antemortem interest is also his/her posthumous interest in that it can survive 
death, then it would be logical to ascribe that interest to the dead, insofar as the 
posthumous interest is associated with the dead. There are no reasons for 
ascribing the person's interest to another person. 
2.4 Levenbook's criticism 
2.4.1 Two presuppositions 
In drawing the same conclusion as Feinberg, Barbara Bau,m Levenbook, in her 
paper Harming Someone after His Death (1984), develops a characteristic 
perspective. Levenbook first uses "A's death" to name an event or process. She 
defines person A's death as "what occurs at the first moment at which A no 
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longer exists" (ibid., 410). If the premise is acceptable that A can lose something 
at the first moment at which A no longer exists, then a further premise follows 
that A can also lose something at a later period after death. For example, A can 
lose his/her mental functions at the moment of death, but cannot however lose 
his/her reputation after death. She argues that there is no problem with ascribing 
losses to him/her at any time after his/her death. Thus since A can lose 
something after his/her death, he/she can be harmed after death. 
Levenbook argues: "Einstein has not lost his reputation as a scientific 
genius, even though he had that reputation until his death. One must claim 
either that he cannot lose it now, having retained the reputation until his death 
and now being incapable of losing anything, or that he still has the reputation and 
can lose it now" (ibid., 417). Of course she supports the latter position. Callahan 
points out that "this ... is not a description of something Einstein has or has not 
got" (1987, 343). It is a description of "us ... It is an assertion of what some in 
the existing community of believers believe" (ibid.). She argues further, ""Einstein 
has not lost his reputation as a scientific genius" does not imply that Einstein has 
something that he could now lose. What it implies is that we, the living believers, 
have beliefs that we could lose" (ibid.) [original italics]. Is Callahan's criticism of 
Levenbook's argument valid? 
For Callahan, to say "A lost his mental functions at the moment of death" 
is merely to say "The mental function of A ceased at his death". Since A's death 
is the termination of A and all his capacities, including his capacities to gain or 
lose, there is nothing that A can gain or .Iose after his death. If there should be a 
flaw in this plausible counter-argument, it would be ignorance towards the 
ambiguity of the concept of "losing". Can the concept of losing as used by 
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Callahan in "the living losing" and "the dead losing" be taken to mean the same 
thing? 
2.4.2 The concept of "loss" 
Compare "the loss of reputation" with "the loss of life by homicide". A person as 
the subject of his reputation conceives loss when it is harmed. Take for example 
the personal reputation: "He is an honest man". This reputation could be 
. undermined or lost by, for instance, a false accusation such as "He is a 
hypocrite". However, this kind of loss can be recovered. A can have many 
occasions by which to regain his previously good reputation. His reputation 
cannot be lost on his death, rather it can and does survive his death. Reputation 
therefore is an example of what is not affected by the loss of "all his capacities, 
including his capacities to gain or lose". Therefore, to say "Einstein as a scientific 
genius has not lost his reputation" suggests not only that we believe he may lose 
his reputation but that Einstein has, in a form irrelevant to his capacities, 
something which can be lost. 
Conversely, in the case of "loss of life by homicide", A's death, Callahan 
points out, terminates A's life and all his capacities. The loss of life is 
irreversible: A can never regain his/her life. Logically, there can be no further 
occasions when the deceased A can be harmed by a loss of his life: A cannot die 
twice because of the very attributes and meaning of "homicide". However, 
his/her reputation can be, in terms of its attributes, harmed after the homicide; 
precisely because the attributes of reputation are now (Le., after death) irrelevant 
to all his/her capacities which are already lost. 
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2.5 Callahan's criticism 
2.5.1 The definition of interests 
As mentioned in the previous section, Callahan points out, "Levenbook has been 
led astray by ordinary talk about losses to the dead" (1987, 342). In a counter 
argument, we have pointed out that since Callahan misrepresents the concept of 
"losing", she overlooked the existence of "the interests" that can be gained or lost 
after the bearer's death. She rebuts Feinberg's claim that "the dead can be 
harmed" with the argument that "the dead cannot be harmed". Is the argument of 
her rebuttal valid? 
Callahan first denies Feinberg's account of the problem "If dead persons 
do not exist as interest bearers, how is it that they can be harmed?" (ibid., 344). 
She criticises Feinberg's reasoning that even though a person no longer exist~, 
the person's interest can survive in the same way that his/her obligations and 
claims can survive death. She argues that these obligations and claims are no 
longer· A's but his/her family's. Her argument thus accords with the line pursued 
in this thesis. However, if she conceives of A's reputation as surviving in the 
same way that we think of his/her table and chairs surviving death, i.e., by the 
principle of succession, then her argument must fail. A person's reputation is a 
prime example of an interest surviving a person's death. 
However, Callahan does not accept Feinberg's definition by which the 
sense of "interest" is taken to mean "having a stake in", She argues that if this 
definition is adopted the following incoherence results: 
"Doe's interest in moving to the country does not become the city-bred Doe 
children's interest on his death. But responsibility for debts Doe incurred and 
what had been his property become theirs. Interests, then, simply do not 
survive a person after his death in the way some of the obligations and claims 
he had do. For those obligations and claims no~ transfer to living debtors and 
claimants. This is how they survive. But the interests a person had before 
death only survive as interests if they are carried on by living interest bearers --
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that is, if the living take up (or had and continue to share) the stake a former 
person had (to put it badly) in some matter" (ibid., 344) [original italics]. 
2.5.2 Inheritance of interest 
Let us apply the precepts of our argument above to "reputation", as an example 
of interest. A person's reputation is an interest that a person bears. According to 
Callahan, if reputation is to survive a person's death this can only occur in an 
instance when his/her family or someone else takes up the stake they had. By 
implication, the reputation that no one takes up cannot survive the person's 
death. This argument can be found not only to be inconsistent but also false in 
the following account. 
If Callahan's account is right, then this "reputation" is not effectively the 
deceased person's reputation at all, but rather the reputation of those (e.g., his 
family) who take up the interest in it. However, when we consider the attributes 
of a person's reputation, we become aware that reputation is a social evaluation 
of the person and that this evaluation is personal, not inheritable. If this rebuttal 
is valid, then Callahan's argument fails on two counts. 
First, the social evaluation can neither be inherited nor can a person's 
reputation be shared as another's interest. On the basis of Callahan's claim, 
even though, after death, the reputation shared by the person's family, for 
example, is harmed, the harm is actually to the family's reputation and not to the 
reputation that the person held whilst alive. Therefore, if Callahan's claim is right, 
it follows that there is no reputation that can survive death. Second, insofar as 
reputation is personal, we cannot discuss reputation in the same way that we can 
discuss an object for succession (e.g., obligations, claims, and even desks or 
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chairs). By placing reputation and inheritable things in the same category, 
Callahan fails to acknowledge that there is an interest that can survive death. 
2.6 Summary 
From the above controversy over "can the dead be harmed?", we will at least 
arrive at a following perspective as a resolvable approach to the debate on 
lidefamation of the dead". 
What has been overlooked in the debate is a proper understanding of the 
concept "reputation". If we identify reputation with social evaluation, we can 
distinguish it between a living person's and a dead person's. Reputation can be 
understood to have a twofold structure. One is the "subjective" reputation 
attached to the person's personality that can be recognised through his/her 
actual experience and emotions. The other is the "objective" reputation as 
something distant from the person's own perception: acknowledgement and 
recognition. 
In many cases of defamation, the structure is not considered as double 
but as sole. If we accept that the concept "reputation" has a twofold structure in 
light of "subjectivity" or "objectivity", we will understand that the reputation which 
survives death is only that of the latter. It follows that death deprives a person of 
the reputation that the person recognised as a part of their personality, while the 
other social reputation continues to exist after the person's death. The latter 
reputation can be harmed and lost, both while the person is living, and after their 
death. 
Therefore, a case of defamation of the living refers to the case in which a 
person's personal reputation, that the person can perceive of or recognize as a 
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part of his/her character, is damaged; to the other case in which his/her social 
evaluation is damaged; to both cases. On the other hand, a case of defamation 
of the dead refers only to that in which the person's social evaluation is 
damaged. The proper understanding of this difference is quite vital because a 
feature of reputation enables a person's repute to survive his/her death. That is 
why, even if the subject being harmed is extinct, the subject's reputation that 
survives death can still be harmed. 
That the person's reputation that survived his/her death is harmed refers 
to the event in which the person's posthumous social reputation was altered. 
Therefore, the social evaluation that was altered after death cannot be attributed 
to the person who was once alive. It should be the dead who have the reputation 
that exists after death. Otherwise, if it is possible to attribute the posthumously 
harmed reputation to the person who was once alive, then it becomes possible to 
attribute the defamation which was done at time 1 (when the person was once 
alive), to the person who was alive at time 2 before time1. This is ridiculous. It is 
so because, by understanding that the defamation which was done is against a 
personal reputation, one of the twofold reputation structures the living perceive 
of, the subject recognizes the defamatory action and therefore the reputation can 
be to the person who can recognize it at the time of the defamation. Thus, there 
is a considerable difference of characteristics in the way that one maintains one's 
reputation between the stages of "before one's death", and "after one's death". 
Nevertheless, the problem of whether the defamation can be attributed to 
the dead in a case where the reputation that survives death is damaged still 
remains unsolved. This reputation is related to "social characteristics", one of the 
main concepts in this thesis. As explicated in Chapter 4, "social characteristics" 
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is a sociological concept which can be applied to the dead and which can be 
extracted only from its relevance with society or communities. Where the social 
characteristics link themselves to rights, they link themselves. to interests of 
society or communities. That is to say, they necessarily open. the way to 
answering the question: "do the dead have interests?". As an example of social 
characteristics, as far as damaging the reputation of the dead is concerned, its 
interest and the attribution of the interests can be understood within the 
dependent relation with the living or in the place of the dead in society. 
2.7 Examination and review in substantial law 
2.7.1 Community and reputation 
In the introduction, the initial discussion on whether the dead have an interest 
suggested, in the light of philosophical examination, that there are both 
advantages and disadvantages in admitting the dead have interests. A further 
dichotomy is evidenced in Japanese and English substantive law which evince 
markedly different attitudes in belief and approach to "defamation of the dead": 
the central subject of the dead's interests. In this section we will examine to what 
extent and how "defamation of the dead" is recognised, dealt with and justified in 
both Japanese and English law. 
Unlike the philosophical discussion in the previous sections, the diverse 
debates based on the substantive law of Japan and England oblige us to 
recognise that any attempt to promote and protect the reputation of the dead 
through the incorporation of a right, raises a number of important, practical 
questions which need to be addressed by the legal system in a modern nation. 
The true importance of the reputation of the dead lies in social praxis. Within the 
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dynamics of any communitl5 we can find recognition of the significance of the 
role of the dead: the reputation of the dead arises from analogy or extension to 
the reputation of the living. The dead represent an important means through 
which the living can express their identity. At the same time the dead are 
intimately embedded in the living's consciousness of their community. If the 
significance of the reputation of the living has a function in assisting the bonding 
of community, then that of the dead also has the same functional explanation. 
Therefore, we might say that the dead may be involved at a deeper level in the 
community than the living. They may be so because they are dead and therefore 
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work through the consciousness of the living; in that sense it would be at a 
deeper level, insofar as such influence is not easily accessible. 
If, when observing the modes and functions concerning the way that 
reputation is protected and valued in the community, mutual concern between 
the members is understood to be not only a fact of human psychology and 
inclination but also a normal mode of i~terdependence, then the value of the law 
of defamation can be seen as a defence against the latent danger inherent in the 
relationship between individuals in a social organisation where extensive 
libertarian rights can be claimed. The Communitarian perspective (e.g., see 
Sandel 1982) suggests that we can grasp the essential structure of a community 
as a transition from the interaction of individuals to solidarity through 
interdependency. However, when we analogise the defamation of the living to 
that of the dead, we recognise that a theoretical grasp of the idea of a reputation 
of the dead is complex. This is because, in addition to the conflict between 
65 The term "community" is used here to refer to "society not as an aggregate of 
individuals, but as an interactive entity that reflects and enhances human sociability" 
(Freeden 1991, 69) and that leads the members of society into co-operation through mutual 
sympathy and interdependency. 
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individuals, a new conflict arises between individuals and the dead (this conflict 
will manifest through the actions of the living). Yet, it must be emphasised that 
respect for individual ends is upheld even in the Communitarian perspective: the 
theory of collective action and that of personal freedom are both fundamental. 
Whilst the issues on defamation have been debated in relation to the greater 
social whole, they must now be debated in relation to the individual. 
If we consider defamation of both the living and the dead as a potential 
danger to the functional bonding of the community, it should also be accepted 
that the dead as well as the living are involved in interests that should be 
protected to some extent at the least. As mentioned below, many of the nations 
which evaluate the functional advantage as important, further accept the concept 
of "reputation of the dead"-notwithstanding how "interests of the dead" should 
be construed is controversial-so as to promote social interest (even England 
may be considering integrating the concept into its substantial law). 66 It is 
evidenced by the fact that laws with relation to defamation of the dead, as well as 
that of the living, exist in criminal codes, which, in general, protect and value 
public interests in many countries. 67 At the same time, the individualist 
argument can also be invoked to justify a claim for this kind of protection of 
interests. That is to say, whilst the arguments are endorsed in favour of a highly 
mutual and interdependent community, the protection of rights of the dead can 
be couched in terms favouring the individual as well. Thus rights of the dead 
comes to be a distinguished value that both the community and individuals can 
take advantage of. Therefore, when we recognise that the rights of reputation 
66 See paras 419-420 of Report of the Committee on Defamation (1975). 
67 Basically, even in England and Wales defamation of the dead have been dealt with 
as an issue on criminal law (see per Lord Kenyon C. J., R V. Topham 100 RR 931, 933 
(1791); Woolman 1981,31-32). 
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serve to enhance both the value that the living enjoy in their community and the 
value per se of the community, we will understand that defamation is one of the 
most significant modes of rights of the dead. Nevertheless, there are markedly 
different attitudes prevalent in particular legal systems with regard to "defamation 
of the dead". An exegesis of these differences as exhibited in Japanese and 
English law provides an insight into the problems proposers of the rights of the 
dead argument necessarily have to confront and redress. 
2.7.2 England's ignorance 
The English principle toward defamation of the dead68 is pronounced. In the 
1934 debate in the House of Lords, the then Chancellor stated " ... no action will 
be able to be brought for a libel on a dead man". But, he added the following 
proviso: "[t]he day may come when this particular matter may have to receive 
further consideration but ... ". This implies the reason given by the Law Revision 
Committee 1934 that "the presence of the plaintiff or of the defendant may be of 
the greatest importance" is unconvincing (see The Lord High Chancellor and the 
Lord Advocate 1975, 114). 
In 1948 the Porter Committee explained the principle of excluding 
consideration of a case when the defamed is dead as follows (The Lord High 
68 The legal history of defamation of the dead can be traced back to Roman law, in 
which it was not iniuria (the relevant bodily injury) to defame the character of the dead, but it 
was injuria and illegal to insult their bodies or their funerals. Such action granted their heirs 
the right to sue for defamation (Buckland and McNair 1936). Likewise, their family cannot 
sue on the ground for the defamation of the dead, "but criminal proceedings will lie if the libel 
amounts to a "vilifying of the deceased with a view to injure his posterity"" (ibid., 299). In this 
way the Roman approach to remedies was similar to the present one adopted by those 
countries with defamation laws for the dead. In the same way that crimes have been 
influenced by the relative values of society, so the meanings of defamation of the dead have 
been affected by the different styles of politics and culture, and the social beliefs of the day. 
Nowadays, defamation of the dead is categorised not just as an infringement of the dead 
person's peace, but also as an infringement of that person's reputation. 
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Chancellor 1954, paras. 27-28). The entire two paragraphs will be quoted for 
greater understanding. 
"27. Under the existing law, statements about the dead, however false and 
malicious they may be and however much distress they may cause to friends 
and relatives of the deceased, do not form the subject of a civil action, nor-
except to the limited extent mentioned above - of a criminal prosecution. The 
essence of civil proceedings for defamation is the damage caused to the 
reputation of the plaintiff. It is, therefore, difficult to see any logical basis upon 
which to found a proposal that the relatives of a deceased person should be 
entitled to bring an action for statements defamatory of the deceased alone. If 
such statements are also defamatory of the living they are, of course, 
actionable under the existing law. It would be equally difficult to find any 
sufficient justification for granting such right of action to the personal 
representatives of the deceased. The basis for a right of action on the part of 
personal representatives is the injury suffered by the estate of the deceased; 
and his estate cannot normally be damaged by defamatory statements made 
after his death. 
"28. The essentially personal character of a man's right to his good reputation 
and of the action for defamation which exists for this protection was recognised 
in 1934 in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934, which excepted 
actions for defamation from those categories of personal actions which survive 
for the benefit of the estate of the plaintiff. We do not think that a sufficient 
case has been made out for a departure from this principle". 
The English principle infers that a human's right to good reputation and privacy 
belongs to him/herself and no others have any entitlement to any action to 
defend him/her against defamation (Gibbons 1996). Therefore, in the case of 
defamation of the dead, the bereaved cannot enforce the right in place of the 
dead and for the benefit of him/her. When, for example, the victim of defamation 
dies during the proceedings of an action the action becomes extinct and the 
relatives cannot bring a further action to protect the estate of the deceased using 
legal mechanisms such as succession or personal representatives. 
One state of Canada, a member of the Common Law nations, prohibits an 
administrator from bringing an action for defamation of the dead. But when a 
case of defamation of the dead simultaneously corroborates defamation of living 
persons such as the dead person's relatives and friends, then the case is held to 
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be absolutely relevant to the living's defamation. The reasons why Anglo-
American law demonstrates such limited provision towards defamation of the 
dead and their bereaved need explication. 
The first reason is derived from the characteristics of reputation. 
Reputation can be characterised as pertaining to the personality and 
exclusiveness of a person. It refers to the evaluation of a person as made by 
others. It is not that which is worthy of being given, but that which a person is 
credited with. 
In 1948 the Porter Committee explains the reason for not dealing with 
defamation of the dead in the following manner (The Lord High Chancellor 1954, 
para. 29): 
"29. Similar objections do not exist in the case of criminal proceedings for libel 
of the dead; but there are practical disadvantages in so extending the existing 
law which satisfy us that it is not in the public interest that such an alteration 
should be made. Historians and biographers should be free to set out facts as 
they see them and to make their comment and criticism upon the events which 
they have chronicled. But to produce the strict proof of the statements 
contained in their writings which the English law of evidence requires, becomes, 
increasingly difficult with the lapse of time. If those engaged in writing history 
were compelled, for fear of proceedings for libel, to limit themselves to events of 
which they could provide proof acceptable to a Court of law, records of the past 
would, we think, be unduly and undesirably curtailed". 
To this report, the Committee on Defamation (The Lord High Chancellor 1975) 
expresses the following doubts: 
"419. We do not think these paragraphs (27-29) take sufficiently into account 
the interests of the public and of the near relatives of the deceased. It is quite 
true that to introduce and action for defamation of the dead is to introduce an 
entirely new course of action. It would be an action to prevent people from 
telling defamatory lies about a dead man shortly after he is dead. Why should it 
remain lawful to add to the grief of a widow by stating falsely just after her 
husband has been buried that he was a criminal? We think that there should be 
a limited protection for such near relatives". 
Moreover, the Committee provides criticism of Paragraph 29 of the Porter Report, 
as follows: 
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"420. Paragraph 29 of the Porter Report does not deal sufficiently with the 
question whether a person should be allowed to publish defamatory statements 
about a dead man within a short time of his death. Records of his past wi" not 
be "unduly and desirably curtailed" if for a few years after a man's death 
historians and biographers are limited to saying what they can prove to be true. 
Where publications contain false accusations against dead men, they constitute 
a highly objectionable method of profiting out of his death and in our opinion, 
while grief is fresh and for rather longer, such accusations should be actionable. 
We put the period at five years, but some of us would prefer three. Five years 
we regard as a limit, however, which means that, greatly through we sympathise 
with the complaints expressed to us by descendants of Earl Lloyd George and 
of Frances, Countess of Warwick (who have been most unflatteringly portrayed 
on television), there is nothing we can do for them. It is just not practicable nor 
desirable to equip the law to deal with "old unhappy far off things and battles 
long ago"". 
The exclusion rule is related to freedom of speech. However, the criticism made 
by the Committee is justifiable. Even in cases where an executor and the 
relatives bring an action of defamation of the deceased, the freedom of speech of 
historians and biographers should not be infringed. Nevertheless, whether they 
be historians or biographers, intentional defamation made by distorted facts 
should be sanctioned. Such defamatory action is in any event inimical to the 
promotion of accurate history and biography. The principle of the freedom of 
speech should be guaranteed in the social order. Insofar as an attack of 
defamation is deemed illegal, it would not be appropriate for the current English 
law to protect infringement of the dead's reputation. 
The second reason bears on the limitations of the "exclusion" principle. 
This principle emphasises reasons for exclusion based on history and literature, 
but seems ignorant of the need to apply the principle more universally. In 
consequence, the principle seems to fail in light of legal generalisation. Based 
on the reasoning of the "exclusion principle" it would seem reasonable to infer 
that the majority of English people are subjects of description in history and 
biography. Needless to say however, in most cases concerning the general 
population, the problem is not with defamation in historical and biographical 
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accounts but with defamation at a mundane level. In a case where the 
defamation is levelled equally at the dead and their relatives, there would be a 
remedy by litigation. But even in a case where there are no relatives, there is no 
reason why protecting the dead should be ignored. It would be a very 
unreasonable state of affairs if, when a person is alive, the defamation against 
him/her is regarded as an illegal infringement, yet when they die such a claim 
should be rejected on account of their being dead. If the protection of reputation 
should be rejected by the fact of death, for example, when a person breaks a 
promise made to a deceased person before their death, there is also by the 
same logic no possibility of claiming against the breach. 
It should be noted that this review of the Anglo-American law's very limited 
provision to embrace issues of defamation of the dead locates the basis of this 
limitation in the report of the Committee on Defamation (1975). Given this, it 
would be significant to review why English law still continues to reject claims of 
defamation of the dead. The common law nations, such as the United State of 
America, Canada, and Australia exhibit an equally limited provision for 
defamation of the dead. It should be appreciated that the essence of this 
limitation is grounded in their links with English law. To reiterate, therefore, we 
should ideally review why defamation of the dead remains a largely ignored 
subject in Anglo-American law. However, such a review is beyond the present 
scope of this thesis. 
2.7.3 The reality of the Japanese substantial law 
Where, by defamatory statements against a deceased person or by an 
infringement such as disclosure of details of private life, the reputation of the 
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dead is damaged, there are two kinds of legal remedy. One is that law concedes 
the concept "defamation of the dead" to be available and regarded as the 
infringement against moral rights of the dead and directly protects interests of the 
dead. The other is that, although law does not concede the direct protection of 
rights to the dead's character, it instead protects the bereaved's rights of 
character when the infringement is against the relatives closely related to the 
dead. The former can be called "direct protection" (OP for convenience) and the 
latter "indirect protection" (lOP) (ashitomi 1990, 171-2). 
The lOP theory has a twofold structure. One aspect states that a 
defamatory act is directly committed against the bereaved. This is the same form 
as general defamation. The other aspect is that a defamatory act is directly 
committed against the dead but in consequence it harms the bereaved's 
respectable and devoted feelings for the dead. In the latter case the bereaved 
may bring an action to claim for a legal remedy on the ground that they hold their 
own rights of character. In the light of protecting the dead from an infringement 
against the rights to character of the dead, both can be justified by the lOP 
perspective. As a matter of fact, however, both OP and lOP camps seem to lack 
conclusive grounds for their own justification. We will espouse the OP thesis and 
develop our position for justification. 
Defamation of the dead in Japan 69 is associated with both civil and 
criminal law. There are however merely two specific prescriptions regarding 
defamation of the dead in Japanese law: 
(1) Article 230 (Defamation) of the Criminal Code: 
"1. A person who defames another person by publicly making an allegation shall 
be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
69 Except Japan and Germany, cases where moral rights of the dead are protected 
are found in Art. 85-3 of the Hungarian Civil Code and the interpretation of Article 101 of the 
Chinese Civil Code (see Wang and Mo 1999). 
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three years, or with a fine not exceeding five hundred thousand yen, regardless 
of whether or not the said allegation is true. 2. A person who defames a 
deceased person shall not be punished unless the defamation is based on a 
false allegation". 
(2) Article 60 of Copyright Law (Law No. 48, 1970) 
(Protection of Moral Interests after the Author's Death) 
"Even after the death of the author, any person who offers or makes such 
author's work available to the public may not commit an act which would harm 
the moral rights of the author if he or she were alive; provided that this shall not 
apply, if an act is found not to be against the will of the author in the light of the 
nature and extent of the act as well as changes in social and other conditions". 
Article 230 is divided into two paragraphs: the first prescribes for defamation for 
the living and the second, for the dead. This division suggests there is difference. 
in the requirements for bringing a criminal action on behalf of the living and the 
dead. The Article does not punish those who defame the dead in the same way 
as those who defame the living. The conditional character of the Article of the 
Criminal Code lies in the respect that only a case of false accusation can lead to 
punishment for the crime of defamation of the dead. The question of "why this 
conditional requirement is needed" will be explained later. Moreover, since this 
crime is regarded as a crime requiring a complaint from the victim for prosecution 
to ensue (Shinkoku za/), we will need to review the question of "why defamation 
of the dead is regarded as a crime" . .In addition to such debate on "defamation of 
the dead", it will be necessary to discuss in this chapter several derivative issues: 
first, whether an act of defaming the dead can be sued by tort law despite there 
being no civil prescription for defamation of the dead; secondly, if that proves to 
be the case, who can claim against those who defame the dead; and third, 
whether the victim in the Criminal Code can be a claimant in the Civil Code. 
Whilst the issues of defamation of the dead is closely linked to both the Criminal 
Code and the Civil Code, we have to note that this linkage is not uncomplicated 
mainly because of the diversity of views on interests of victims. 
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If that which is protected in Article 230 I is a right of reputation, we need 
diverse devices of justifying how there exist crimes against a right of reputation of 
the dead under a general rule that the dead have no rights. Even if a view 
argues that rights of reputation are only for the living but not for the dead, some 
devices for its justification are required. Professor T. Uematsu (1974,333; see 
Kawabata 1996, 117) contends that, despite an extreme exception from the 
coherency of the legal system, the reputation a person once held should be 
protected even after his/her death, due to the social consensus that a person's 
reputation is recognized as a decisively high value and importance in human life. 
In Uematsu's view the dead's reputation would be actually the reputation which 
the dead had when he/she was alive. This view is in accordance with the DP 
thesis. On the other hand, Professor Maeda (1995) considers the reputation 
prescribed in Article 230 II as the devoted feelings that the bereaved hold for the 
dead. This view is in accordance with the IDP thesis. Although legal remedies 
can be justified by either of the DP thesis or IDP thesis, the discussion on "what 
the interest of Article 230 I is" enables the third thesis to stand up. R. Hirano 
(1972, 79) claims that the article of the Criminal Code was prescribed for 
protecting the living's expectations regarding the posthumous dealing with the 
reputation of the dead. He also argues that, although there is found the term 
"defamation of the dead" in the Article, it expresses no more than the feelings 
that members of society do not want to be defamed after their death as we" as in 
their life. Evidently, the second view and third one regard the living, not the dead, 
as the subject of interests. 
We are required to regard the term "defamation" in Article 230 I in the 
same light as the term "defamation" in Article 230 II, because the same words 
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exist in the same provision. We should understand that both the first section and 
the second one of the article are provisions for the infringement against rights to 
reputation and thereby the concept "reputation" per se is dealt with in the same 
way. Although we point out, in reiteration, that there are structural differences 
between the living's reputation and the reputation of the dead, the first view is 
legitimate in that an interpretation is required for consistency of the Article that 
the antemortem reputation survived death. However, we still remain with a 
question unsolved, that is the question of "why the dead can be legally protected 
despite the fact that the dead do not physically enjoy interests in life if the 
interests in the provisions are for individual's life" (Yoneyama 1998, 90). With 
regard to this point, the second view attributes reputation, an interest in life, to 
the bereaved. To its advantage this view has coherency in that it accords the 
interest of the deceased to the claimant for its protection. The third view thinks 
the legislative intent of the provision lies in protecting the individual's abstract and 
general expectations rather than individual's interests in life from the infringement 
against them. This view considers the legal interests in Article 230 as public 
interests but not as personal ones. Therefore it regards the substance of the 
defamation prescribed in the first subsection as an individual's feelings of 
disgrace and that prescribed in the second subsection as an infringement against 
individual's feelings of how they are being posthumously dealt with. It follows 
that, whilst they are according with each other in terms of an infringement against 
feelings, their contents of feelings are different. Namely, the feelings that 
individuals can recognize and the expectations that individuals can create after 
their death in terms of their being treated. 
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In the debate on interests of protection concerned with the dead who can 
not be the subject of rights or interests, Dr. S. Ono (1970) espouses, under an 
understanding that the reputation of groups which do not hold the legal capacity 
of juridical persons can be allowed to be a object for legal protection, the 
extension that the dead can be regarded as a subject of legal interests. He 
contends that a deceased person exists in a family relation as a moral entity 
(ibid.) and further that social and external reputation can be thought to exist as a 
legal interest for the sake of the dead, and therefore there is no difficulty in 
regarding a deceased person as a passive subject of the defamation (ibid., 209). 
Professor Hirakawa (1995, 227) also argues that views which do not accept the 
dead as a subject of legal interests are not appropriate because they stand on 
the ground of the human-centric orientations, and that, since the dead are 
entities included in the composition of the world, they can be a subject of legal 
interests. 
What should be emphasized here is that, irrespective of the fact that the 
Japanese criminal code has a provision of "defamation of the dead", Japanese 
law does not concede the dead to be subjects of rights. Being a subject refers to 
an entity who enjoys interests identified with contents of the right. The dead can 
not be a subject who enjoys rights of reputation or moral character. Yet even if it 
were not for the dead's rights of reputation or moral character, it does not follow 
that the dead have neither reputation nor character. Professor S. Machida 
(1996) criticizes the view which argues that the character of personhood survives 
death as being fictitious, but, despite such a criticism, in the light of recognition, 
the surviving character really functions in society (Yoneyama 1998, 94; footnote 
25). We do not stand on the recognition that if a person dies then nothing of the 
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person remains. Since our culture is composed of what has been produced and 
accumulated by the character of the living and the dead, the provision on 
"defamation of the dead" was created on the basis that the deceased are entitled 
to protection. To reiterate, the dead cannot enjoy profits even if this reputation is 
legally protected. Nevertheless, the dead are definitely a subject to which the 
damaged reputation is attributed. As Hirakawa (1995) addressed, the event of a 
person's death does not alter the person's character per se, but people's 
evaluation of the character and concern drawn from the character are likely to be 
changed. In this sense, the Criminal Code does not apply the reputation of the 
living to that of the dead, but protects the dead's reputation that the dead have at 
present (Yoneyama 1998, 92-3). Thus our position suggests that DP of the 
bereaved's feelings to the dead and of the expectations of being posthumously 
treated is not the substance of the legislative intent of Article 230 II. Protection is 
no more than indirectly and partially functioned by the obedience of the provision. 
In addition, thus regarded by the Japanese as an unlawful act, law 
prescribes tortous liability in Articles 709-724 of the Civil Code. The principle of 
this "unlawful act" is "[a] person who intentionally or negligently violates the rights 
of others shall be liable for the loss caused by the act". If this violation against 
the rights is interpreted into illegality and only if there is an infringement against 
an interest that is worth legal protection, even a weak interest can be protected 
although it is not established as a new right. As mentioned below, Japanese 
case laws and leading theories accept reputation, as an interest worthy of 
protection by the Civil Code (see Igarashi 1989). In that case, however, it takes 
for granted that the protected subject is a living person. An important question of 
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how an interest worthy of being legally protected exists should be asked in a 
case of posthumous defamation. 
With the above discussion in mind, we will examine the reality of law 
cases in practice. 
There are no judgments of the Supreme Tribunal or the Supreme Court 
with regard to defamation of the dead. There are a few court decisions and 
reconciliation cases in lower courts and high courts. It should be noted that 
these cases are not relevant to the prosecution by Article 230 " of the Criminal 
Code, but to tortous liability caused by damaging the dead's reputation. 
However, the scarcity of cases does not mean that the importance of the concept 
is worthless. Rather it should be appreciated that the provision of the Criminal 
Code plays a functional role in protecting legal interests and deterring offenses. 
In the first civil case70 regarding defamation of the dead, the Tokyo District 
Court held that, even though defamation of the dead can be sued under the 
Criminal Code, any claim under the Civil Code is not feasible. The reason is that 
a claimant for compensation caused by unlawful act should in principle be a 
subject to whom is attributed infringed rights and that where a deceased person 
is defamed the deceased person cannot claim for the compensation nor can 
his/her relatives (children in this case) claim for the compensation on the grounds 
that the dead was defamed. Needless to say, in a case where the infringement 
to the reputation of the dead resulted in the relative's infringement, they can 
claim for a legal remedy on the ground of the infringement against their "own" 
rights. 
70 Judgement of the Tokyo District Court, 20 November 1903 (Horitsushinbun 175, 
17). 
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In a novel Jiko no tenmatsu (written by Toshimi Usui) published in Tenbo, 
a general magazine, the writer concluded that a main reason for the motivation of 
the suicide of Yasunari Kawabata, a Nobel-prize novelist, was his obsession with 
a young maid who took care of him. Kawabata's bereaved took legal action 
against the writer and the publisher. However, reconciliation between the parties 
was made on the 16th of August in the year before the judgement of the Tokyo 
District Court?1 
In a Rakujitu moyu case 72 of 1977, a member of the family of the 
deceased sued a novelist for defamation. In a biographical work titled Rakujitsu 
moyu (The Sunset Is Flaming), Saburo Shiroyama described the whole life of 
Kouki Hirota, a former Prime Minister. Presuming about the mysterious suicide 
(in 1929) of Sadao Saburi, a Minister of China and Hirota's political opponent, 
Shiroyama described Saburi's reasons for suicide as follows: 
"In addition, it is said that he [Saburi] not only involved himself in women of red-
light districts but also with some wives of his subordinates. The very dignified 
Hirota was reported to have said 'he is not worthy of being called a minister', 
and frowned severely towards Saburi's wholly improper personal behaviour" 
(1974,71) [my translation]. 
The plaintiff X, a nephew of Saburi, claimed these paragraphs defamed the 
deceased Saburi's reputation. He also claimed that the author should make a 
public apology and be liable for monetary compensation, a million Yen. The 
Tokyo District Court showed a positive attitude towards defamation of the dead in 
the decision: "When, by the action of defaming the reputation of the dead (e.g., 
by means of an abuse of the reputation of the deceased) the living involved, such 
as the bereaved, are defamed, it goes without saying that the action should be 
argued as tort on the grounds that the defamation is against the living 
71 For the details on the beginning of the file up to the reconciliation, see Igarashi 
1977,55. 
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themselves." As a matter of fact, however, the court did not take "defamation of 
the dead" into consideration. It dealt with the case as a case of damaging the 
respectable feelings of the bereaved for the dead by defaming the dead. The 
court held "it should be understood that the action of defaming the reputation of 
the dead can be illegal only insofar as the defamation is the result of a false 
allegation". Thus the decision was against the plaintiffs claim because there was 
no evidence to prove the action as false allegation (see Igarashi 1977,55). 
The appeal court dealt with this case, as well as the first instant judgment, 
as a claim for a tortous remedy against the infringement of the bereaved's 
devoted feelings to the deceased. Yet, in terms of regarding the judgment of the 
illegality, the appeal judgment is different from the initial instant judgment. One 
point is that despite addressing both the rights of character of the dead and 
Article 230 " of the Criminal Code, the appeal court judged whether the action of 
defaming the dead can be applied to the illegal infringement against the 
bereaved's rights of character. This is evidently inconsistent. The other point is 
that the appeal court emphasised the consideration on passing years. The 
implication of the passing years suggests that consideration should be given 
priority to the freedom for seeking historical facts or the freedom of speech, not 
only because passing years reduce the bereaved's devoted feelings to the dead 
but also because facts concerned with the dead are changed, year by year, into 
historical facts. 
The fact that people's memories of the dead inevitably fade away accords 
with one of the reasons why English law rejects the protection of the rights of 
character of the dead. In this appeal case, the court held that, because of 
72 Judgement of the Tokyo District Court, 11 July 1977 (Hanrei-jiho 857, 65). 
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publicly making an allegation after forty-four years of death, a condition should be 
~atisfied that the allegation should be serious falsehood or lie or that the 
infringement should be beyond endurance. Moreover, it should be noted .that 
since we cannot find a provision, in the present laws, regarding who excises a 
right for the sake of the dead the court rejects any DP remedy for defamation of 
the dead. 
In a district court case, 73 1981, Y newspaper publishing company 
published an article describing a supposed extra marital affair between A who 
was stabbed to death and the offender. A's parents and elder sisters claimed not 
only that the dead's and their own reputation were damaged, but also that their 
respect and memory of the dead were harmed. They sued for seeking a notice 
of apology and monetary compensation against Y newspaper publishing 
company. In this judgment, since the claimants did not claim for a remedy 
grounded on defamation of the dead per se, resultantly the court did not form a 
judgment on it. The complaints made by the claimants were based on 
defamation of the bereaved's through defamation of the dead, so that the court 
accepted the mother's alleged claim but rejected the two elder sisters'. The court 
maintained that in a case where publishing an article damages the reputation of 
the dead by a false allegation and as a result reputation of the relatives, unlawful 
act can be constituted under the consideration of the real situation where the 
decrease in reputation of a person involving in social life influences reputation of 
his/her relatives. The mother's claim for pecuniary compensation was accepted, 
but her claim for an apology was not because of a lack of its perceived necessity. 
73 Judgement of the Shizuoka Discrict Court, 17 July 1981 (Hanrei-times 447, 104; 
Hanrei-jiho 1011, 36). 
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In the Shc5sefsu Mikkoku (Novel "Secret Information") case,74 a Sanki 
Saito's second son claimed for a remedy against the damages of his own 
reputation, his deceased father's reputation and his respect for and memory of 
his father. Shozo Kosakai, novelist, published a non-fictional novel "Mikkoku" 
(Self information) regarding the event of a crack down on a Haiku poet group 
suppressed by the Special Higher Police (Tokubetsu Koto Keisatsu or Tokkof5 in 
World War Two. The author provided a false allegation that the deceased Sanki 
Saito was a spy for the police. The son claimed, in place of the deceased, for 
the author and the publisher to publish an apology to the deceased and to pay 
pecuniary compensation for the defamation of the son and the damage of his 
respect for and memory of his deceased father. The court pointed out the 
defendants' negligence and held that the defendants were liable for paying 
pecuniary compensation and taking an appropriate measure for the recovery of 
damaged reputation on the ground of Articles 709 and 723. Regarding as an 
issue on whether the plaintiff, son of the defamed deceased can claim, in a place 
of the deceased, for a remedy of recovery of the damaged reputation of the 
deceased, the court maintained that whilst it acceded the possibility of 
establishing unlawful acts because of the precedent case (the Rakujifsu moyu 
case), exercising the right of the dead lacks reasons based upon substantial law 
and it should be rejected. However, this is the first case where a remedy for 
unlawful act on defamation of the dead per se was admitted by the court. The 
alleged claim for publishing an apology for damaging the deceased Saito's 
reputation was acceded and despite "indirectly" the reputation of the dead per se 
74 Judgement of the Osaka District Court, Sakai Division, 23 March, 1983 (Hanrei-
times 429, 180; Hanrei-jihO 1071, 33). 
75 Their principal duties were the control of social movements and the suppression of 
radicals and advocates of dangerous foreign ideologies (See Aldous 1997). 
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was protected by the decision. With regard to an issue on whether the plaintiffs 
claim, ina place for of the dead, is possible, the DP for defamation of the dead 
was rejected.76 
In a case77 where the reputation of a deceased politician was allegedly 
damaged, his son and brother's claim based on defamation of the dead was that 
a newspaper company should publish an apology for the dead and at the same 
time there be made monetary compensation for them because of the argument 
that defamation of the dead can be identified with that of the bereaved in this 
case. Acknowledging that a person's reputation and rights of character can 
survive death, the court decided that the existence of Article 230 II of the Criminal 
Code and Article 116 of Copyright Law cannot be applied to an unlawful act that 
should be judged by general civil law. For the same reason as the decision of 
the Mikkoku case, the court held that a claim, in a place of the dead, against 
defamation of the dead lacks grounds in substantial law. This decision denied 
the possibility of the protection for damaged reputation of the dead and their 
rights of character. 
In the latest Eizu praibashii sosho (Lawsuit of AIDS and Privacy) case,78 
Fokasu (Focus), photograph magazine weekly published by Shinchosha, carried 
a story which covered A's prostitution activities with her photograph 
surreptitiously taken by the magazine. She had been suffering from AIDS 
(Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) and died of the disease. The plaintiffs, 
A's parents, made a claim for damages against the reputation of the deceased 
daughter, her right of privacy and her rights to refuse to be photographed, and 
76 For interpreting the Mikkai case, see Ajitomi 1983, 47; Urakawa 1983, 113; Awaji 
1985, 102. Except for Awaji 1985, the lOP thesis of the court cases is rejected there. 
77 Judgement of the Tokyo District Court, 26 May, 1983 (Hanrei-jihO 1094, 78). 
78 Judgement of the Osaka District Court, 27 December, 1989 (Hanrei-jiho 1341, 53). 
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moreover the plaintiffs rights of reputation and privacy, their rights to peacefully 
perform a religious rite, and rights of their respect and memory to the deceased. 
The claim was that the company, F6kasu's chief editor and a photographer under 
exclusive contract should publish an apology and pay monetary compensation. 
But the court held that the deceased's rights of reputation, privacy and portrait 
should be regarded as personal rights protected only in their life because of the 
characteristics of the rights and furthermore it also maintained that one loses the 
capacity of legal rights at one's death and at the same time one loses one's right 
of character. With regard to rights of character, the court asserted that there are 
no general provisions which can justify for providing the bereaved and relatives 
with the establishment of the same categorised rights that a deceased person 
enjoyed whilst he/she was alive and that there are no substantial provisions for 
acceding the enjoyment and excise of rights of the dead person's character. 
Regarding the significance of Article 230 " of the Criminal Code which the 
plaintiff took as sufficient grounds, the court contended that the provision in 
question should be interpreted as no more than a provision prescribed for the 
nation's purpose of protecting social or public interests. Regarding as other 
grounds, i.e., Articles 60 and 116 of Copyright Law, the court decision was that 
the reason why Articles 60 and 116 were prescribed, despite the presumption 
that an author's right of character becomes extinct at the time of the author's 
death because it is a personal right (see Article 59), is the necessity for protecting 
posthumously the rights of character and therefore the deceased author's 
relatives are vested with the same rights. Accordingly it should not be assumed 
that one's right of character can continue to be effective after one's death. The 
existence of the provisions cannot be a good reason for justifying the acceptance 
124 
of the deceased right of character. With regard to the infringement against the 
plaintiffs right of reputation and privacy, the court did not accept the alleged 
claim and then it rejected the claim for a public apology in publication and rights 
to peacefully perform a religious rite. 
As reviewed above, Japanese court decisions on defamation of the dead 
reject the OP thesis, which refers to a perspective that defamation of the dead is 
an infringement directly against the dead and the harmed dead should be vested 
with a remedy for directly being protected. In early cases, regarding Article 230 II 
of the Criminal Code and Articles 60 and 116 of Copyright Law, the court 
accepted the posthumous existence of rights of character and examined whether 
an application of those provisions contain the possibility that defamation of the 
. dead and infringement of the deceased's character can be· regarded as an 
unlawful act in the Civil Code. The court rejects the DP thesis because there are 
not any substantial laws on the infringement against the dead's rights (see the 
Rakujitsu moyu case and the Mikkoku case). However, in the Mikkoku case, the 
court definitely denied that these provisions in question can be applied to another 
area of law. In Fokasu case, arguing that these provisions are not for acceding 
rights of character, the court rejected a ground for the lOP thesis. 
Nevertheless, the courts consistently have accepted a claim for protecting 
the bereaved's reputation, their respect for and memory of the deceased, the 
infringement against their rights of character, although there are some 
differences in the details. For example, in the dispute on whether defamation of 
the dead can be identified with that of the bereaved there are the pros (see the 
Mikkoku case and the Fokasu case) and cons (see the first instant and appeal 
cases of Rakujitsu moyu). With regard to the protection of the bereaved's 
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respect and memory of the dead, the court accepted a claim for monetary 
compensation based on unlawful act in a case where defamation of the dead is 
illegal and the infringement against the feelings is liable. This judgment is a legal 
practice of the lOP thesis for defamation of the dead. As an orientation of the 
court cases of defamation of the dead we would say that a remedy for 
momentary compensation based on the infringement of the bereaved's respect 
and memory to the dead has been so far established (see Ashitomi 1990, 183-4). 
2.7.4 Japanese discourse 
Concerning the dead person's reputation, Japanese scholar's perspectives are 
strongly influenced by German references (e.g., Ajitomi 1990). As previously 
mentioned (see 1.5.4), the present Criminal Code is influenced by the German 
Criminal Code, but insofar as this provision is concerned, it is not. In the social 
tradition of Japan and Germany, however, both nations have a very similar 
history in terms of "ancestor worship". The discourse of rights of the dead deeply 
linked to history is more abundant than the English and Anglo-American 
discourse. Therefore when we are examining details of the Japanese theories, it 
is appropriate to cite from German legal discourse and debate on the subject. 
To reiterate, there are two distinctive perspectives: the OP thesis, which 
agrees with the views that a person's moral interest can survive the person's 
death, that the infringement against the interest can form an unlawful act, and 
that law can directly relieve the defamed dead by legal protection; and the lOP 
thesis which asserts that law can indirectly protect the interest of the dead by 
protecting the bereaved's interests when the bereaved's rights of character are 
infringed. 
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(1) Legal grounds 
The substantial ground of the DP thesis rests on the perfect protection of human 
rights of character (ibid., 185). Since one's posthumous situation that one takes 
interest in is likely to influence behaviours, emotions and lifestyle of other people 
and oneself, one's rights of character cannot sufficiently be protected unless it is 
protected after one's death (ibid.). In the current of the past, present and future, 
the DP theory requires human character to be protected even from a viewpoint 
concerning the dead. Its SUbstantial ground is resonant with Article 13 of the 
Constitution, which provides the protection of the dignity of individuals. If 
reputation and moral character of a deceased person are harmed and there is no 
remedy for the infringement against the dead, and even if the remedy for the 
bereaved is available, it should be understood that the availability of protection of 
the dignity of the dead is insufficient (ibid.). Addtionally, the DP theory pOints out 
that there are not so many cases in which the infringement against the dead's 
rights of character is simultaneously identified with the infringement against the 
bereaved's right of character, and furthermore that there are many cases in 
which the infringement against the dead's rights cannot be regarded as legally 
remediable interests for emotional or psychological damages, for example the 
bereaved's respect for and memory of the dead. Also the IDP theory is criticised 
on the basis that, in a case where a dead person happens to have no relatives, 
there cannot be damages to the relatives or remedies which should be offered 
(ibid.). 
The DP thesis rests substantial grounds of law on Article 230 II of the 
Criminal Code, Article 233 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Articles 60 and 
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116 of Copyright law (ibid.). The thesis understands that in the Criminal Code 
and the Criminal Procedure Code, rights of character continue to exist after 
death. The DP theory's interpretation of the Copyright law is that the author's 
interest of character remains even after the author's death. If the view is 
accepted that interests are worthy being protected, the continuity of a right after 
death can be accepted as a right without its subject. Therefore it is understood 
that the bereaved or appointee have an entitlement to exercise the right of moral 
character for the sake of the author. The DP theory positively argues that 
justification for the author's posthumous moral rights in Copyright Law can be 
applied to other moral rights such as rights of reputation. 
The German court decision and leading theory rest on the DP thesis (ibid., 
Ashitomi 1980; Igarashi 1977, 56-7 etc.). The substantial reasons for protection 
of the dead's rights of character is, as Japanese DP thesis argues, that 
protecting legally a right of character even after the person's death results both in 
perfectly performing human dignity and in developing freedom of character 
(Ashitomi 1980). It is because from the point of view of the living, their 
expectation that their interests of character can be protected after death 
influences their own and others' behaviour, emotion and way of life that the 
protection of character can see it become perfect in the current of the past, 
present and future. 
The DP perspective in Germany is based upon two court judgments: the 
first in the First Civil Division on 26 November, 1954; the second in the same 
division on 20 March, 1968. In the former case, the key question concerned 
whether or not the deceased's (Cosima Wagner) diaries, letters, etc. could be 
published (see Bar 2000, 130, footnote 772). The decision of the court stated: 
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"The right of character endures after death when the original legal entity, i.e., 
the person, passes away. The author's right of character is unanimously 
admitted in both jurisdiction and bibliography. This applies in the same way 
also to the general right of character; because the values of the character 
worthy of protection outlive the legal capacity of the subject, which expires on 
death" (BGHZ15, 249) [my translation]. 
The second judgment involved "Mephisto: a story of career", a contemporary 
critical novel. The dispute in this case concerned whether the description of the 
deceased in the novel represented an infringement against the rights of character 
of the deceased. The federal court based their judgment on the earlier decision. 
They held that the value of a person's character can be an object worthy of 
protection after the death of the person concerned, and that therefore, the rights 
of general character can continue to endure after death.79 
The gist of both decisions is that the right of character that endures after 
death is a right that can exist without the living subject. This concept however 
does not necessarily have relevance in criminal law. If we can understand that 
the concept of legal interests is a concept that does not necessarily have to be 
associated with human rights and the individual living subject, then we can 
accept the view that even though the right of character endures after death 
despite the absence of a living subject, it can be regarded as a legal interest 
worthy of protection. However, civil cases of this nature may generate new 
problems which will need to be resolved. The most serious problem is the 
explanation for whether or not rights can exist even if there is no subject. This 
problem will be discussed in a later section. 
The lOP theory argues that when the dead were defamed, rather than the 
infringement against the dead's right of character, a remedy for the protection of 
the bereaved's right of character is required. Obligation On unlawful act and 
79 BGH June 4,1974, VIZR68/73. 
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other remedies are directed to the bereaved who are considered to be indirectly 
damaged through defamation of the dead. This theory rests the ground on the 
provision of the Civil Code on unlawful act and general procedures such as an 
injunction based on rights of character. Conceptual grounds for a legal remedy 
are defamation, feeling of worship and damaging reputation, respect and 
memory to the dead. 
(2) Scope of protection 
Regarding the scope of protecting the value of the dead's character, the OP 
thesis confines the scope of protection to what is worth being protected after 
death. It understands as being not protected at death the value of character 
which evidently can be ascribed to the living and that the existence of such 
character assumes the existence of the living. To rephrase, the protected values 
and interests are objectified ones of character that a person made up in his/her 
whole life, such as author's right of character and rights of portrait, naming, 
reputation and privacy (Ashitomi 1980). 
However, in observing the modes of the infringement against the dead's 
rights of moral character, the lOP thesis judges what range of the infringement 
can be identified with the infringement against the bereaved's respect and 
memory to the dead. The notion of "the respect and memory to the dead" is so 
broad that it can be understood that the range of the infringement against the 
dead's character, which can be protected by the DP theory, generally overlaps 
with the range of the infringement against the bereaved's respect and memory of 
the dead. 
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(3) Claimants 
Who is a claimant for legal relief? The DP thesis takes it for granted that the 
dead are physically incapable of defending themselves against defamation so 
that they need others who can execute defense on their behalf. Claimants are 
not necessarily in accord with successors, for successors are entitled to inherit 
the property rights from the deceased and are definitely different from those who 
execute the rights of character on the dead's behalf. Professor Ashitomi (1990), 
espouser for the DP thesis, argues an analogical application of Article 116 of 
Copyright Law. This article provides that the order and scope of the bereaved 
only embraces spouses, children, parents, grandparents and siblings, and that, in 
a case where the bereaved for the dead exist, or where they do not exist, it is 
possible for the dead to appoint a person to act on their behalf. The DP theory 
appreciates that this is in accordance with the draft of German law except for 
grandparents. The order based on blood connections means that in a case 
where relatives in higher rank do not exercise the right in his/her manner against 
the dead's will, other relatives of a lower rank can exercise it on the dead's 
behalf. Moreover, the reason that there is instituted a system of claiming by the 
appointment is that in a case where a right is not exercised by the relatives, and 
at the same time where the dead's interests of character are concerned with 
studies or vocations, it would be possible for non-relatives to exercise the right on 
the dead's behalf. 
In the IDP theory the core of the protected interests is the bereaved's respect 
and memory of the dead. The theory stresses human relationships that produce 
the interests. Therefore it argues that, since a claimant can exercise a right of 
the dead person's in a case where the infringement against the right is according 
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with that of his/her own, it is possible for not only relatives but also close friends 
of the dead person to have an entitlement to pursue action as the claimant. 
Whilst there is a view which argues that even a group has an entitlement to claim 
for a remedy against its own defamation when its own social reputation is 
damaged by the speech, for example, by which its founder's reputation is 
damaged, some scholars doubt whether subjective feelings such as the respect 
and memory to the deceased can be applied to the group. In addition the lOP 
theory contends that there are not any problems on the order of claimants and 
that in light of feelings of reputation and memory to the dead claimants have an 
equal entitlement to claim. 
(4) Periods of protection and contents of remedy 
The OP theory accepts application of the concept "moral rights" of Copyright Law 
to "defamation of the dead". In claims made by relatives they are entitled to 
claim up to the time of their death. In claims made by appointees they are 
entitled to claim up to the expiry of the year, fifty years after the author's death, 
and for the relatives' lifetime if they are alive. A criticism is however that such a 
period for protection is so long that the characteristics of the dead can be 
changed along with the times and academic studies, historical descriptions and 
reviews should take priority over protection of moral rights. 
The lOP theory argues that protection can be claimed as far as the above 
claimants are alive. 
As regards contents of the relief, the OP theory acknowledges that the 
dead do not and cannot perceive or experience mental suffering whether it be 
caused by defamation or any attack. Also, present and future momentary loss is 
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irrelevant (to the deceased, but not of course to the estate of the deceased). 
Consideration of events, loss, outcomes etc., that may be generated in the future 
is not appropriate. It may even be possible to argue that, since the dead cannot 
experience their own agony, even the bereaved are not entitled to claim in place 
of the dead (Hubmann 1953). Therefore any compensation for damages and 
consolation money cannot be accepted by the court. As a relief for the protection 
of the dead, remedies such as injunction and recovery for defamation would be 
available. An example of the latter is publishing an apology. Publishing an 
apology refers to, in magazines or newspapers, a withdrawal of the defamatory 
statements and the making of a formal offer of amends. As for the requirement 
of the apology, although there is a view that the case of a dead person seeking a 
withdrawal is sufficient (Igarashi 1977, 59), the claim for the right to reputation 
has been recently argued. Thus, as understood above, the legal remedy for 
defamation of the dead can be theoretically acceptable, but as an actual effect, it 
may not be feasible. As Igarashi (ibid.) points out, it may be plausible that the 
principle of journalism "speech against speech" could matter in some aspects. 
The lOP theory considers a relief for defamation of the dead as one for the 
infringement against a relative's reputation. It expands the limitation of the 
protection and relief for the dead to the relatives. In other words the relief has a 
twofold structure: a relief for defamation of the dead and a relief for the relative's 
devoted feelings to the dead. The former is possible for monetary compensation, 
recovery of harmed reputation and injunction; and the latter for monetary 
compensation. There are no definite guidelines for determining the amount of 
compensation. The circumstances that the dead were involved in should be 
taken into consideration for determining the amount. In addition, not only the 
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circumstances but also the social character of the dead, such as social status, 
vocation and position, are evaluated. An examination is required as to whether 
recovery for damaged reputation and injunction can be applied to cases of the 
relative's devoted feelings to the dead, namely cases where reputation of the 
dead is recognized as indirectly infringed. 
2.7.5 Developing to our arguments 
In criticism of the OP theory utilising the lOP theory, two points come into 
question. One is whether the concept "defamation of the dead" per se can be 
justified. The other is whether a problem of the infringement against the dead's 
rights of character does not need to be resolved at the level of litigation but can 
be sufficiently resolved at another level such as vicarious protection. The review 
of the lOP perspectives suggests that there are no problems on the legal and 
theoretical composition in terms of their position that indirectly protect the 
damaged dead by evading a problem as to whether the dead who are not 
subjects of rights in legal system have their own rights of character. However, 
even so, once a person's character is damaged after the person's death, we 
cannot disregard this reality of what happens. 
The first discussion in this section is on whether the right of the dead's 
character can be justified. The lOP theory argues that the contents of rights of 
character are to protect the subject of the rights so that in principle a person has 
no rights after the extinction of the subject. The provision of the Japanese Civil 
Code prescribes that a person's death deprives the person of an entitlement to 
be a subject of rights and duties and the procedure for succession of the rights 
and duties should commence. The lOP theory, based upon the above general 
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rule, argues that rights of character such as personal reputation and privacy 
cannot be succeeded at the time of death but should lapse. However, as 
mentioned in a previous section, this thesis pointed out that the mode of 
reputation, an example of object for rights of character, has a twofold structure 
and explained the contents of the rights of character that can endure after death. 
Social reputation of the dead is composed of both the personal contents ascribed 
to those who were once alive and the objective social evaluation which can be 
separated from the person and be altered due to social factors and 
posthumously personal factors (see 2.6). At the person's death the former 
becomes extinct but the latter still remains. The latter can become a reality in the 
form of reputation ascribed to the dead. In this sense, it is wrong to think there is 
no right of the dead's character. 
A point, stemmed from this point, to be considered is that it is evident that, 
even after a person's death, the value of his/her character can continue to be an 
object for legal protection, seen as court judgments suggest that a right of 
character endures after death, though the subject per se no longer exists. It is 
not denied that this reality imposes certain restrictions on the rights of character 
of the dead, confined to that which should be protected after death. The reason 
why the scope is restrained is that it is impossible for the death to freely develop 
their character and that the infringement of feeling cannot be generated, that is, 
the dead can no longer experience. Thus the dead have' different character 
attributes to that of the living and this difference generates the difference in the 
scope of protection between the living and the dead. 
The difference of attributes can be explicated by the following case of 
defamation of the dead. Even if the character of the dead is succeeded from that 
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of the living, there exists an infringement against specific character after death. 
As mentioned, the good example is Kaimyo discrimination, namely religious 
discrimination against Burakumin. This discrimination is against the dead 
Burakumin's character, but never the living. It is so because kaimyo, an object 
for discrimination, is evidently given after death. 
It follows that there are substantial grounds for justifying rights of the 
dead's character and therefore to protect rights of character succeeded from the 
living results in perfect protection of a human being's character. Yet in the 
discussion on legal grounds for rights of the dead's character, the opponent to 
the DP theory criticizes an analogical application of -Article 230 II of the Criminal 
Code and Articles 60 and 116 of Copyright Law. The reason for it is that these 
provisions have their own reasons for provisions, that is, Article 230 II can be 
exceptionally justified on the ground that the Criminal Code, the fundamental law 
regarding crimes and punishment prescribes for the purpose of the state's public 
interest, for example, social order, and that Articles 60 and 116 of Copyright Law, 
by taking the peculiarity of the Law into consideration, prescribe protection of the 
author's moral rights. Therefore the IDP theory argues that to be an exceptional 
provision does not result in justifying general rights of the dead's character. This 
argument is wrong. Theorists who attempt to justify rights of the dead's character 
by the existence of the three Articles do not attempt to extend them to the rights 
of the dead's character or to claim for the acceptance rights in other provisions 
as rights of character. The theorists are interpreting the provision which refers to 
the concept rights of the dead expressed by, in reality, some phrases such as 
"defamation of the dead" and "rights of the dead's moral character". If it is the 
case, it is natural that we understand that the phrase "rights of the dead's 
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character" should be understood as what the law suggests as rights of the dead's 
character. There is no reason that, despite such a provisional declaration, we 
have to interpret an infringement against rights of the dead's character as those 
of the relative's ones. In other words, the strict position of legal interpretation 
. would argue that, even if there are any rights of character law protects, the IDP 
theory can be considered as a sort of an analogical interpretation based on relief-
oriented interpretation. However it is possible to criticize the view that the 
justification by the strict interpretation is no more than that on the ground that 
there are really such phrases in the provisions. 
To avoid the criticism, we have to return to the principle of Article 230 II of 
the Criminal Code and Articles 60 and 116 of Copyright Law. It is apparent that 
Article 230 II suggests that the provision's interest to be protected is the 
reputation of the dead. Reputation has a two-fold structure (see 2.6). There is 
no doubt that reputation related to feelings or emoti6ns no longer exists in the 
dead, but the social reputation that can be succeeded after death does exist 
even in the dead. In a case where "the dead can be a subject of reputation" or 
"the dead have character" is expressed by ordinary terms, in the light of the 
contents, this is the same as stating the "reputation of the dead can be infringed" 
but is different from claiming that the "living have character". When we talk about 
the dead, their subjects are not subjects of rights or their character is not 
character in terms of law. Namely, the criticism would be plausible that, even if in 
a case where reputation of the dead is regarded as a venerable interest it is 
asserted to be an object for protected character, the assertion per se does not 
necessarily admit an entitlement of "a subject for rights" for the dead. Although 
personal attributes such as reputation and social evaluation for physical and 
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material nature of a person can become extinct, the social evaluation drawn from 
the person's mental nature can continue after death as a character of the person. 
This suggests that character of a person still exists in the deceased person. 
Since interests in the Criminal Code are mental fruits of substance and values, 
protection for the dead is required by the Code. The dead are no longer subjects 
of rights, but it is still possible for their reputation to be infringed. Therefore it 
should be understood on the grounds that defamation can be made in cases of 
the dead, interests in defamation of the dead can be identified with reputation of 
the dead per se. 
As for Copyright Law, the OP theory's criticism is that the provision on 
protection of moral interests of the author's death does not mean that rights of 
author's character can survive author's death. The lOP theory argues the moral 
right is personal and therefore it becomes extinct at the time of author's death. 
The reason for establishing the provision is that the provision does not protect 
interests of moral character of the deceased author, but works are worthy of 
protection after the author's death as representations of the author's objectified 
spirit, and furthermore that there are any interests that should be protected as 
national and cultural production. Therefore law admits relatives to have the 
same right as the moral right of the author. Thus the lOP theory contends that 
the provision was made for a special aim and interest and that it cannot be 
generalised to other civil cases. Works represent their author's objectified spirit. 
These works he/she produced are a reflection of his/her spirit. These works 
come to represent his/her objectified spirit when he/she transferred his/her ideas 
onto paper. Therefore, copyrights playa role in protecting and perpetuating the 
work of the original "living spirit" in a form called "objectified spirit". The spirit 
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continues to exist within these works, and can be constantly recognised after the 
author's death. In other words, what should be emphasised here is that rights of 
character may continue to exist in a form separate from the subject of the rights. 
Therefore, even if the rights lack a subject, it should be quite plausible to think 
that the rights per se continue to exist after death. This is the principle ground for 
admitting, in Cosima Wagner's case, that "[t]he right of character endures after 
death when the original legal entity, i.e. the person, passes away". 
The second main debate in this section is on whether rather than at the 
level of litigation, the problem of the infringement of the dead's character can be 
sufficiently resolved at other levels. We can rephrase it as "the protection for the 
dead can be sufficient by protecting their relatives". There are, in the debate on 
rights, many problems regarding the infringement of the character of the dead to 
be resolved. So it would be a good way to use a framework such as vicarious 
protection to circumvent the difficult problems. This view interprets the 
infringement against the dead's character as that against the relative's character, 
but as Heidrich (1970, 5.170) argues, there are some situations in which the 
interests of the deceased and that of his/her relatives do not necessarily accord 
with each other. He also points out the disadvantages of a situation where, whilst 
a statement about the dead is favourable to them, it is against the interests of 
their relatives so that the relatives have to file a separate action based on their 
own rights of character (ibid.). Or, there can be a situation in which, whilst a 
statement about the deceased considerably damages his/her reputation, the 
relatives still remain silent about it. Furthermore, there could be a situation in 
which the image of the deceased is distorted by his/her relatives (ibid.). It is 
uncertain whether any relatives know or take into account that the deceased's 
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reputation should be protected by any means. This consideration of the reality in 
which the protection of the dead's reputation is dependant on the relative's 
discretion, of necessity leads us to register an objection against a rigid 
determining of the qualification for being a claimant. This problem would be 
especially pertinent in a situation in which there are no relatives of the dead. In 
these circumstances, it is possible that the deceased's right to character is 
almost entirely unprotected. This is the reason why it should be argued that in 
respect of defamation of the dead Article 234 of the Japanese Code of Criminal 
Procedure should be applied, thus making a provision that a claim can be made 
by a prosecutor. Paragraph 2 of Article 12 of the draft of BGB (the German Civil 
Code) also admits a way in which the deceased can appoint a claimant on their 
behalf. However, the expansion of the qualification of claimant admitted by this 
Article may generate a conflict between the application and freedom of speech 
(Igarashi 1977, 58). Furthermore, the provisions of the Article may have 
implications for legal stability. However, even if such a criticism is taken into 
account and if under the aim that a person should be protected from the 
posthumous event concerned with the person, the solution by using the concept 
"rights" is not feasible, then reputation of the person cannot be protected before 
and after his/her death. 
As for what legal remedies for the relief of an infringement against the 
deceased's character are feasible, as an actual effect, it may not be feasible. 
Publishing an apology is in general available as a remedy, but a criticism points 
out that the remedy is not appropriate as a remedy for recovery prescribed in 
Article 723 of the Civil Code. As a remedy for recovery of social evaluation, 
rather than publishing an apology, publication of a cancellation or the court 
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decision would be sufficient. In general, it is understood that, since a remedy for 
restoring matters to the status quo ante should be claimed in an extreme case 
where the damage is beyond a standard, the view that argues that a claim, based 
on the devoted feelings to the dead, for re-establishing the status quo ante is 
feasible, is too subjective, because of the subjectivity of the feelings and the 
strength of the emotions, to be acceptable. Can injunction rest its ground on 
feelings? Ashitomi (1990, 190) argues that, whilst interests of the devoted 
feelings, both in scholarly discourse and in court decisions, are not defined as 
specified personal rights of character, such as life, body, freedom, reputation, 
names, portraits, these feelings refer to the generic rights of independent 
character and furthermore can be categorised as a right of character which is an 
inclusive concept including interests that in Japan is not sufficiently defined-
e.g., privacy, personal documents, spoken words, personal information. 
Nevertheless he also points out that there is a problem on whether, even if the 
specific right of character can be grounded for injunction, the right of character 
which is not sufficiently defined can be grounded in it (ibid., 191). In the present 
situation where injunction even in respect of the living's is restricted, cases in 
which injunction could be applied would be confined to extreme cases of 
defamation (Igarashi 1977, 59). 
2.7.6 Even if there is no subject can rights exist? 
"Defamation of the dead" and "infringement against character of the dead" are, 
as explained in this thesis, a typical example for rights of the dead. Our 
argument is that an infringement against interests discussed in "defamation of 
the dead" can be interpreted into that against rights, but nevertheless still the 
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most difficult problem remains insufficiently unsolved. The problem is on "how it 
is justified that even if there is no subject, rights can exist". 
To repeat, the dead have no capacity for rights because they are dead. 
Therefore they cannot be the subject of a rights claim. The presumption for 
being a subject of a rights claim is that you are a living human being and 
therefore a person entitled to enjoy rights. In this respect, foetuses and artificial 
persons (e.g., corporations) can qualify but not the dead. However, the mere fact 
that an entity is not a living subject does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that non-living human beings do not have interests worthy of protection. A 
counter-argument to the existence of such interests is that this might include 
interests for such things as chairs and stones. But we have already resolved this 
problem by demanding that such interests are linked to a concept of social 
characteristics. Nevertheless, to avoid any misunderstanding on this issue the 
relationship between non-subjects and rights will need further development. 
Rights maximally provide the priority normative protection to individual's 
values and interests within a society. As a matter of fact, the rights we enjoy in 
modern society give priority to the fundamental values related to individuals and 
the interests derived from these values. These values and interests express: the 
inner worth generated from human dignity; the inner freedom related to 
conscience and beliefs; and the desirability for the welfare to advance the 
individual potential in life (Hasegawa 1992, 158). However, according to Waldron 
(1987, 183ft), some problems arise in the interpretation of the rights. 
First, the values and interests conceptualised by rights are in pursuit of 
individualistic, private desire. But, it should be noted that individual responsibility, 
liability to others, communal duty of obedience to law and promise and further 
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social feelings, such as devotion, respect, loyalty and patriotism, all playa vital 
role in society. These are said to be the empirical, communal and moral heritage 
that has passed down through history. Consideration for these collective social 
values is significant, at the least as significant as the protection of private values. 
But, rights-based theory has ignored this significance. When the importance of 
the communal association is recognised, it will be appreciated that the position of 
no-subjects is congruent to that of the living. Being without a subject does not 
damage the significance of the values per se. 
Second, it should be noted that, even if the justification of individualism 
can be allowed, moral desirability to individuals presupposes a further desirability 
that is presupposed in the very constitution of community. This communal 
desirability is a value that should be greater than each individual's worth in order 
to sustain every individual human's well-being. In other words, it is possible that 
even the rights of no-subjects can be justified on the grounds of the communal 
desirability. 
Third is the understanding that rights are, when viewed from the rationality 
of individualism, no more than a form of ideal. The reality rather is that rights 
based on and justified in individualism generate a conflict of rights between and 
amongst individuals that requires reconciliation. When the dark side (Le., anti-
community) of rights is emphasised, a negative effect of the subject per se is 
illuminated as a conflict, for example. Rights based on individualism have many 
self-interested, prudential elements which override the sense of a moral and 
responsible community-itself a contradiction in terms unless community is 
understood to be more than a group of individuals in the same spatial locale, 
rather we should consider community to be taken to mean a community of 
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interdependent and duty conscious beings who have the interests of their 
community as their prime concern rather than self-serving interests. When the 
communal order, an order greater than the worth of any single individual is 
presupposed, then "no-subjects" can be interpreted to be a form of legal 
requirement in the presupposed order by communitarianism. 
Understanding "subjectless" as a form of legal requirement in the 
presupposed order by communitarianism does not always apply to any situation 
where rights lack their subjects. For example, whilst a subject who holds a 
personal right of reputation dies and his/her rights of reputation can survive 
death, his/her rights to vote, another example of personal rights, cannot survive 
death. The difference rests on the characteristics of interests between reputation 
and the ability to vote. The former has a twofold structure: rights of character as 
being attributed to individuals and rights of character as a social reputation. On 
the other hand, the latter has legal interests that cannot be realised after death 
but are feasible only whilst a person is alive. 
A criticism may be made on the basis that even if this value of evaluation 
belongs to a right of character that an individual holds, it is not an exclusive right 
for an individual, i.e., a right that an individual possesses within his/her life, but 
when the contents of the right of character are reviewed, the argument that the 
right of character is extinct at the instant of death and thus an attribute only the 
living can hold is questionable. A right of character gives entitlement to legal 
protection of the social evaluation and is, therefore, composed of genders, ages, 
beliefs, social status, names, social requirements, roles, authorities, etc. 
As mentioned in a previous section, the living's rights of character have a 
twofold structure. One aspect is character which can be attributed to a person 
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but cannot survive the person's death. The other is a social evaluation which can 
endure after death. Take an academic degree for example. When a person 
enjoys holding the degree, it is an example of character attributed to the person, 
but when the person dies, the degree can survive death and it can be held by the 
dead as a social evaluation of historical record. In the same way, social status is 
a reputation that a person recognised through a social activity, but after death it 
is expressed as an objective evaluation. The reputation can survive death as an 
evaluation separated from the person. Values of both characters of the cases 
can be attributed to the posthumous person. 
A claim "the deceased's social evaluation can continue in the form of the 
mere impression of the living's right of· character" (ibid.) is attempting to 
essentially differentiate between the social evaluation of character of the living 
and the dead in an evaluation of character that can continue to exist after death. 
The claim is not acceptable. The living has a social evaluation that can be 
claimed as a defined legal right, whilst the dead "have" a mere impression of it. 
Yet again this is questionable. For instance, in any calculation of compensation 
for death caused by a traffic accident sums awarded are based on the social 
evaluation that victims held before their death. We do not evaluate the dead in 
this circumstance by an impression of his/her right of character but by the right of 
character that the dead per se "have". This social evaluation is not an 
impression but a reality underpinning monetary compensation. 
There is a view that the difference in requirements between the first part 
and the second paragraph of Article 230 is due to the differences of social 
character of a living and dead person. We do not agree with this view. That this 
difference pertains does not lead rationally or logically to the further claim that the 
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dead have no rights of character. Article 230 states defamation of the dead is 
not punishable unless the case is proven to be one of false allegation, and in the 
context of the Article's requirements for claiming defamation, this point states a 
decisive difference between the living and the dead. So even if, by stating an 
historical fact, a person intentionally damages the dead's social evaluation and 
, 
therefore reputation, the action is not punishable. However, and crucially, this 
principle cannot lead to the conclusion that the dead's right of character should 
be denied. The reason why a case of false allegation is punishable is due only to 
the different attributions of character and social evaluation the living and the dead 
are held to possess. Therefore our position suggests that the discussion on the 
social evaluation of character should be reviewed by analysing the difference in 
the social character of the living and the dead. The dead's reputation, protected 
in criminal law, is not only referred to by their objective and social reputation. It is 
also a reality that the fixed character of their social evaluation endures after 
death. The character of the dead endures in the form of memories. It is formed 
and memorised in the same way as the social character of the living. The 
substance of rights of character cannot be differentiated between the living and 
the dead ipso facto the substance is an abstracted social evaluation. Yet, the 
difference of the Criminal law's attitudes toward the living and the dead resulted 
in producing a requirement of "false allegation". The living have to live on the 
basis of real social evaluation and relationships with others based on the 
evaluation, while on the other hand the dead can exist on the basis of objective 
evaluation which does not need a fictitious name. 
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Moreover, if reputation is considered as the sum of evaluation that the 
living hold toward other people whether living or dead, then rights of character 
necessarily pertain not only to the living but also to the dead. 
Pointing out that using an historical fact which results in defamation is 
punishable in the case of the living and not in the case of the dead is neither 
incompatible nor contradictory with regard to rights of character. This difference 
in punishable outcome is due to no more than the difference that which was 
generated in the first place on the basis of the attributions of the living and the 
dead's character. A person has, at the time of death, an historical status which is 
predicated in their characteristics, works represented and achievements as a 
living person. 
2.8 Conclusions 
In the first discussion "can the dead be harmed?" and "do the dead have 
interests?" we presented some positive arguments to support rights of the dead 
from the perspective of social character and reputation. But difficulties of a 
metaphysical and metaethical nature still remain in the discussion. In the second 
discussion of this chapter, examining the attitudes of Japanese and English law 
toward defamation of the dead, we demonstrated that the right of the dead for a 
claim of defamation, the right that exists in Japanese legal discourse as well as 
that which exists in Germany can be justified. We also established that it would 
be possible to prescribe for rights of the dead in English law. 
However, the Japanese criminal law and civil law show a different attitude 
toward defamation of the dead. The Civil Code does not admit the ground by 
which it is possible to change an unchangeable rule that a person loses a subject 
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of rights and duties at the time of the person's death. Even if the dead's right of 
character is accepted, a remedy for the infringement against the right would be 
taken through the relative's claim for the remedy. The dead per se have almost 
none of a remedy under his/her name. Therefore as a remedy there are almost 
no differences between the DP thesis and the IDP thesis. To establish rights of 
the dead, we will have to develop and deepen not only substantial discussion but 
also philosophical discussion. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 
Intention 
The aim in this chapter is to explicate intention in relation to making a will. The 
first part of the chapter will review what is the intention of a will. The meaning of 
intention will be reviewed differently in the pre-death and post-death stages in 
relation to the question of whether or not the maker of the will exists. The second 
part of the chapter will discuss some cases of intestacy and conclude that there 
is, in a broad sense, an intention element to intestacy and it can be considered to 
survive death by a legal fiction. 
3.2 Definition of succession 
3.2.1 Two groups of rules 
The essence of succession in modern law is "the transmission of property vested 
in a person at his death to some other person or persons" (Parry 1953, 1). 
Succession is regarded as a legal institution of private ownership; succession 
and private ownership can be said to have the same foundations (Hagiwara and 
Nagata 1958, 161). The continuation of a person's legal personality or estate 
after death is considered possible by virtue of the two point legal classification: 
dying testate or dying intestate. In simple terms, the former describes the 
situation in which the deceased has made a legally valid will; in the latter, the 
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deceased has not. 80th situations use different means for the transmission of 
property. There is however no difference in the respect that the property of a 
deceased passes to other living persons with legal capacity and thus the 
purposes and functions of succession are fulfilled (Akeyama 1979, 5). 
Almost every modern and contemporary law of succession is broadly 
classified into two groups of rules: first, rules deciding who can inherit the 
person's rights and duties after his/her death; second, rules transferring the 
deceased's rights and duties to his/her successors (Ito 1981, 14).80 These ideas 
are not controversial. 
There are various definitions of a will (e.g., see Atkinson 1953, 2-3), in 
Japanese and English law; Mellows, an English lawyer, defines a will as: 
"A declaration in prescribed form of the intention of the person making it of the 
matters which he wishes to take effect on or after his death, until which time it is 
revocable" (Margrave-Jones 1993, 6). 
A will gives legal effect to the final intention with regard to succession that the 
deceased expressed before death. Therefore this constitutes a form of guarantee 
that the intention will be carried out: a person expresses his/her intention in 
documentary form and cOrT:Ipliance with the relevant legal provisions triggers the 
institutional device that enables effect after death. 
3.2.2 Two questions to be answered 
It is not uncommon for a considerable time to lapse between the making and 
execution of a will. Importantly also the subject of the will ceases to exist upon 
death. Still, despite the fact that a subject who autonomously made a will no 
longer exists, the law regards the will as a living person's will. This is a legal 
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fiction. As for the assumption of the legal fiction, in this chapter we will attempt to 
answer two questions: 
(a) the intention of a will that takes effect after death is that of a living or a 
dead person; and 
(b) the intention of intestacy is that of a living or a dead person. 
As mentioned in 1.5.2, if a will belongs to its maker and is enforced on death, 
then the law must resolve the paradox that it is granting a right to something 
without a subject and justify the continuation of the intention of a will. Justifying a 
will's post-death existence and its post-death enforcement may, therefore, make 
it feasible to presuppose there is a right of the dead. 
3.3 Intention of a will 
When observing the process of a will's inception to its execution, one can see 
two wholly different procedures operating and co-existing. The first procedure 
commences at the point when the will is made and governs all stages of the will 
pre-death including amendments, revocation, and the creation of a new will up 
until the last will. The second procedure commences upon death. Here, the 
execution of the will takes place, that is, the transfer of what was once the 
deceased's property to the beneficiaries. What are the different characteristics of 
the intention shown pre-death and post-death in these procedures? 
3.3.1 The pre-death stage 
The nature of intention with regard to a will should not be considered as different 
to a general intention, but rather, as belonging to the same category of intentions 
80 James Phillips (1989) states the point in a similar manner: "[r]ules governing the 
distribution of property after death ... must be designed to solve two main problems. 1. "Who 
is to receive the property"? 2. "How is the distribution to be effected"?" (ibid., 518). 
151 
that are connected with other legal acts. The fact that this intention can refer to 
specific and often various objects makes no difference. The action of making a 
will leads in time to the creation, transfer and extinction of rights and duties to the 
beneficiaries and the executors of the will. From a legal and philosophical point 
of view, a question concerning intention arises: did the intention exist before or 
after law? We will not answer this directly, but instead focus our discussion on 
examining intention as expressed in wills as an autonomous action. It is 
important to note that, whilst this intention is categorised alongside other 
intentions, the fundamental distinction between the intention of a will and other 
variants arises post-death. That is, since the testator is dead, further clarification 
of their intention is not possible; moreover, it becomes extremely difficult to prove 
any sleight of hand (Nakagawa and Izumi 1988, 448) .. In this sense, an intention 
in the guise of a will is final. 
The intention underlying a will is derived from a certain state of mind. In 
general intention can be defined as a power81 to determine a motive and a 
reason. It follows that we understand that whilst intention exists beyond both 
mechanical determination and human determination by instinctive behaviour, 
animals are determined by their functioning power whereas humans possess the 
capacity to determine their own actions. Whilst it would be possible, on 
occasion, to manifest one's intention by temporary impulsive desires and 
81 Hans Kelsen (1973,32-33) rejected the psychological approach of Will Theory. He 
argues that intention discussed in psychology is a fact that is empirically verified by 
observing existence and belongs to the sphere of existence. He also claims that intention in 
ethics and law is composed by the viewpoints of norms and what ought to be. He 
emphasises that there is no concrete phenomenon in human minds according to law and 
ethics. Thus, he claims that it is necessary to acknowledge the difference between the 
psychological and legal concepts of intention. However, a legal fact generated by making a 
will is originally a result of two kinds of mental elements called desire and determination. 
Evidence would be that a will is always revocable by changing the mental elements. We can 
recognise intention not as ideal but as an actual point. 
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emotions, the legal act of making a will demands more than this, and thus is at 
the least caused by motives composed by some rational elements (e.g., duties 
and knowledge of interests). The reason why the intention underlying the will is 
generally considered as reasonable is that an integral part of the intention is to 
recognise the desire of making a will. 
Making a will comprises two mental activities. First, there is desire. This is 
a mental process in which a certain juridical effect (e.g., a transfer of property 
after death) is "desired emotionally" (Finnis 1991, 38). In general, desire covers 
a wide range of words including a mere want; wish; a longing for; and devotion 
and covetness. Also, desire is a kind of motive that urges a person to find a 
means to realise what is desired. Nevertheless, the mental activity of desiring to 
dispose of property is still short of conducting the necessary action of making a 
will. In other words it is not about desiring to dispose of property, but about 
desiring to make legal provision so that those who follow will legally be entitled to 
it. The second mental activity is determination that enables the realisation of the 
desire. To express something that is desired may be a declaration of desire, but 
this is not the same as a declaration of intention (SatD 1988, 142). The 
declaration of intention must also include the means to realise the desire. 
The testator's aim, by employing the legal device called a will, is to create 
new relationships that will have legal effect. The legal relationship is considered 
chiefly to be concerned with disposing of the testator's property after his/her 
death. For example, person A makes a will that directs the distribution of A's 
property after death. The law does not concern itself with how or why the testator 
came to hold these aims-insofar as the maker was of sound, rational mind, and 
there is no possibility of coercion, particularly in the instance of a last minute 
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codicil. Thus, personal motivations and purposes do not normally effect the 
validity of the will. For the intention to be performed after death, it need only 
comply with the relevant legislation or laws. 
The task here then is to distinguish between declaration of intention and 
declaration of desire. The former is an action fulfilling the latter (ibid.). Making a 
will per se is the declaration of the testator. It is more than an action that 
transmits a mere desire of leaving a bequest. A declaration of an intention 
encompasses the idea of setting up rights and duties. Thus, what is meant by 
the declaration of intention for the transmission of property?82 It is a declaration 
of intention for generating new relationships of rights and duties. 
However, this does not resolve all of the difficulties relating to the 
declaration of the intention. Understanding the concept of intention in this way, 
we find ourselves unable to grasp the idea of a declaration (ibid., 144)83. Take 
the following analysis: if the idea of a declaration contains within it the contents of 
the intention, it is meaningless to declare the intention itself. Thus, a will is 
defined as a means for specifying how a testator wishes his/her property to be re-
distributed or otherwise disposed of (ibid., 142). Put another way, the means by 
which the testator's intention for the disposal of his/her property is performed is 
by the means of making a will. Therefore, according to Sato's view regarding the 
82 For example, what does a will, in which certain property is left to a wife, declare? It 
is not a declaration of desire that binds the recipient to perform what the will declares. For 
the actions that are the means for achieving the purposes of the will lie in the declaration and 
act of making the will. Does the relationship between rights and duties already exist in the 
declaration? The answer is no. This is because the act of making a will can create new 
relations between rights and duties. So, does the will declare rights and duties that arise in 
the future? The answer is sometimes "Yes!" and sometimes "No!" Whilst the intention for 
the bequest is declared, the will cannot dictate all the respective relations between rights and 
duties that follow. 
83 Whilst Grotius (a leading natural lawyer in the Enlightenment), distinguished inner 
intention (animus voluntas) and its sign (signum) and explained some of the relationships 
between the two elements (Arai 1987, 656), he did not examine the relationship between 
intention and its declaration. 
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declaration of intention, the intention of a testator can be considered as 
something that includes not only a desire or wish but also a means by which the 
desire or wish is performed. 
The characteristics of a testator's intention suggest that the intention as 
expressed in a will is an act generated by desire and determination. 
Testamentary intention presupposes a motive for bringing about a post-death 
disposal of assets or one for causing a pre-death disposal of the assets to 
change. Thus, the testamentary institution of a will refers to a document, which 
meets formalities that law requires, defining the declaration of the testator. It 
follows that, provided the will is not amended or withdrawn, the will shall be 
regarded as final. That is why law requires strict formalities for the creation of 
wills. Thus, certainty of the testators intention is based on the requirements of a 
strict adherence to formalities. 84 These formalities are essential because the 
characteristics of a will have no effect until the testator's death. This explanation 
applies to both Japanese and English laws of succession. 
3.3.2 At the posthumous stage 
.In Japanese law, succession commences at the moment of death.8s The terms 
of the will are revealed and carried out by the executor. The rights and duties are 
distributed amongst beneficiaries. There is a difference between English and 
84 Mellows suggests that the main arguments for a will's formalities are: "first, that 
forgery is made more difficult; secondly, that there can be no dispute as to the identity of the 
testator; and, thirdly, that the likelihood of a will being signed under coercion is reduced" 
(Margrave-Jones 1993, 60). Still, Mellows has his doubts. He makes two further contentions: 
"[t]he first is to achieve certainty of the testator's intention, and this is indeed a reason for a 
will being in writing, and signed. The second is that by requiring the formality of witness, a 
person will think carefully about what he is doing, as there will be little doubt as to what was 
in fact intended to operate as a will" (ibid.). These latter points are made in order to 
guarantee the initial points. 
85 Article 882 of the Japanese Civil Code. 
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Japanese procedural rules. Japanese law allows creditors to claim directly 
against the beneficiaries, whereas in English law claims by creditors are made 
against the deceased's personal representatives. 86 In other words, in English 
law, specific legal authority is given to an intermediary. This procedure was 
adopted from the ecclesiastical courts; in this process, when a person dies, all 
the property that the deceased owned might be temporarily transferred to a 
representative appointed by the courts. Then the representative, under the 
court's supervision, may pay creditors and collect debts; once this has been 
completed, the remaining assets are transferred to the entitled beneficiaries 
under the rules of testacy or intestacy. 
Despite this difference, what is notable here, in both of the legal systems, 
is the time lapse between making the will and its taking effect. The execution of 
a will is finished at the point at which all the terms of the will have been 
completed. At the moment when the will comes into play (Le., after death) the 
subject of the will no longer exists. Despite the non-existence of the physical 
subject of the intention, the will is considered legally valid and consequently 
generates legal effect. We are left with the question: "what is the rationale for 
this inconsistency?" 
A will takes legal effect and is legally valid, despite the physical non-
existence of the subject of the will. This necessarily raises the question: "why is it 
that it is only necessary for the action of the making of a will to enable the 
intention without its subject to be effective?" Normally, if an intention continues 
to exist after a person's death, insofar as it is a type of intention, it is assigned to 
a seat or subject. So in context, at the time of extinction, what or who is the seat 
86 Personal representatives, or executors as they are more commonly called, are 
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or subject? Is it the deceased, the testamentary document, or the executor? 
The inconsistency does not lie in the content of the intention, before or after 
death, but rather in terms of its seat and subject. Thus, we have returned full 
circle to our starting-point: that is, is the intention as expressed in a will that takes 
effect after death, that of a living or a dead person? 
Since the deceased is no longer the subject of his/her property from the 
moment of death, it would be possible to assume that at the moment of death, 
any rights of a person are extinct. Their estate incarcerates and upholds the 
interests, rights, etc. of the deceased until such time as it is no longer 
necessary-so in a sense the deceased, as represented by their estate remains 
the owner. There is a problem in the arguments of the Liberals based on the 
views of natural lawyers following Grotius: that is, the right to make a will is a 
form of a right to transfer which is a concomitant of a property right. For transfer 
cannot be brought about between living persons and a deceased person who is 
no longer a subject of the property. Therefore, It5 (1984, 342) claims that we 
cannot deduce a right to make a will directly from a right to property. Moreover, 
he argues that only when a presupposition is accepted that there exists a 
different agreement, for a right to making a will, from the social contract that 
established a property right, can Will Theory be justified (ibid.). Will Theory 
presupposes that the intention of the dead at the time the will is executed is of 
necessity the same87 as the intention of inter vivos (It5 1981, 24). This however 
merely raises the question: "what is the foundation of a testamentary right?" 
appointed by the person who dies testate. whereas administrators represent the interests of 
those dying intestate (Margrave-Jones 1993. chp. 17; Kerridge 1996). 
87 A will is like a container. inasmuch as various declarations of intention can co-
exist. The characteristics of a will suggest that independent declarations of intention in a will. 
on the testator's death. takes effect at the same time. But, on the other hand, a will is a 
document. If a description of a date when the will was made lacks a legal requirement. and 
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There are various theories accounting for the foundations of testamentary 
inheritance. For example, Leibnitz links the will with the doctrine of immortality of 
the soul (see McMurray 1969 (1919), 452). Put another way, the foundation of 
testamentary disposal is founded upon a kind of religious belief that the soul 
remains after death; that is, acts without subjects can still be carried out. This 
utilises the typical sophistry of the medieval lawyer. 
As for Heredity Theory, Hozumi summarises: 
"First of all, an asset is utilised for maintaining its owner's life and is likened to 
part of his/her body. Therefore, where the owner has descendants, the 
requisites of the owner for maintaining his/her own life should be transferred to 
them. This is the fundamental reason why law allows a right to succession" 
(1990, 6) [my translation]. 
It appears that part of maintaining life implies the continuation of the partial 
continuity, although to a small extent, of an intention in order to justify the 
continuation of property rights. 
W. von Blume (1913) prefers the notion of character and value 
succession. In short, his theory is based upon two elements. One is the 
continuity of "blood"; the other is the continuity of assets. The former was 
conceptualised by ritual succession, the oldest form of succession. Blume points 
out that the former is not necessarily connected to the latter. Nonetheless, to 
establish the connection, he develops a conceptual tool of "character" which 
comprises the individual's intention. He developed the idea of Werk, that is, all 
that an individual produces in his/her lifetime that is left after death is an 
embodiment of his/her character (Ohtsuka 1993, 178). By developing this idea 
he is attempting to liken the connection of assets and blood to the correlation 
between body and soul. To enable succession and to facilitate the development 
even if there are many declarations in the will, they cannot take effect. Will theory has to 
address this point in order to be coherent. 
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of Werk, it is central to his thesis that the producer's death cannot destroy them. 
If this kind of succession can be allowed, the succession of the producer's 
intention is justified. Thus, the testamentary right becomes the testator's 
intention which here comprises his/her proprietary right. 
Logically speaking, a supposition that the dead are not the subject of 
assets is antithetical to the idea that intention can survive a subject's death. 
Nevertheless, if the intention has posthumously legal validity as the intention of 
the dead, it has to be a legally fictitious intention. In English law, some have 
argued this does not matter. J. W. Salmond explains the orthodox position: 
"The rights which a dead man thus leaves behind him vest in his representative. 
They pass to some persons whom the dead man, or the law on his behalf, has 
appointed to represent him in the world of the living. This representative bears 
the person of the deceased .. , Inheritance is in some sort a legal and fictitious 
continuation of the personality of the dead man, for the representative is in 
some sort identified by the law with him whom he represents .. , To this extent, 
and in this fashion, it may be said that the legal personality of a man survives 
his natural personality" (quoted by Williams 1957,482-3) [original italics]. 
3.3.3 The intention underlying a will 
A will is a person's declaration of what is to be done after his/her death; the 
intention is that of a living person about what is to happen to their estate post-
death-ipso facto the intention as declared here is that of a living person. The 
declaration has three defining characteristics as a juristic act: i) it is revocable at 
any time during his/her lifetime, ii) it does not become operative until death, and 
iii) it is to be executed after death no matter what (Atkinson 1953, 1; Margrave-
Jones 1993, 8-9; Kerridge 1996). Much like a unilateral contract, the moment 
when the will is made is understood to be at the point of declaration of the 
intention. Of course, it is after the testator's death that his/her will takes effect. 
One view that identifies a will with a declaration of intention considers the 
execution of the will as a juristic act. But rather than this kind of analysis, more 
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profitable discussions focus on accounts of: "what is the legal effect of a will?", 
"where and how is the effect?" and "why is the effect generated?" 
The legal effect of a will can be analysed at two levels: first, legal effect in 
the form of an actual action; and second, purely legal effect generated by a 
juristic act. The first category is dependent upon the testator's action in making a 
will. The resulting will can take an infinite number of guises dependent upon a 
multitude of factors. Some examples of these factors include: varying degrees of 
duties required of parties once the will is executed; the economic status of each 
of them at the time when the duties are performed; their ability to understand the 
relevant laws; the lawyer's interpretation of the precise contents of the will; and 
the availability for legal means, etc. However, the effect of the second category 
is not dependent upon contingent factors at all. Rather this category is regarded 
as certain in effect. This is because it refers solely to the transmission of 
property rights (Le., their creation, transfer and extinction) on and after the 
testator's death. 
In Japanese law, a will's nature is considered different from the 
corresponding relationship between rights and obligations that exist in a general 
contract of sale. For example, when assets are bequeathed, an obligation is 
imposed on the testator to transfer the property to the beneficiary who then 
becomes the owner. On the one hand, although the testator has a right to leave 
a bequest there is no correlative right to attain the beneficiary's rights; likewise 
although the beneficiary has a right to reject the bequest, s/he still has no 
correlative obligation to the testator's other rights. Thus, whilst, despite the fact 
that the action is a kind of unilateral act generated by the making of a will, it is not 
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clear where the effect of the action of the will originates, it is clear where the 
effect of a bilateral contract originates. 
A contract of sale can be, in general, explained by the following correlation 
of a right and an obligation (Sat5 1988, 146). A contract of sale creates an 
obligation-right; this means, there is an obligation to transfer the ownership from 
the seller to the purchaser and . correspondingly, an obligation-duty to be 
performed by the purchaser to seller. A seller has a right for the obligation to be 
performed much like the purchaser has a right to receive the object for sale. 
These rights effectively form an invisible bond between the parties. By this, they 
may playa role in binding the parties. As such these rights are by-products of 
logical thinking and are not tangible. However, when the right is infringed, the 
correlative secondary right refers not to a mental power but to a physical power. 
Sat5 (ibid., 147) names the former a primary claim and the latter a secondary 
claim. She also specifies a difference between the two claims: 
"The primary claim means a right which can create, by a declaration of one's 
intention, an active and autonomous relationship between the parties and their 
object. On the other hand the secondary claim means a right that is passive in 
nature. Moreover, impliCit within the claim is the idea that it is not unfair to use 
legal means to recover the right infringed" (ibid.) [my translation]. 
As for an obligation, Sat6 points out: 
"The creation of an obligation by paying the purchase price to a seller refers to 
a binding duty on the seller's mind. If the seller does not perform his/her 
obligation subject to this inner binding duty, there lies a possibility of actual 
enforcement against him/her" (ibid.) [my translation]. 
If the correlation of a right and an obligation is though~ of in this manner, it 
becomes possible to think that, in a contract of sale, there is a -two-way 
relationship between a right and an obligation. First, the mental power of the 
primary claim and the binding duty may take place in both the parties' minds. 
Secondly, there may be physical power in the secondary claim by virtue of the 
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potential for enforcement of the obligation. We would argue that it is these 
powers which are the legal effect of a contract of sale. 
Since, however, the act of making a will is unilateral, the effect of a will 
must also be unilateral; consequently, the correlation between a right and an 
obligation cannot be found in the act. When the declaration of a will is analysed, 
a binding power to the parties can however be identified. Yet, even then, what 
binds the parties does not present the full picture, for we ought to note that there 
are cases in which a party is not subject to what binds the other party. In 
Japanese law, for example, a testamentary recipient may give up the 
testamentary gift at any time following the death of the testator (Art. 986 of the 
Civil Code). Hence, there is no absolute requirement that the recipient must take 
the gift. Moreover, in a case where by the provision of "Disinheritance of 
presumptive successor by will" (Art. 893) such procedure is adopted, a question 
arises: to whom or what does the presumptive successor make his/her objection? 
The reason why the answer to-"where and how is the effect of a will"-is 
not altogether clear stems from the idea that the relationship between the parties' 
rights and duties is rather complicated. As stated hitherto, in order to examine 
this complexity, English law utilises a legal fiction in the process of transferring 
ownership from the testator to the beneficiaries. H. Steiner questions whether 
what the executor has is a power or a duty (1994, 255). If it is a power, how did 
he acquire it? (ibid.) Whilst the testator is alive the executor is the same as 
everyone else, under a duty not to interfere with the testator's possessions. Put 
another way, s/he lacks any power to dispose of the testator's property (ibid.). It 
is precisely because the will is only legally valid and effective when its maker 
dies. However, Steiner remarks that if it were· possible for the testator 
162 
posthumously to transfer the power of disposal to the executor, there would be 
no call for an executor (ibid.). It would be possible for the testator to transfer the 
property directly to the testamentary donee. In fact, this is precisely what 
happens under Japanese law. Here, the testator's rights are not transferred to 
the executor after his/her death but directly to the testamentary donee. The 
executor merely acts for the testator and the testamentary donee. Steiner's 
answer to this is: 
"It would appear that if the executor does have a duty, and moreover one which 
is correlative to a right, this duty is one correlative to a right held by the state 
which is the only possible author of the requisite fiction" (ibid., 257) [original 
italics]. 
Namely, the right to demand compliance with duty vests in the state. 
Then, why is it that a will takes effect? In other words, how is the transfer 
of property by a will justified? Legal fictions assist to overcome technical 
difficulties in legal coherence and, as a result, bring about the effect of a will. 
The effect of the will is derived from the duality of legal relations between private 
persons. Rights, duties and powers created by the will are not only the residue 
remaining from the will's effect but are creations of law. They do not result from 
a deduction from the state of nature. Therefore, "there can be no moral 
counterpart to the legal power of bequest. So the justification of bequest, if there 
is one, cannot lie in the demands of justice" (ibid., 258) [original italics]. 
If that is the case, and those elements rely upon a universally binding 
fiction, then, if the testator declares an intention to make posthumous gifts, 
should the act be regarded as a renunciation of his/her property at the moment of 
death? Proprietary rights obviously belong to the living. Death leads to the 
removal of the rights of the living. The fact that a person's lost rights are 
transferred to someone else is another matter. People lose all other rights along 
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with their personal rights at death. Legal fictions merely make the posthumous 
transmission of property possible. Subsequently the fictions enable the rights of 
the living to survive his/her death. If a testator declares the intention that s/he will 
permanently own his/her property even after death, Japanese law and English 
law disregard this declaration. This is precisely because succession inevitably 
starts by reason of death.88 
3.4 Intention of intestacy 
Succession is the posthumous transmission of property or status. Nonetheless, 
the question-"what is the basis for succession?"-is not easily answered. 
Historically, changes in political and cultural norms have influenced succession in 
its various forms. Succession's diverse forms indeed make it almost impossible 
for us to seek a single answer to its basis. Current analyses have approached 
the idea of succession at different levels, for example, the examination of 
succession's interpretation; its systems and sometimes the synthesis of both.89 
Examining this discussion is outside the scope of this thesis. Rather we will 
concentrate on explaining the intention underlying intestacy. Of course, before 
we can explain such intention, its foundation must be established. We have 
already seen that a will is an example of intention; can the same be said where a 
person dies intestate?9o We shall argue that there is intention even in intestacy. 
88 See Art. 882 of the Japanese Civil Code. 
89 For example, Grotius's discussion on intention was controversial both in its 
interpretation and systemisation. The controversy stemmed from using Will Theory not only 
as a basis for the interpretation of freedom to leave testaments, but also, as a basis for 
connecting the foundation stone of the system of succession to private ownership (Ito 1981, 
13-14). 
90 Intestacy refers both to a situation where a will has not been made and where a 
will is deemed to be invalid. We will be referring to the former only. 
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This argument is justified not only by the claim that intestacy may be founded 
upon an intention not to make a Will,91 but also, by the following explanation: 
"The rules relating to beneficial entitlement on intestacy are designed to reflect 
the wishes of the average testator, and are in fact based on an analysis of a 
large number of wills" (Margrave-Jones 1993, 173). 
This is to say that, although intention of intestacy is not as clear-cut as the 
intention underlying testacy, which lies more in the order of systematised 
intention, there is a kind of order of quasi-intention within intestate succession. 
We would argue that in cases where succession occurs in the absence of 
a will, and this succession leads to the disposal of property and inheritance, 
human intention still lies at the centre of intestate succession. The intention is 
broader in conception and, yet to some extent more confined. It can be 
understood in terms of the temporal continuation of present, past and future. 
The intention of those who can legally act, despite being constrained, is 
directed towards the future. Irrespective of making a will, the assumption is 
his/her intention will be carried out. But so far as the transmission of property is 
concerned, few deny that the power of intention is at the heart of succession and 
is its very essence. At death however almost all of the individual's intention is 
extinguished; the remaining part has a new binding power and new 
characteristics, which are directed by law. As shall be examined later, a 
comparison between the nature of pre-death and posthumous intention 
evidences significant differences. In order to argue that the existence of quasi-
intention is a ground for intestate succession, we will explain how the order 
involved in the intention at the pre-death and the posthumous stage differ. 
91 This expression per 5e is seemingly bizarre. The reason why we make use of that 
the connotation is required that there would be not an intention of a will but one of the 
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3.4.1 The pre-death stage 
Some are conscious of death on a daily basis. This consciousness may in turn 
motivate them to arrange for the posthumous disposal of their property and 
assets. The living have expectations that their respective wills will be executed 
once they are dead. This assumption of expectation stems from the knowledge 
of there being a deep-rooted system in modern society for property disposal. 
This expectation is embedded in a desire, such as a wish or a hope, but it is not 
as definite as the intention which underlies the will. When intention is respected, 
the expectation may be considered the presumed intention that has been 
processed through the legal system. In circumstances of intestacy the law has 
possibly considered taking this "presumed intention" into consideration. Given 
the emphasis on intention, the following definition of succession is plausible: 
"Whilst testamentary succession is subject to the testator's definite intention 
regarding his/her property, intestate succession can be attributed to the 
presumed intention based on legal provisions" (Takashina 1958,47) [my 
translation]. 
In the Japanese Civil Code, regulation based on the intention of the ancestor and 
the descendant, as opposed to the division of the estate per se, influences co-
succession. 92 However, in practice, the majority of succession cases do not 
follow the Civil Code. Successors appear to determine their actions under 
diverse social restraints. A good example is the renunciation of their rights to 
succession. 93 These practical cases should at least be supported to some 
general people. 
92 Examples respecting the intention of ancestors include provIsions such as 
"designated share in succession" (Art. 902.), "designation or prohibition of partition by will" 
(Art. 908.), "the spouse becoming a successor" (Art. 890.), and "Lineal ascendants, brothers 
and sisters" (Art. 889.) and "statutory shares in succession" (Art. 900.). Examples of 
respecting intention of successors are provisions such as "procedure of renunciation" (Art. 
938) and "execution of partition" (Art. 907.). 
93 To avoid dispersing assets, it is not uncommon for a successor (e.g., other 
siblings) to, in terms of practice, exclude a sole successor (e.g., an elder brother) who then 
may be compelled to renounce their rights to partition of the estate. But the renunciation 
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degree by an implied-shared intention existing amongst Japanese people. Yet, it 
is not true to say that, in all cases, a sole successor is advantaged whereas 
those compelled to renounce their newly found inheritance are not (ibid.). It 
should be acknowledged that a sole successor is often disadvantaged if left with 
assets of little value, particularly in situations where these assets incur debts. 
Taking a functional approach to objects of succession, it can be the case 
that not all the objects belong solely to the deceased. For example, there are 
cases in which a wife contributes to maintaining or increasing the property 
holdings of her husband; or in which an elder son's assets are absorbed into his 
parents' assets. Here, the property to be passed on cannot be wholly considered 
the deceased's personal assets; r~ther the evaluation of ownership lies in the 
nature of co-operative shares.94 This analysis of social structure suggests the 
intention of a deceased and their successors is not subject to the absolute 
autonomy assumed by the Civil Code, but, is more akin to a compromised 
intention affected by the deceased's or successor's expectation or by the 
necessity or consciousness of posthumously supporting the surving family (ibid., 
50). 
Conversely, Akeyama (1979, 12-16) argues, the one-sided posthumous 
distribution of property is most often the passing on of a kind of unearned 
income, particularly in situations where shared property becomes the survivor's 
personal property. To circumvent this result, inheritance and gift tax playa role in 
redistributing the possible unfairness of unearned capital. 
seems to be based on intention, so far as the procedure is subject to the provision on 
renunciation. 
94 One radical view accepts the remains of the credit for rewards and the existence of 
the claims for unjust enrichment (see Art. 703 of the Japanese Civil Code.) (Endo 1980, 1-
14). 
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Although a deceased's intention affects the phenomenon of succession 
vis a vis a will, the order of quasi-intention affecting the living can also influence 
succession. If succession stems from a family's co-operative relations whilst 
living, succession and support are correlated to each other. For example, we can 
consider the following two things as restraints to freedom in making a will: first, 
when a wife is implicitly a co-owner; and second, where parents have a duty to 
support their dependants. "Co-operative relations for the living" refers to "limited 
family co-operative relations based on the principle of self-responsibility" (Izumi 
and Nakagawa 1988, 10-12). Succession can be considered a liquidation of the 
deceased's assets for guaranteeing provisions for the surviving members of the 
family. There are many lawyers who espouse this view. This view assumes that 
there is quasi-order between parents and their children. Their present life first 
has to be taken into consideration by succession law. Yet, the question of how 
successors of surviving grandparents and siblings are justified and associated 
with quasi-order still remains unresolved. Although this can be explained by the 
blood· relationship, the question "how can the blood bond make succession 
possible?" also remains unanswered. Moreover, this view on the blood bond 
does not explain succession between spouses (Nakagawa 1963, 179-180). 
Even so, we will argue that a "blood" base for succession can be justified 
by the historically prolonged use of quasi-order formed as a result of an 
ancestor's conscious recognition of blood relationships. 95 Moreover, we will 
argue that other quasi-order forms can justify succession between spouses, 
particularly those, who are not blood related. Again, these forms have arisen 
95 For example, Doma (see Ito 1981, 184-5) argues that the family right to 
succession is akin to natural rationality. and that a will is no more than a supplement for 
intestate succession. Although Doma attempted to justify the family right to succession by 
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because ancestors consciously viewed their spouses as blood relations. It 
appears to follow from this context that a blood relationship is nothing more than 
a mechanism that forms order in society. It is often presumed by other 
documents that a person did not wish his/her property to be transferred to his/her 
heirs. In a case, for example, where there is an inhuman act that was committed 
against an ancestor by his/her heir, since s/he failed to express his/her real 
intention in the document of testacy, the procedure of succession is executed 
regardless. Generally speaking, in cases of intestacy, it appears that the 
intention of the deceased is regarded as a desire to leave one's estate intestate; 
this is, however, not the same as the presumption of intention seen in testacy. 
The ground for this legal presumption can be found by using the concept of 
quasi-order of intention. To recapitulate, this is conceptually different from the 
intention seen in cases of testacy. 
It could be argued that the quasi-order of intention rests upon its purpose 
or function, justified by society (Akeyama 1979, 12-16). According to this view 
(ibid.), the argument justifying succession lies both in the potential 
accomplishment of the function of domestic production and in specifying 
guaranteed provisions for family members. These two elements stem from 
maintaining or holding together a domestic bond. Via these three kinds of 
functional grounds, the general welfare and kinship of family members can be 
furthered by posthumous support. The deceased presumes that s/he has a duty 
to support those remaining after his/her death; moreover, potential successors 
also take it for granted that, so far as there remains the posthumous asset, the 
potential successor's should acquire it. Thus from the successor's point of view, 
using the term "the right of blood", he still failed to justify a spouse's right to succession 
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a successor's claim is transcended into a right to succession. Basically therefore 
it should be noted that the scope of the claim of the claimants for support and the 
scope of the claim of the successors as justified by law are essentially in 
accordance with one another (Hagiwara and Nagata 1958, 163). 
3.4.2 At the posthumous stage 
Here, law governs succession. People are compelled to trust in and obey such 
law. It could be argued that even obeying the law is akin to reflecting and 
meeting the intention of the deceased and their descendants. For it is possible to 
say that there is a kind of intentional order in peoples' attitudes toward law. 
Against this, it can be argued that there is a different order in quasi-intention. 
Under this order, in cases of intestate succession the posthumous disposal of 
property is still maintained. The underlying reason for this disposal is to provide 
support for families with limited means. So, as stated earlier, intestate 
succession can be considered the liquidation of the assets of the dead family 
member in order to support the remaining family. Succession is a mechanism to 
modulate competing interests within the family. Broadly speaking, it can be 
argued that law maintains this order of interests, moreover, members of society 
support it. 
3.4.3 Analysis on intention of intestacy 
H. Grotius (1853) and I. Kant (see End5 1980, 8), both natural lawyers, sought 
foundations for both succession from an individual's intention, and the 
transmission of other rights. Grotius and Kant argued that we could deduce the 
(ibid.). 
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foundations of the posthumous transmission of property from the pre-death 
transmission of an individual's intention to his/her successors. Will Theory 
seems to succeed in logically explaining the succession of debts. If a society 
admits the principle of successive ownership, because it is based on the intention 
of the deceased, then primitive ownership, a situation in which nobody owns the 
property, is a corollary. Given successive ownership, there would be no 
alternative but the conclusion that attributing the intention of the deceased and 
that of his/her successors should be legally fictionalised. 
As for intestate succession, Kant and other natural lawyers argued that, 
whilst a right is based on an agent's intention, the death of the right-holder results 
in non-ownership of the property. The law then transfers the subject to the 
successors, on the grounds that it is considered the presumed will of the 
ancestors, that enables transmission of the proprietary right (Le., the object of 
rights) (ibid.). The "presumed will" of the owner is a product of legal fiction so 
that intention can survive human death. Moreover, this point suggests that the 
distinction between human life and death can be placed on a time continuum of 
past, present and future. 
Moreover, whilst a further ground for intestate succession is based upon 
on maintaining the stability of general traders (Izumi and Nakagawa 1992, 2-3), it 
is worth noting that the succession of private property is guaranteed and this 
practice is welcomed in society. Guaranteeing the possibility of family 
succession prompts people, although they are imposed on by death duty, to 
maintain and increase their assets in order to support the remaining family (ibid., 
3). 
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On this analysis, we can now see why most continental legal provisions 
including Japanese law use the principle of statutory succession. Successors 
are guaranteed their shares in succession. Justification for any restraint (e.g., 
legally secured portions) of testamentary freedom should be predicated on the 
following argument. Izumi and Nakagawa (1992, 16) argue that even in societies 
where principles of Privat-autonomie (private autonomy) and Vertragsfreiheit 
(contract freedom) are generally valid and where private property can be 
autonomously disposed of, the societies are nevertheless composed of co-
operative relationships .between family members. 
The co-operative life implies there are duties to support children, spouses 
and parents. A spouse's right and rights based on blood ties, to succession, is 
necessarily accepted in the life based upon the co-operative relationships. Izumi 
and Nakagawa remark that: 
"when the system of modern private ownership faced the family of limited means, 
ideally, responsibility ought to be have been taken individually but this was not 
always feasible. Although there is no family responsibility per se, guaranteeing 
the maintenance of the family has to be undertaken by an individual within the 
family" (ibid.) [my translation]. 
Such theoretical insufficiency is a reality that liberal countries cannot avoid. "The 
reality lies between family responsibility and individual responsibility" (ibid., 17). 
Modern society assumes individualism and self-responsibility. A right is . 
exercised under the individual's name; therefore the family community cannot be 
regarded as a legal person. Nevertheless, the family's continuing existence and 
function depends largely on unpaid labour (ibid.). In addition, guaranteeing the 
living of family members may be governed by the morality of family responsibility 
and solidarity. For this reason, almost aI/ liberal nations accept testamentary 
freedom and domestic responsibility within families; nevertheless, they restrain 
the freedom for the sake of the presumed successors (ibid.). An example of this 
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kind of restraint is reservation. It originates from ancient German law, and has 
amongst its supporters the French .. The idea of reservation refers to legally 
secured portions of property. Another example is duty portions, derived from 
Roman law, which the Germans have adopted. Despite having different legal 
characteristics, the two kinds of restraint are the same in terms of their logical 
basis for which restraining freedom to dispose of property can be justified. One 
view is that the minor difference between the two institutions is that 
"the reservation refrains a testator from autonomously disposing of his/her 
property beyond the allowed limits, i.e., it restricts the action of disposal. 
Conversely, the duty portion refers to a device that effects the disposal action 
thus transforming it into monetary credits. In this situation the validity of the 
action itself is irrelevant, the focus being upon crediting those who have duty 
portions, with any surplus beyond the line being transformed into debt. In light 
of these requirements for the stability of trading, the institution of duty portions 
may be more modern than reservation" (ibid.) [my translation and italics]. 
It is argued that restraints on the freedom to dispose of private property rest upon 
the order where the accumulation of the deceased's and successor's intention, 
instantiate and reflect the temporal continuation of the past, the present and the 
future. It can be argued that as a result of this consciousness and intention, the 
law includes the intention of ancestors. This intention is not formalised like a 
testamentary disposal, rather it is a quasi-intention. Even primitive societies, to 
some degree, have complex systems of succession that have been influenced by 
diverse factors. It follows that more developed systems of modern law cannot 
attribute succession to a sole cause. Rather amongst the many causes, the 
main factor is legal consideration of the development of the deceased's intention 
and the concomitant change in people's legal consciousness.96 
96 In Japan, the reformation of the Civil Code in 1980 changed the shares of the 
spouse from one-third to one-half, and added a provision concerning the amount of 
contribution, i.e., the amount of contribution can be added to the share in succession (Art. 
904-2). It appears this reformation is based on a change to succession's social basis that 
has been influenced by factors such as the conscious enhancement of female rights. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
In the light of the analyses concerning succession of testacy and intestacy, the 
following reasons are proposed as to why a person's intention in succession can 
survive his/her death: 
(1) For testacy, the right of ownership cannot be directly deduced by virtue of the 
transmission of property post-death. For death is the cut-off point for the 
continuation of pre and post-death ownership. English law allows the testator's 
property to transfer directly to his/her executor, but at this point a logical fallacy 
takes place. For if the transmission were executed from the testator to his/her 
personal representative, logically it means the transmission from a living person 
to another living person .. However, since a will takes effect on death, the legal 
effect cannot be between living persons. Therefore, how can there be a 
transmission from the deceased person to his/her personal representative? The 
answer is it cannot take place between the living and the dead. This is because 
the dead ceases to be the subject of rights. Having said that, in order to succeed 
in the posthumous transmission, there is no alternative other than by using a 
legal fiction. That is, because the deceased's intention is succeeded by the 
living's intention, the once owned property could be transferred to the personal 
representative. This legal fiction can be applied to Japanese cases in which 
property is transferred from the testator directly to his/her beneficiaries. If it were 
not for this legal device, it is not justifiable that the executor in English law or the 
beneficiaries in Japanese law can legitimately receive property from their dead 
testators. It follows that if the beneficiaries can directly receive from the dead, 
Similarly, raising the profile of human rights has been instrumental in reducing inequality 
174 
then the property that the dead bequeathed can apparently be regarded as a 
right of the dead. Although the legal fiction is often bewildering, logically a right 
of the dead can exist in the institution of succession. 
(2) It is argued similarly that for intestate succession, the intention of a living 
person can survive his/her death. The intention used here is different from that 
used for testacy, but it can, as quasi-intention, maintain the order of succession. 
For the purposes of legislation, this kind of intention is also fictionalised. The law 
presumes intention is fictional which in turn presumes an individual's intention 
can survive his/her death. This is to enable the continuation of individual 
intention from the past, to the present, to the future. So, the living's person's 
intention that is extinguished by death, paradoxically becomes the intention that 
survives. The point is that, removing the legal fiction from succession leaves 
intention cut off without foundation. Logically, intention that exists posthumously 
should be a new form of intention for the dead. Insofar as life upholds intention, 
intention is necessarily broken at death. An individual's daily life consists of 
countless desires, determination and intention. Most are cut off at death. The 
fact is however, a very small amount of an individual's intention, perhaps 
equivalent to desire-e.g., for the disposal of the corpse or the property-can 
survive death due to legal fictions. Hence there is no alternative but to express 
this idea as "intention of the dead" given that intention as it is usually understood 
is discontinued by the event of death. Further, whilst the expression "an inert 
hunk of matter thoroughly removed from the realm of moral significance" 
(Lomasky 1987, 213) is correct, if the succession of intention is sought, the 
between legitimate and illegitimate children. 
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expression "intention of the dead" should be accepted. This is because if 
succession of intention is legally fictionalised, then "intention of the dead" has to 
be likewise fictionalised. It therefore follows that, in the same way as intention of 
a will, the rights of the dead can logically exist in succession law. 
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Chapter 4 
The social characteristics of the dead 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will explain our four presuppositions relating to the social 
characteristics of the dead. The first is concerned with the categories by which 
the dead can be recognised in their relationships with and between the living and 
society. The second explores the concept of social characteristics and we 
present the argument that social characteristics per se contain concepts of both 
rights and duties. The third proposes that both the identity of the living and their 
social characteristics can partly survive death. This is one of the reasons why 
the dead are different from other things and they are recognised as an entity 
close to the living. The fourth which we elucidate in the final section of this 
chapter argues that the social characteristics of the dead entails deeply rooted 
rights. Throughout this chapter, an attempt will be made to justify the rights of 
the dead by using the concept of the social characteristics of the dead. 
4.2 Relationships between the living and the dead 
4.2.1 Identity of the dead 
The dead have a central place in the living's mental activities such as 
consciousness, memory and recognition of their character and achievements.97 
97 Some terms used in this paragraph, such as consciousness, memory, recognition, 
existence, are sometimes used as philosophical terms. Many definitions abound for each of 
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Since the dead, whose life is, at least in terms of cellular activity, completely 
terminated, have no resources for autonomous motion, it is clear enough 
therefore that they cannot be the subject of motion. On the other hand, unless 
the living are conscious of the dead, there would be no continued meaningful 
existence of the dead. Any meaningful existence of the dead is therefore derived 
from and within the mental activities of the living. The living can actively involve 
themselves in the memory of the dead, in contradistinction to the passive 
involvement the dead have with the living. This relationship is exemplified by the 
medical circumstance where even if the organs of a patient who is brain dead are 
functioning, the relationship nevertheless between the living and the patient is 
unilateral, due to the patient's lack of consciousness, and is not a social 
interaction. 98 The active/passive roles are inherent in this relationship when 
translated into the case of dead persons. Additionally, long after death the dead 
lack any cellular activity whatsoever, which fully highlights the point that human 
corpses are categorised as "real" (res in Latin), which means something relating 
to a thing rather than to a person. 
However, it is true, that despite such a clear-cut distinction between a 
person and a thing, we believe that a thing, e.g., a desk or a chair, should not be 
placed in the same category as a corpse. The reason for this is that we hold an 
assumption that the relationship between a living and a dead person would in 
normal circumstances be qualitatively different to that between a person and a 
thing such as a desk or a chair. T. Yara (1996), prominent anatomist, notes that, 
these terms. However, general meanings will be used in this chapter for explaining such 
concepts referred to above, by which consciousness is defined as "direct recognition that a 
person holds about a mental fact that arises inside his/her mind" .. 
98 E.g., although a decaying corpse which emits an offensive smell can affect a living 
person, this phenomena does not mean an exchange of actions between one subject and 
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on the side of those who observe the dead and the corpse, the difference in such 
an assumption raises a problem. He also states that as viewing a dead body as 
a mere thing cannot convert the subject from being a body to being a mere thing, 
so the failure to view a dead body as a mere thing cannot change its state of 
being a thing to a state of being a body. A corpse is a more emotional object 
than a thing by far. An aversion to dealing with a corpse as a mere thing would 
be, as T. Tachibana (1992, 17) addressed, an instinctive reflex. It is considerably 
difficult to refrain from the emotional resistance, because people have, although 
there is the difference of degrees / extent, common religious thoughts and beliefs 
of death so that although the dead have been objectified in the process of the 
advance of natural science, the dead still remain insufficiently objectified. 
In most cases we conceive the relationship between a living and a dead 
person to be much stronger than that between a person and a thing. The 
grounds for this difference in relational power lies in the different degrees of 
perceptual strength a person projects towards objects of consciousness, 
perception and recognition. The degree of strength projected to any particular 
perceptual "object" can be attributed to the impression that a person receives 
from the object: expectation and desire for it, for example. 
Moreover, the source of the perceptual power can be ascribed to the living 
persons' memory, where the situational details of how a dead person was as a 
previously living person are retained. Influenced by such memories, the living 
resultantly relate to the dead in a different way from that of relation to things (see 
1.4.3). A person as a social being cannot consider biological death of humans as 
the extinction of them. Human death is regarded as something containing a 
another. The corpse is a source of the smell but it cannot get rid of the smell by its intention 
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higher value than something in a thing. Therefore even to utter strangers' 
corpses, we hardly have the nerve to treat them as a thing like a broken chair 
and a desk. This is a brief explanation bearing on empirical recognition. 
Additionally logical recognition can be explicated by recognising the relational 
strength or bond between the living and the dead. Directing attention to the 
relationship between the dead and the living and excluding any psychological 
impressions we may have of the previously living person per se, point out a form 
of universality that invokes the notion of a causal relationship or a substantially or 
necessarily dependant relationship. Given the fact that any dead person used to 
be a living person, the experiential and logical recognition suggests both that a 
dead person inherits sOrTlething, i.e., a partial identity as mentioned below, from 
his/her former entity and that s/he demonstrates that this "something" is a reality. 
An example of the "something" is a status which the dead draw from the living, 
and which is recognised in the relation between the dead and society. Traditions 
of sociology divide status into two categories: an ascribed status and an achieved 
status (Linton 1936). The former derives from "attributes over which a person 
has no control-age, sex, or colour, for example-or from membership in a group 
to which he is assigned by others-family, religion, nationality" (Chinoy 1968, 67). 
The latter is a status which can be obtained by an endeavour and competition 
and which is distributed by the result of the performance-vocational status, 
educational background, wealth. Yet there is an achieved status which is almost 
recognised as a kind of ascribed status, once it is achieved, in evaluating the 
person. Some of such ascribed statuses and achieved statuses can survive the 
person's death as his/her identities. For example, a Japanese female is still 
or will. In this regard, the corpse is the same as a fish that emits an offensive smell. 
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Japanese and female after she dies. Moreover even her educational background 
and vocational status can survive her death as a social evaluation which 
continues to be after death (see Chapter 2). 
Notwithstanding the brevity of our adumbration above we propose it is 
plausible. without further argument. to postulate that one of the main factors that 
we as living persons are conscious of when relating to the dead is a natural 
assurance that the dead physically retain a partial identity of their previously living 
bodies except in circumstances where there is no body after death. for instance 
after an horrific accident or following an atomic bomb attack. At death when a 
living person hence becomes a corpse, what is assumed not to undergo 
substantial transformation whilst alive does undergo transformation upon death 
into another thing. However, this is not a total transformation, rather there is in 
death a partial retention of the characteristics and form of the previously living 
person. 
Although, the issues surrounding identity or partial Identity are the topics of 
a multidisciplinary subject encompassing tho discourses of philosophy and 
psychology, a brief discussion of the general thoory of identity is nocessary here 
to clarify our argument. Whilst most discussions on Identity have focused on 
people, identity appertaining to things has also been discussed (o.g., seo Oaker 
2000, esp. Chapter 4). The morning star and the evening star havo different 
meanings despite being identical with Venus. Apparently, however, both stars 
have the same identity. It WOUld. in this regard, be essential that things have 
their own names for the sake of being identified but their namos are not 
interchangeable insofar as they have their own identity. 
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If we regard naming as part (further discussion on names, see 4.6.2 and 
4.6.3), at least, of the substance of identity, then we should pay attention to the 
term "body" which is common to both the living and the dead body at the 
transition from life to death. As long as the dead body has not been destroyed or 
has not disappeared, those who attend a person's death, i.e., his/her transition 
from life to death, are in no doubt about the fact that his/her dead body is derived 
from his/her living one. The retained partial identity of the dead body derived 
from the living one therefore provides a visible continuity between the dead 
person and the person they were when alive. 
A new corpse, whose tissues and organs are, in a broad sense, still alive 
immediately after death starts to undergo physical alteration and sooner or later 
begins the process of decomposition. However, what allows us to recognise the 
partial identity of the dead person is first an attempt to identify the shape of the 
living body in the corpse. A living body can be represented as a conceivable 
mode. It exists as not only a physical figure, including a carriage, but also a 
representation of characteristics. In a sense, the living body can be viewed as a 
being seemingly in the most natural situation, but its visible shapes (e.g., 
physique, height and weight) are social products. For the feature of a living body 
may be characterised by multiple social conditions that the person has been 
involved with. For example, coalminer's shapes of fingers, legs, hands, etc., can 
be, to some extent, deformed by their vocational conditions. Other similar 
examples are pianists' long fingers, sumo wrestlers' obesity and boxers' 
somewhat deformed faces. Any physical features of hair, carriage, action, body, 
etc., playa vital role in a guide for understanding their social meanings. A living 
body is located in the structure of signified symbols. The meanings and values of 
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the symbols are determined by the locus of the symbols in society. In 
,comparison between a living body and its dead body one discerns physical 
similarities in most cases. If there is in terms of forms or shapes a similarity 
between the previously living person and their corpse, then this enables us to 
recognise the partial identity of the corpse. This recognition is frequently found 
not only in the process of change from a living body to a corpse, but even in 
circumstances where a corpse is drastically altered into, say, ashes (although 
this is, admittedly, an extremely thin example of identitl9). However that case 
does not suggest that the corpse has a visible partial identity of the living body, 
but rather that any evidence for proving the partial identity should be required. 
For example, a corpse's false teeth may serve to identify a badly damaged 
corpse involved in an aeroplane crash. In this case evidence for the partial 
identity is linked to the victims' antemortem images that are kept in the observer's 
memories. In short the observer can experience the reconstruction of their 
memories through the evidence. 
4.2.2 Partial identity 
Whilst the issue of the identity of a corpse can be developed through an 
application of a body-identity theory, it seems that the traditional discussion 100 on 
personality identity developed not only the body-identity theory but also a 
99 Although the term "identity" has several definitions in sociology, psychology, etc., it 
is used in this paper to refer to "sameness", in so doing it reflects the way Locke (1960 
[1690]) used the term. 
100 Psychological theorists, such as Parfit (1986), Shoemaker (1984) and Perry 
(1976), who accept the neo-Lockean theory personal identity mainly ask a question: "what 
makes A at t1 the same person as B at t2" (Campbell 2001). 
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memory-and-character theory 101 (Locke, 1988 [1690]). The latter theory 
suggests, as its name implies, that on the assumption that human memory and 
attitudes of personality toward a person are important for the construction and 
maintenance of identity, then the continuity of the living's memory activities 
constitutes a personality identity of the dead. In particular circumstances 
therefore, it could be argued that if there was a lack in the continuity of memory 
and personality then this could equate to a lack of identity for that particular dead 
person (Shoemaker and Swinburne 1984). 
It is verging on the ridiculous, however, to think that, as suggested by the 
discussion on the continuity between a living body and its corpse, the latter still 
holds the memory and personality of the former entity. It is also not plausible to 
believe that human ashes retain the memory and personality of the living person. 
However, in order to argue the plausibility of partial identity even throughout the 
process of transition from living body to ashes, the role of memory in this process 
is instrumental. Yet we have to recognise that it is the living who directly or 
indirectly observe the dead body who form and hold these memories and not the 
dead person who has the partial identity with his/her previously living body. For 
further discussion, it is worthy of note that we as living persons involve ourselves 
in and with other humans. Apart from indirect relationships, in most cases, the 
memories we have and develop of these other humans are as a result of our 
mutual involvement. This kind of memory can be called "personal memory" 
which is chiefly based on our personal experience. 
Furthermore, our memory of a deceased person may be expressed in 
such terms as "weak" and "strong". Suppose that someone died of an illness. Of 
101 Collins suggests that "[t]he setting for the introduction of the idea of q-memory is 
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those who were involved with the deceased, some hold strong memories about 
her/him and others hold weak memories about her/him. The strength of a 
person's involvement with a deceased person may determine the strength of their 
memory of the deceased. Those who were closely involved with the deceased 
may have strong memories of how and what the deceased person was and did. 
But those not closely involved may hold a vague, or weak, image of the 
deceased person. On the other hand, however, it is clear we can argue that this 
kind of memory, irrespective of whether it is strong or weak, not only constitutes 
the partial identity of the deceased but plays a role in enabling us to recognise 
the partial identity of the body. What allows us to recognise the deceased person 
is something that is formed from our memories of that person, and moreover is 
something that is held in our memories, therefore memory has a very active role 
in constituting, shaping and reconstituting the partial identity of a deceased 
person. 
At any rate, those who remember the dead reconfirm by their memory that 
the dead inherited their bodily identity from their former living body (Le., the 
memory of the physical continuity of the partial identity). Whilst it would be 
possible to think that the dead were changed into something which is totally 
physically different from a living person, it would be very difficult to think that a 
living person loses everything s/he held at death and, after death, becomes 
something new. Death is the situation which generates them rather than vice 
versa. However, if it were not for this partial identity of the dead, we would lose 
the focus of our sentimental activities, e.g., when we grieve a death in front of the 
corpse, precisely because the corpse per se cannot be identified with the living 
the widely concept of memory presupposes personal identity, so that no reductive analysis 
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person we remember. Therefore, if it is warranted to assert that the dead inherit 
something from their former living selves, then the first of several presuppositions 
follows. This can be stated as: 
Presupposition 1: There are four ways in which we can categorise the attributes 
of the dead with regard to the role they play in society and hence establish the 
relationships between the living and dead: (1) the dead as an impression of the 
human character, (2) the dead as a catalyst for succession, (3) the dead as a 
successor and (4) the dead as a symbol. These categories lead in turn to the 
social characteristics of the dead. 
4.3 Four modes 
4.3.1 An impression of the human character 
The universal ground which distinguishes humans from animals, plants and 
inorganic substances is the concept that humans have agency. Agency entails 
that people are moral subjects. Each subject has the dignity of being a person 102 
and that of being alive. Although there are some compelling views 103 as to 
based on memory in the spirit of Locke's view is workable" (1997, 73). 
102 Many scholars attempt to identity with the criteria of personhood. For example, 
Dennet (1978) considered six conditions for personhood: (1) persons are rational beings; (2) 
they are beings or objects to which mental (intentional) predicates or states of consciousness 
apply; (3) we take a personal stance toward us; (4) they are capable of taking a reciprocal 
personal stance toward us; (5) they are capable of verbal communication; (6) they are 
capable of a form of self-consciousness not found in other species [original italics]. Barresi 
(1999, 79-98) provides with six criteria for understanding personhood: 1) Persons are 
constructed out of natural but organic materials; 2) Persons emerge as a form of adaptation 
through the process of evolution; 3) Persons develop ontogenetically; 4) Persons are created 
through the unifying activity of self-narrative; 5) Persons are constituted through socio-
historical and cultural processes: 6) The concept of person is a normative ideal [original 
italiCS]. 
103 See the debate after The Case of Animal Right (T. Regan, 1983), e.g., The animal 
issues (P. Carruthers, 1992) and Animal Factories (2nd ed.) (J. Mason and P. Singer 1991). 
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whether or not some non-human animals have a moral significance as an agent, 
this thesis accepts an assumption that law regards all non-human animals as res. 
The term "personality" as well as "person" is a Latin derivation of persona 
referring to a mask used for theatrical performance. Persona through usage over 
a long period has come to represent the role that people play in life and 
furthermore to mean the multiple characters that they hold. Both philosophers 
and psychologists have explicated the notion of personality. In psychology an 
understanding of personality has largely been developed on the basis of positivist 
assumptions as the sum of the patterns of thinking, feeling and behaving that 
manifest to some extent the consistent characteristics of a person which endure 
even when that person is involved in changeable situations. Personality has also 
been worked up as a concept to be employed to understand, explain and predict 
such actions and behaviours. Personality cannot be directly observed, 
perceptually experienced, as a desk and a chair are, but is rather a constituted 
concept, which whilst based upon observation and experience, is also to a 
certain extent beyond observation and experience. In attempting to define 
personality from a psychological point of view that emphasises individuality, we 
define personality not only as an integrated system of traits of body and mind that 
enable us to consistently, although to some extent, act, behave and experience, 
but as a vital manifestation for allowing us to predict a person's action and 
behaviour (see some traditions of sociology, e.g., G. W. Allport 1951; R. B. 
Cattell 1950). The common ground of both philosophical and psychological 
theories of personality is their assumption of rational agency. 
Many great philosophers have attempted to explicate the transcendental 
essentialism of agency. In Two Treaties of Government (1988 [1690]), for 
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example, John Locke provided an assertion, based on an empirical and 
psychological perspective, that agency is an intellectual entity that possesses 
rationality and reflection and simultaneously thinks at different times and places. 
To Locke, the essential trait of agency was consciousness regarding self. For in 
order to sustain the identity of agency, we are dependent upon our 
consciousness. Kant (1998 [1785]) derives the Categorical Imperative, which he 
identified as "the supreme principle of morality", from human dignity. Kant 
considered agency as a human who is morally responsible. To Kant, a morally 
responsible human refers to a human who holds as a subject of freedom a 
capacity of autonomy and who enables him/herself to be subject to the 
Categorical Imperative. Hegel (1942 [1821]) interpreted the concept of 
personhood as a transcendental individualistic agent. Thus he also accepted 
rationality as a main requirement of agency. 
In a current discourse, Gewirth (1978) argues agency on the basis of any 
prospective purportive agent who eschews logical contradictions (see Beyleveld 
and Brownsword 1994). These philosophers commonly emphasise rationality as 
a distinguishing nature of agency. Rationality enables agents to construct 
abstract concepts, to combine these concepts beyond time and space and to 
make presumptions upon them. 
Thus philosophers recognised the brains functions which control rationality 
and the self-consciousness as the central character of personhood. When we 
discover the basis of human dignity and personhood in biological facts, we 
recognise that we attempt to understand a personhood from a different viewpoint 
from biological aspects. The world determined by casual conditions can be 
grasped by facts, but the world where personhood exists cannot necessarily be 
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determined by causal conditions. Said in that way, when a person emerges in 
the world where personhood is not ascribed to the casual conditions or 
requirements and where his/her attitudes are determined by him/herself, and not 
by others, there is an irreplaceable personhood there. If personhood possesses 
dignity, this dignity may be identified with the irreplaceable nature of personhood 
I 
itself. 
An agent or person 104 acts as a moral subject. The agent is, even after 
his/her death, associated with his/her survivors through their memories, and to 
some extent his/her antemortem actions and behaviour, whilst nevertheless as a 
result of death the agent loses the status of morarsubject. Suppose that person 
A, an acquaintance, dies. A was a rational human and led a social life as a moral 
agent. She was responsible for her vocational assignments and kept her 
promise so that we would adequately memorise the minutiae of her daily actions 
and discourse. Also we might recollect some of her physical characteristics and 
distinctive talents such as singing and playing tennis. All of her facets and 
characteristics are registered in and recalled through our memory. Once she is 
dead, she is no longer able to sing, to keep promises or to demonstrate her 
distinctive skills when playing tennis. We, depending on the nature of our 
acquaintance might feel grief at her death. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between her and us is that of an acquaintance, we are not part of her family. 
104 Actually, there are many different ways of identifying personhood. Sapontzis 
analyses that "[moral] discussions concerning or even just involving personhood commonly 
employ both moral and metaphysical concepts of personhood" (1981, 607). To him, a 
"moral" concept refers to "an evaluative concept concerned with assigning rights, duties, 
obligations, and respect" (ibid.). On the other hand, a "metaphysical" concept refers to "the 
sort of thing Strawson discusses in individuals, that is, a part of the basic structure of our 
experience of the furniture and arrangement of the world" (ibid., also Strawson 1959) 
[original italics]. He thus distinguished the two kinds of concepts with their functions, 
evaluations and descriptions, but we will take them as a moral concept in this thesis. 
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Here therefore a question arises: how is deceased A related with society and 
US?105 
Before her death A was able herself to alter her relationship with society 
and us. Given that, if she had committed a crime, she would not only have been 
legally punished but also socially sanctioned. If she had breached her promise 
with us, we might have re-estimated our opinion of her or in some cases may 
have broken the relationship with her. Whilst alive A was positively involved in a 
relationship with society and us and at the same time as an agent she could 
establish many relationships in and with society and us. However on death she 
loses her agent status and is thus no longer able to be positively associated in or 
with anything and anyone. This change in status can also be expressed 
grammatically, where, for instance, a dead person is a subject of a sentence: "A 
dead person scares other persons", "A dead body emits offensive smells", and "A 
dead body starts with rigor mortis". In our discussion the phrase "A dead body or 
a dead person does X" evidently uses an active verb, but this does not mean that 
they do a purportive action by themselves. For example, the sentence "A dead 
person scares a person" would suggest that scaring a person is not a conscious 
action committed by the dead but rather is equivalent to what is rhetorically 
expressed as "A person fears a dead person". Although in the case of the 
emission of the smell and the rigor mortis the active voice is also used, their 
usage of language can be categorised as a description of natural phenomena, 
such as "the wind blows" and "the rain falls". Going back to A's case once she is 
dead, we have to recognise that she will always be an object not a subject. Thus 
a further question arises, what is the objectivity of the dead? 
105 Relation is called lien, which is derived from a Latin term Iigare. Also another 
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The concept of a res, or a thing, is opposite to the concept of personhood. 
Only persons govern almost all things, to enjoy them for their own sake and to 
dispose of them. In order to satisfy their own physical, mental, personal or social 
necessities, persons utilise things in the way they wish to do so, although this 
doing so is limited by prevailing laws and / or regulations. For example, persons 
may make use not only of property, animals, plants and inorganic substances, 
but also of air, sunlight, space and even the moon or social status, social position 
and social reputation, or even other people's roles and pieces of work-insofar 
as they do not infringe any copyright. Therefore, the relationship between people 
and res can be ascribed to that of governing and being governed, that of using 
and being used, that of possessing and being possessed. Even if a corpse is not 
used in the same way by which a desk and a chair are used as res, we may 
categorise the dead as an example of res by virtue of the simple dichotomy of a 
person and non-person. 
The dead are nonetheless objects that are considered differently from 
other things. The reason for this is that they inherit part of what they had as living 
persons. The reason why, despite not being alive, the dead are considered as 
different from other objects is that they generate morally different meanings to 
that of other things. We bury varied objects for instance, rubbish, dead mice and 
time capsules. However, the action of burying a corpse is assumed to be 
different from burying these things because the characteristics or implication of 
the dead per se is significantly different. This characteristic is in most cases 
derived from how a person was living his/her life before death and the kinds of 
relationships s/he had with others and society. The dead as an object signify 
Latin term lex is stemmed from ligare. Thus it would be presumed that lien refers to legal 
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part of who and what the person was before his/her death and that they have a 
different meaning or connotation from other objects. 
It is appropriate in relation to a dead person's possessions to give 
meaning to actions regarding a dead person or corpse. In general there are in 
the field of social psychology numerous references analysing the relationship 
between people and their possessions. According to one leading view, 
possessions are interpreted as a person's extension of self (see e.g., Dittmar, 
1992). Given this view is justifiable, it would be possible to argue that the dead 
person's articles are an extension of the self that the person possessed. To 
sum up, the dead can be understood as a surviving impression of the 
characteristics of the living, although there are their own characteristics, through 
the succession of the partial identity such as bodies, figures, shapes and images 
deeply associated to the dead. In most cases where a dead person comes to 
our minds, his/her carriages, looks, behaviour and the fragments of words and 
voices recall our memories to the deceased. We can recognise the image of the 
person's characteristics in a way that manners, behaviour, values and beliefs the 
person held evoke our memories through the partial identity. The characteristics 
that the dead had and our memories of the dead person's actions and 
behaviours are bound to affect the dead person's relationship with society and 
us. Unless we are conscious of the dead by recognising the partial identity 
between the dead and their previously living selves or by using photographs of 
the dead in tandem with our memory, the dead cannot have a relationship with 
society and us. Unless therefore the dead are dependent upon us for their 
meaning and significance, any impression of their enduring human character 
relation. 
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would be meaningless to us and thus the dead could not be objects for the living. 
The reason why we recognise that a person leaves the impression of his/her 
character after his/her death is that the dead person with no ability of 
consciousness exists in almost the same figure as that in which the person 
exists, and moreover continues to show so much of a similar continuum and 
image of the original person that we can discern no differing feelings from those 
for that original person. These images enable us to confirm the impression of the 
living person in the dead one. 
4.3.2 A catalyst for succession 
The second mode of the dead suggests that the dead have a character in 
succession law. This character is not intrinsic but extrinsic. This is solely on the 
basis that the character of the dead person is determined entirely on the grounds 
that the person is dead. It is assumed that under the authorised standard 
succession law in modern democratic nations it has been established that death 
per se will be treated equally. On the basis of that premise the dead can 
therefore be a catalyst for succession. For example, on death a prime minister 
and a salesman are both subject to the same law (e.g., succession law): which is 
to say that on death there is no discrimination between bodies on the grounds of 
race, wealth, class or character. This also means that under the laws pertaining 
to death different people, upon registration of their death, are treated equally 
although they may be unequally treated on the ground of taxation, for example. 
It follows from this that this equality of treatment towards all dead bodies 
constitutes an extrinsic characteristic of the dead and that is the reason why the 
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characteristic is, irrespective of whether there are posthumous assets, treated 
equally under succession law, at least in Japan and England. 
Whilst the dead, in terms of a catalyst for succession, have equality or 
formality, they also have other characteristics at the stage of "effects" of 
succession. When we add the term "deceased" to some social elements of 
identity, such as a person's name, social status, social roles and vocations, this 
addition enables us not only to draw a clear linguistic distinction between the 
person living and the person after death, but also to find, in addition to the 
equality identified above, other extrinsic characteristics. We now refer to the 
characteristics that are suggested when the following contrasts are considered-
Mr Smith V's. deceased Mr Smith, parents V's. deceased parents, children V's. 
deceased children, civilians V's. deceased civilians, neighbours V's. deceased 
neighbours, sellers V's. deceased sellers, and buyers V's. deceased buyers. 
The term parents, especially in Japanese family law, suggests not only 
that parents have a social status and a social role, and both the right to parental 
authority and the duty to bring up their children, but also that they have a lineal 
relation of ascendant to their children. Even on their death when they become 
"deceased parents" they retain the identity "parents" (Le., the identity of this 
social status remains a social fact), provided that they were parents who entered 
into the social relationship of parenting, and not merely the biological act of child 
production. In this latter case the term parents is really empty of meaning. 
Nevertheless, that which the deceased parents have and are after death is 
markedly different to that which they had and were when alive. Given this, would 
it be correct to think that they lost, on death, all rights and duties warranted by 
parenthood? We contend that the dead upon death lose the status of subjects of 
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rights and duties but nevertheless that some rights and duties per se remain after 
death. 
Regardless of whether succession is testate or intestate, it was argued in 
Chapter 3 that general succession is based on both the blood and the co-
operative relationship. What this entails is that, even if the parents died intestate, 
they are, in a sense, still involved in their rights and duties. In this regard, we are 
not claiming that the deceased parents as subjects of these duties and rights can 
perform the duties and exercise the rights. Rather, despite the absence of the 
deceased parent's stated intention, succession law contains the rights and duties 
expected normally of living parents within its effects. In other words, whilst the 
rights and duties are weakened and restricted to a greater extent, they are still 
broadly the same as those for the living in the system of succession even after 
death. 
Therefore, it can rightly be claimed that succession law not only 
acknowledges the type and status of this relationship but, in addition, that 
succession law does not deny that the status and role the living parents held 
continues to have affect after their death. Human death is treated legally in the 
association of the dead with succession law and society. It seems. through the 
association, that the dead are not merely a leading actor of the physiological 
events, but also that of the social and legal events. The details of a person's 
funeral may be determined not only by what is derived from the person's social 
relation with people and society whilst alive. but also by the reflection of 
predicting the change of the personal relation of the person's death. For 
example, supposed that dead person was the president of a large corporation, 
his antemortem position or status which survives his death is inevitably subject to 
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succession law relating with the management of the company. For a while after 
death and the funeral, the deceased will have to be "alive" as a deceased 
president up to the election of the next president, for example (Wakimoto 1997). 
In short what the person held whist alive continues to be alive-legally and 
socially after his death. The dead cannot complete his/her social death until, at 
least, a new president is elected in the shareholder's general meeting, a new 
personnel system of the company is arranged, and a commemorative event for a 
new start of the company and praise for the dead, is held. Midst the uncertainty 
of the relation, the deceased president is considered as socially alive until the 
reunite of the community that he had been involved. The cases of sellers and 
buyers can be explained in the same way. Salesmen have a social role during 
their life according to their profession, and, upon death, they do not lose all of the 
facets of this role. Even after sellers and buyers die, i.e., become "deceased," 
and despite the differences in succession in Japanese and English law (see 
Chapter 3), they nevertheless are obliged under the precepts of succession law, 
through the mediation of a living party to "settle their affairs". This implies that 
deceased 'sellers and buyers, for example, do not necessarily lose all of their 
former social status on their death, e.g., parents, lawyers, thieves, doctors, or 
indeed several combinations of these. Therefore, the obligation to "settle one's 
affairs" is an obligation of "'human agents", rather than different obligations 
according to roles or status one had when alive. The point that should be 
emphasised here is the import of the presuppositions that succession law is 
based on, i.e., that in order to "settle affairs" the previous roles of the person are 
invoked and recognised to enable this process. The other point we wish to 
. reiterate, is that people hold many roles etc. when alive, and frequently at the 
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same time (see Goffman 1959; Berger and Luckmann 1967), therefore when we 
refer to a person as a "buyer or seller" we are not describing the person in toto 
but rather the person as they are at that time to us in that particular relationship, 
interaction. For instance, a person whilst being a parent, might also be an 
employee, a dreamer (whilst awake/asleep), a customer (in the shops, a 
restaurant, or perhaps of insurance policies etc.), a seller (of unwanted items), a 
patient (ongoing minor or major illness), a taxpayer and of course more generally, 
a citizen. Who a person is at a particular moment, depends on what or who is in 
relationship with them at that particular moment. 
4.3.3 A successor 
As mentioned in the previous section, there are common cases in which the dead 
both inherit what they had and were whilst alive and are the subjects of that 
which wi" be dealt with after death. However, it is normally argued that such 
processes of succession are merely arrangements where, for example, any pre-
death debt is dealt with post-death. In this interpretation, there is no need to 
think that what the living hold is retained after death. Instead this line of 
reasoning legitimates the possibility that debts existing or incurred after death 
(e.g., funeral expenses) can be retroactively dealt with at the time when the 
debtors were alive. In other words, to espousers of this argument, death is no 
more than a point in time that is ongoing and insofar as what is dealt with after 
death is concerned, the distinction between the dead and the living cannot 
directly affect how any debts are handled. However, this view is not nevertheless 
justifiable as in, for instance, the following case. 
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Take for example a circumstance where a mining accident leads to a coal 
miner's death. In this case his right to life is compromised to some extent by the 
fact that the nature of his job is such that he is more likely than most to suffer 
severe injury or death as the result of an accident. In the event that he is killed 
as the result of an accident he is entitled to compensation in a way that takes into 
consideration the nature of his job, i.e., the fact that he was prepared to risk his 
life. In this circumstance then, the vocational attributes of the deceased before 
his death can be regarded as an important and relevant factor in the 
compensation claim. However, he is not confined only to his vocational 
attributes. The miner, as a member of a society has many and multiple social 
characteristics, e.g., as a subject who complies with and reflects the rules of the 
moral "ought" as based upon claims, duties, circumstances, expectations, and 
interests, all of which are distributed throughout "real" society. 
Yet once he has been involved in an accident which leads to his death and 
the claim of compensation for this fatal result has happened, he is necessarily 
regarded as a deceased miner, and Simultaneously the diverse relationships or 
social status he held would be revealed by any press releases involved. These 
circumstances raise the broader issue of how we are associated with such 
relationships and status in some pre-death and post death cases. Irrespective of 
whether, for example Mr. Jones is still alive or has been dead for twenty years, it 
is acceptable to use the phrase "Jones is my father". It follows that Jones, 
whether indexed in a past-regarding sentence "Jones who died twenty years ago 
is my father" or in a present-regarding sentence "Jones who works with the ABC 
Company is my father" is, regardless of the passage of time, my father. That is 
to say, Jones' parent-child lineal relation survives his death. Since it is possible 
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that such a pre-death relation continues to exist after death, the ground of the 
relation enables Jones' survivors to deal with his debts after death. Otherwise if 
a different relation in the parent-child lineal relation were suddenly generated 
after death, then succession law, especially intestacy, would break down. 
However, the above explanation does not answer the question "why can 
the parent-child relation survive death?" To address this question consideration 
of a different relation might be fruitful: suppose that a person has a "relation" with 
an employer based on an employment contract. The contract establishes a 
relation between an employer and his/her employee. However, if the employer 
died, the employer-employee relation would not survive that death. Is it therefore 
plausible to argue that the lack of survival in the employer-employee relation lies 
in the difference between the relations based upon family status or ones that is 
based upon contract? Our argument is that the only relations which can survive 
death are those relations which persons are unable to dissolve by their own 
intention whilst they are alive. The parent-child relation can be divided into two, a 
biological relation and a legal one. It is a relation based on a blood relationship 
that cannot be changed by anyone. On the other hand, the relationship 
established through employment is contingent and an employee can dissolve the 
relation with his/her employer whilst alive. Tomorrow, for instance, the employer 
may close down the business, or the employee may leave his/her job. 
Nevertheless, in the case of adoption, the parent-child relation can be legally 
dissolv~d but this means no more than that law treats it as a quasi blood relation. 
How about the relation established by marriage? Contrary to the case of 
the parent-child relation, when a person talks about his deceased wife "Ann", in 
terms of logic, he should say, "Ann was my wife" but not "Ann is my wife". There 
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can be no rational objection to this observation. Therefore, in light of this 
expression, it is clearly signalled that the husband's relation with his wife cannot 
survive her death. Indeed, as pointed out above the marriage relationship is a 
further example where a relation can be dissolved by his or her intention whilst 
both parties are alive. Moreover, a person can choose a new spouse after 
his/her ex-spouse's death, however the parent-child relationship cannot be 
changed, one cannot "choose" a new parent after one dies, in the same way 
parents cannot "choose" a new child to replace the child lost, although of course 
they can elect to try to have or adopt another, different, child. 
If this explanation is warranted, then it could be argued that an intestate 
case, for instance, in which a widow is an heiress is based not upon the relation 
that can survive death but upon the legal status that she was a spouse of the 
dead. However, in the case of the parent-child relation, both the relation and the 
status can, as mentioned, survive the parents' death. For example, where a wife 
and a child have a claim on the deceased husband's or father's compensation for 
his death, his status and relations that survived his death must be evaluated to 
determine the amount of the compensation. If so, this suggests that, where a 
wife and a child have a claim to the compensation, the various aspects, relations 
and responsibilities of the deceased whilst alive must, on the assumption that 
. some of what the deceased had whilst alive can survive, be taken into 
consideration. 
Thus, with the exception of a straightforward case in which post-death 
payment is easily executed, in most cases of post-death settlement of debts, 
consideration should be given to the power of the status and relation of the 
deceased that can still remain after death. What the death of a person implies is 
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not that the death commences the mere arrangements for any pre-death debt 
posthumously dealt with, but that part of what the person, whilst alive, holds can 
survive death and at the same time the death starts with generating something 
new, such as a claim to compensation and an assessment of the compensation, 
by posthumously taking advantage of what can survive death. 
4.3.4 A symbol 
The dead can be considered "alive" in and through the living's memory and 
recollections. The dead are internalised in the consciousness of the living. This 
consciousness is intrinsically so social that it can be formed through the relation 
between the living and the dead. In this way they can be conceived as a form of 
historical living spirit; this is not merely an idea, but is instead a vital function of 
the human psyche. This distinction is important because unlike an idea a spirit is 
an immaterial existence and transcends time. The spirit is a source of thought or 
deep reflection so that it prevails over the idea and exists as a universal reality in 
real events. In other words, it would be possible to believe that the dead can 
exist in and through the living. If the living are barely conscious of the dead and 
even if the dead as a physical corpse exist in front of us, we may regard them 
physically in the same way as stones and furniture and the dead which are not 
regarded as an example of a spirit may fade away from our memory. 
The dead have significance as a social symbol and can be viewed as such 
in the manner that we deal with the dead as well as in the way that we feel 
towards the dead (emotions, perception, etc.). Our character and some of our 
activities are directly affected by the role and status that the dead play in society 
(and the status that they involve themselves), as is the law and the social norms 
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within it. In this regard the dead as a symbol resemble a norm, especially a 
social norm, but not a rule. A rule is a statement of a norm, and it prescribes 
behaviour. It prescribes that X behaviour may be done (permission to do X), can 
be done (authorisation to do X), or ought to be done (obligation to do X), or the 
converse of these (Beyleveld and Brownsword 1994, 171; and see footnote 5). 
If the definition of a norm is, as mentioned, warranted, the dead which 
resemble a norm and are also a symbol can generally express the idea of a 
question relating to human social action and seem to require us to do the three 
kinds of behaviour above. There are some cases in which corpses exist as a 
symbol, or where the dead are symbolised by a particular form, e.g., ihai in 
Japanese traditional practice, or exist as a real symbol and therefore even if their 
normative meanings are not expressed by words they are an objective existence 
that is independent from the living's consciousness. It may be possible to say 
that the dead can convey a norm to the living. Needless to say, the dead as a 
symbol playa role in normatively binding the living in many ways, but we assume 
that members of society involved with the dead accept this role. Whether the 
contexts of the norm are right is not necessarily required as an assumption. 
What should be emphasised is that the dead function as a normative power in 
the form of a symbol or through the consciousness and memory of the members 
of society. 
In applying Weber's classification (1922) we find that the normative role of 
the symbolic dead is grounded in: our obedience to long-held traditions and 
convention; our emotional submission to what is shown as a prototype of norms; 
and our respect for the norm imposed on the relationship of domination and 
obedience that were regarded as justifiable per se. The normative role and the 
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emotional submission were approved during the pre-history stage of the human; 
and the respect for the norm subsequent to the development of human history. 
Thus the dead as a symbol exert a normative influence in the relationship 
between a society and its members. 
If the dead can be conceived as a form of historical living spirit, then 
copyrights, for example, that embody a deceased person's spirit and recognition 
can be considered to represent the dead's antemortem social attributes. The 
copyrights may be regarded as symbolised spirit. The spirit of the dead can be 
embodied in these copyrights and can exist as a visible phenomenon of their 
spirit, a phenomenon that we can see and understand. If an argument that 
before death the person was historically a living spirit and the works he/she 
produced were a reflection of his/her spirit is acceptable, we can say that these 
works came to represent his/her embodied sprit when he/she transferred his/her 
spirit and ideas onto paper. 
After this transference their spirit and ideas come under the auspices of 
the legal device called copyrights, which exists so as to protect material from 
being claimed as the production and property of another living spirit. In other 
words "copyrights" exist to protect and perpetuate the work of the original "living 
spirit" in the form, as it will be termed in this thesis, of "symbolised spirit". Thus, 
we contend that the person's spirit which produced the object of the 
phenomenon, i.e., the copyrighted works, continues to exist within these works, 
and can be constantly recognised as a symbolised form, as works or copy rights 
for example, after his/her death. 
The copyrights thus represent the living spirit of the deceased person. 
S/he, prior to death, would have had an expectation based on an appeal to both 
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legal and moral rights that after her/his death, the copyrighted works as 
instantiations of her/his spirit would be vested with legal and moral eternal life 
through the protection afforded by copyright law, although in reality there is a 
time limit. A person, post-death, is therefore wholly reliant on the co-operation of 
the living to preserve and maintain the ideas and spirit of his/her work. 
Thus where the form of the symbolised spirit is a real object, the dead can 
still be considered as a living spirit the living can recognise. If this is so, the 
expectation that the spiritual eternity can be perpetuated could represent the 
justification and explanation of the interest that the living have in extending 
copyright to the work of the deceased, and could therefore provide an ontological 
rationale for the value and priceless capacity of the symbolised spirit of the dead. 
It follows that things, as a symbolised spirit. attributed to the dead are thought. 
character, reputation, religion. art. etc. Yet it is worthy of note that not all of these 
are categorised as things to be associated with their significance as a social 
symbol. Instead, as mentioned previously, some may be merely associated with 
the third category of attributes. 
Whether the dead have a kind of normative place or role amongst SOCiety 
and people or whether the presentation of their values in the form of works which 
symbolise their spirit, they may be regarded as an existence that is signified 
differently from the way in which we ordinarily apprehend and conceive people, 
events or objects. If and only if the dead function symbolically in this way can 
they gain power as a symbol. The contexts that the symbol signifies become 
complicated through rites such as funerals or memorial gatherings. in a 
circumstance where the tradition and custom involved in treatment of the dead 
have spread amongst people, or through the living's actions and emotions. 
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To sum up, it was argued there are four modes by which we can 
categorise the attributes of the dead with regard to the role they play in society. 
All of these can be· part of that which survives death of the previously living 
person's character, spirit, status and roles. A principal phenomenon of that 
which survives a person's death is the social characteristics. 
4.4 The social characteristics 
Presupposition 2: Social characteristics106 refer to the roles that a person plays in 
society and from which it is justified to demand performance in certain 
circumstances, based on the stipulations of a moral "ought", . This definition 
contains the concepts of rights and duties. Therefore both are immanent in the 
concept of social characteristics. 
4.4.1 Persons and social characteristics 
Engelhardt (1988) identifies two categories of person: "persons in the strict 
sense" and "persons in various social senses". The former refers to moral 
agents, who possess moral rationality in the sense of being able to appreciate 
that actions can be tied to a sense of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness. The 
latter refer to those who are to be treated as being persons for social 
consideration: they are important on "general secular grounds to justify practices 
through which infants, the profoundly mentally retarded, and the very senile might 
in general secular terms be assigned a portion of the rights possessed by entities 
who are persons strictly, including rights not to be killed nonmalevolently at whim" 
106 In the traditional debate on "social interaction", two kinds of status characteristics 
are used as a similar concept of social characteristics: diffuse status characteristics (race, 
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(Engelhardt 1996, 147).107 Engelhardt argues, based on his interpretation of a 
Kantian idea, that to find grounds for protecting such individuals: 
"[O]ne will need to look at the justification for certain social practices in terms of 
their importance for persons so as to justify for a particular community a social 
role one might term "being a person for social considerations". Since this sense 
of person cannot be justified in terms of the basic grammar of morality (Le., 
because such entities do not have intrinsic moral standing through being moral 
agents), one will need rather to justify a social sense of person in terms of the 
usefulness of the practice of treating certain entities as if they were persons. If 
such a practice can be justified, one will have, in addition to a strict sense of 
persons as moral agents, a social sense of persons justified in terms of various 
utilitarian and other consequentialist considerations" (ibid.). 
This meaning of "being a person for social considerations" could provide a 
ground for justifying the way of dealing with not only infants but also the 
profoundly mentally retarded and those suffering from Alzheimer's disease. 
Despite a lack of personhood as based on rationality and morality, they are in 
fact to be treated as if they were persons. Engelhardt (1988) argues that being a 
person in various social senses establishes their place in the social relationship 
with persons in the strict sense and that what vests certain cases of human 
biological life with personhood is the moral practice of persons in the strict sense. 
Therefore, unlike persons in the "strict sense" who have rights and duties, 
persons in "various social senses" have rights but are not necessarily expected to 
perform duties (ibid.). Evidently Engelhardt's view on duties is wrong. For even 
persons in "various social senses" whom he identifies may be under duties or 
obligations to pay succession tax. 
age, sex) and specific status characteristics (mathematical ability, artistic skills, mechanical 
aptitude H see Berger et al. 1972; Knottner and Greenstein 1981). 
o Engelhardt attempts to modify the flaws in the concept of persons that Michael 
Tooley (1972) proposes by categoriSing two kinds of persons. To persons in the strict sense, 
acceptance of the notion of persons in various social senses has a two-fold advantage: first, 
it enables us to draw a prudent line between those who and who are not subjects of rights to 
life; and second it makes virtues such as benevolance to the vulnerable acceptable in a 
SOciety or community. 
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Such an argument would suggest that his concept of "persons in various 
social senses" is not necessarily in accordance with the concept of "social 
characteristics of human beings" that we are referring to in this thesis. However. 
the latter concept shares to a great extent the concept of "persons in the strict 
sense" to which Engelhardt refers. "Social characteristics" can be defined as "the 
roles that a person plays in society and from which it is justified to demand 
performance in certain circumstances. based on the stipulations of a moral 
"ought"". Whilst persons in various social senses have only a limited role in the 
practice of social relationships with other persons in the strict sense who 
conversely play a central role as moral agents. the "social characteristics" we 
refer to here relate to the substance of humans who live in their society or 
community. Therefore. this view is linked to the argument that the concept per 
se contains the notions of rights and duties. 
4.4.2 Existence outside society 
Human death is generally a natural state generated by biological mechanism. 
However. insofar as it exists in human society. it can be inevitably identified with 
signified social characteristics and can be composed as a social event or 
phenomenon arising from socially organised actions and procedures. The 
reason why we have decisive interests in human death is that the natural 
phenomenon of or event of death definitely has a social base. David Sudnow. 
who adopted ethnomethodological approaches for his Ph.D. thesis Passing on: 
the social organization of dying (1976). expresses his hope that he shows "the 
relevance of a sociological perspective for the description of even that hardest 
and coldest of biological facts-death" (ibid., 9). His grasp of the concept of 
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· death in his book was an attempt to recognise that in a constructed social 
situation, death is not only thought of as a social fact that is recognised for any 
practical purposes and treated as a social product. Thus the occurrence of a 
death can be generally regarded as "something that occurs as a unit event, as a 
happening of the group" (ibid., 165). Sudnow addressed how deaths are 
conceived is "seen in such paradigmatic remarks as "the nation mourns its loss", 
... "the family lost a son in the war", and others" (ibid.): 
"Characteristically, in announcing deaths, offering sympathies, describing the 
deaths of others, etc., relational categories and the collections of such 
categories are conversationally employed, e.g., ''I'm sorry to hear about your 
father's death," "his brother died," "closed because of a death in the family." In 
conceiving deaths as unit affairs, a powerful basis for the enforcement of rights 
and responsibilities associated with the death of a unit member is thereby 
provided for, namely, that those rights can become linked to a member's status 
as a member" (ibid.). 
In short the rights and responsibilities can be thought to be linked to the social 
statuses of the members of some unit, the statuses that the members have their 
membership associated with the rights and responsibilities. 
Sudnow points out that if clinical indications of dying are revealed in 
patients there are quite large differences of degree in the medical staff's, at the 
County hospital, endeavour to resuscitate the patients, via the criteria of ages, 
social status and physical appearance. These conditions that differentiate 
between the patients are much in accordance with the "social characteristics" 
conceptualised in this thesis. At the County hospital there was no medical 
endeavour to resuscitate patients, except for wealthy patients who died at its 
centre of emergency unit. Sudnow never saw any patients of the age of 40 or 
over as the subject of an emergent treatment-an external massage for the 
halted heart confirmed by auscultation. Physicians, in treating and attending 
their under-20-year-old patients, attempted to resuscitate them by using oxygen 
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inhalation and stimulants. In the circumstance of dying, the treatment is 
determined by the patients' social statuses or positions. Being an attempted 
suicide, drug addict, prostitute, assailant, or homeless person, greatly influences 
how they are treated at the time of their dying (see ibid., chap. 4). Very often 
such people who are considered as morally low are used, as sort of guinea pigs, 
for medical drills and tests which have no relevance to the cause of their death. 
Social roles may be determined by gender. Despite the feminist social 
movement against patriarchy, which assures a gender's inferiority of women, 
there are a number of societies that still accept, to some extent, the universality 
of patriarchy. Since masculine identity is conceived as sexual strength, power 
over women and political dominance, females are forced into dependent social 
roles by the acceptance of patriarchal values on their daily basis. However, 
unlike their social locus in society, women have been long educated by the 
emphasis on their assumed biological characteristics, such as "maternal 
instincts", "affection" and "emotions", based on the traditional dichotomy between 
reason and desire. On the other hand, men are supported by the social structure 
that the biological superiority, contingently produced, to women, where men are 
allocated into the psychic space such as "reason", "reasonableness" and 
"reliability" (see Turner 1984). It follows that men still manifest the superior 
characteristics in society. Yet the interpretation of this assumption is significantly 
difficult to be explained. One of the reasons for it is that it is obscure how the 
biological difference between men and women is constructed by social aspects. 
Especially in modern society the difference of nature/culture and nature/society is 
dependent on individual's recognition or perception. Once even a natural 
biological phenomena such as birth is related to the advancing genetic 
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technology-embryo, transplants, sperm banks, artificial insemination, 
sterilization, contraception and prophylactic hysterectomy, it can be put on the 
social agendas. This means that "cultural massively intervenes in natural 
processes" (ibid., 117). The cultural expansion of "natural reproduction" may 
illustrate that it is in accordance with the process where the status or social 
characteristics of women are loosing the strands of the biological character of 
women. 
Historically, women were forced into the social system of patriarchy by the 
emphasis on their biological attributes. The system confined women to child-
rearing, home discipline, subordination to husbands, the management of health 
and household. Whilst they advantaged the remoteness from the social 
competition, they were compelled to show a passive attitude toward the physical 
activities (sports) or psychological activities (political movements). 
The above historical views would suggest that, insofar as humans live in 
society, that is to say, they continue to exist from birth to death (and thereafter as 
entities which can remain in certain post-death forms such as ashes), it would be 
warranted to say that they have a social and legal existence. It is therefore highly 
improbable they would possess no social characteristics within the sOciety.10B 
Nonetheless the recognition of these social characteristics is subject to 
speculation. Georg Simmel (1958) provides some pointers to aid recognition in 
his essay titled Wie ist Gesellshcaft moglich? (How is society possible?): 
"We see the other not purely as an individual, put as a colleague or friend or 
party-member, in short, as a fellow inhabitant of the same special world, and 
this unavoidable, wholly automatically-operative, assumption is one of the 
means of transmitting his personality and reality in the imagination of the other 
108 E.g., Montgomery (1998) capsules a Wittgenstein's argument relevant to 
individuals, "individuals cannot hold a private conception of self that makes no reference to 
social categories". Individuals can interpret themselves only as a composition of SOcially 
constructed roles (ibid., 98). 
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into the quality and form required for his sociability" (ibid., 25; translated by 
Poitz 1972, 31) .. 
Therefore, it is warranted to point out that "the other constantly appears to us in 
generalised social form, as an officer, a believer in Christianity, an official, a 
scholar or as a member of a family. The role-image distorts and obscures 
perception of individuality" (ibid.). One criticism which arises here would be that 
the attempt to construct social characteristics often leads us to distort, 
supplement and typify the true picture. That is to say, to construct social 
characteristics would reveal the impossibility of constructing the true nature of an 
individual and yet this "true picture" is the very condition and ground for our 
perception of social characteristics. Conversely thus the concept "social 
characteristics" that can veil the purely unique enable us to recognise personality 
and reality existing in the imagination of the other. Needless to say, although this 
recognition is far from that of the true nature of an individual, it would not be 
denied that irrespective of "existing in the imagination for the other", the social 
characteristics playa vital role in society. 
Furthermore, Simmel goes on to argue: 
"We know of the official that he is not only an official, of the merchant that he is 
not only a merchant, of the officer that he is not only an officer; and this extra-
social existence, his temperament and his personal destiny, his interests and 
the worth of his personality, however little he may modify the central fact of his 
official, mercantile, and military activities, each time gives him a certain nuance 
for each person who comes face to face with him, and interweaves his social 
image with extra-social impondarables. All intercourse between people inside 
social categories would be different if each person confronted another only as 
that which he is in his category at that point in time, i.e. as the bearer of a social 
role devolving upon him at precisely this moment" (ibid.). 
Simmel illustrates that it appears "an individual is, as regards certain aspects, not 
an element of society" (ibid.). However, he overlooks the plausible claim that 
one's extra-social existence, such as one's temperament, personal destiny, 
interests and the worth of one's personality, can be sometimes recognised as 
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being part of all social existence, although he did use the term "interweave". For 
example, actions such as awakening, eating and walking have been regarded as 
purely individual actions that have always been carried out by humans since pre-
history. However, it can be argued that even those actions are on occasion 
social actions. For so far as persons live as a social existence, we can 
understand that the actions that they do cannot be purely individual actions but 
actions sometimes associated with interaction with society. Namely, an 
individual's biological instinct is oriented to culturally formed channels or 
processes by the association with society-e.g.. learning social roles, 
internaiising social customs, etc. 
Contrary to this argument, Simmel contends that "an individual is, as 
regards certain aspects, not an element of society .. .forms the positive condition 
for the fact that he is so as regards other sides of his nature: the nature of his 
socientated being is determined or co-determined by the nature of his non-
socientated being" (ibid.). This fact "an individual is not an element of society" 
may illustrate that each individual has his/her own biological and genetic natures. 
However it is plausible to argue that such natures do not merely form an 
individual's character through social interaction with society but also even our 
genetic and biological natures can be, on occasions, social when they are 
recognised by us. Thus it is possible to argue that, so far as we coexist with 
others, we are not beings whose social characteristics can be separated from the 
beings per se. Rather they are the substance of the meaning of our existence in 
society. 
212 
4.4.3 The concept Alssein 
On the basis of the above discussion, we argue that social characteristics related 
to humans involved in society and law are not mere attributes but the vel}' 
sUbstance of the existence of humans who live in society. In accordance with 
this regard, the concept "social characteristics" all but accords with the concept 
Alssein or "being-as", which Maihofer (1954, S. 114; 1956, S. 47), the German 
philosopher, used in an attempt to explicate the substance of being a human, 
publishing three essays on legal ontology in the 1950s. He argues that, in "the 
co-operative world", a person is associated not with indiscriminate others but with 
"certain" others. This Alssein is not a mode of relationship between a person and 
indiscriminate others but that of a person's relationship with "certain" others. 
Maihofer identifies Alssein in the following way. First, "the co-operative 
world" refers to the place and space where the social beings exist. Although 
generally it is called human society, it is the social world constructed by objects 
which hold their significance in the daily practical activities based on the 
necessities of everyday life and human concern with those necessities. In this 
social world we encounter diverse objects and persons and always seek to 
discover our relationship with objects and other persons. 
Even in di.lemmas, where if it were not for mutual dependency we could 
not live independently, we build relationships with others. Whilst we depend 
upon others in the meaning relations of the co-operative world where we labour 
and act, others illustrate the many different possible meanings of existence that 
constitute the total meaning of the relation we and others within society share. 
A being associated not with indiscriminate others but with "certain" others 
in such a daily co-operative domain is called Alssein by Maihofer. This Alssein is 
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a mode of social existence. It is a form of existence that is capable of being 
compared with everyday life and plays a vital part in the functioning of society. 
For example, it is the role-playing involved in parenthood, in the relationship 
between a landlord and a tenant, or a seller and buyer, or a citizen and 
neighbour. The essence of such "being-as" could be the social element, which 
would involve consideration of a person's social status, authority and their 
various roles. When we recognise that we, as human beings in the world, can 
exist in terms of Alssein, we also become aware that Alssein can lead us to the 
normative world, i.e., the world which is controlled by norms. 
4.4.4 The structure of relations 
Maihofer attempts to find the grounds for explaining I justifying rights and duties 
from the concept Alssein. First he explains the notion of "culture affairs", which 
refers to certain everyday phenomena, that is to say, social situations such as a 
person's social status (e.g., as purchasers, fathers, and citizens), self-defence, 
and emergencies (1958, S. 156f.). Therefore the notion should not be defined as 
a phenomenon which is only applicable to isolated objects. The "culture affairs" 
can be interpreted as the complex phenomenon of human life generated 
between subjectivity (human beings) and objectivity (the world) or the existence 
of human beings. What comprises the existence of the "culture affairs" comes to 
be mutually associated with Alssein. Thus, as mentioned earlier, we who co-
exist with others in everyday life encounter, in any "culture affairs", humans 
involved in interactions founded on characteristic relationships such as a 
purchaser and a seller, a landlord and a tenant, a doctor and a patient, a teacher 
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and a pupil, a father and a mother or/and a farmer and his/her staff (ibid., S. 161-
162). 
In analysing the structure of the "culture affairs" as the reciprocal 
relationship of Alssein, Maihofer abstracts some important elements from the 
concept of Alssein relating to rights and duties. 
(1) Instructions and responses 
First the social order structure of the "culture affairs" imposes parameters on the 
concepts of "instruction and responses". In the "affairs", in relationships between 
for instance a buyer and a seller, a medical doctor and a patient, or a teacher 
and a pupil, one person, the instructor, instructs another person, the instructed 
(ibid., S. 163). This kind of instruction directed from one person to another brings 
about a response from the latter to the former. Thus the instruction corresponds 
with its response (ibid.). 
(2) Circumstance and significance 
A response corresponding with an instruction generates an "affair" between one 
person and another, the "affair" where the person is directed by others-for 
example, a buyer is directed by a seller (ibid., S. 163f.). Maihofer identifies this 
"affair" with circumstance. This circumstance provides the significance whereby 
a person is understood to be a being for others-for example, a buyer is a being 
for a seller. This significance which can occur on a daily basis, provides an 
ontological rationale for the meaning which a person has for others and others 
have for the person (ibid.). 
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(3) Expectation a,!d interest 
We base this significance on the expectation that is mutually A/ssein between 
two or more parties-for example, the expectation of a father for his son or of a 
pupil for his/her teacher. This expectation furnishes a rationale for the interest 
that each A/ssein holds in another's existence or actions (ibid., S. 164). Since 
this interest arises from the "culture affairs", it can be called "natural rational 
interest". The interest provides a rationale for values and valuelessness that the 
existence and action of each A/ssein holds toward another A/ssein. Each A/ssein 
requires others in order to realise its own existence. With regard to law, law 
makers have important agendas that enable us to realise the "expectation" that 
one A/ssein holds to another (ibid.). 
(4) Request and duties 
According to Maihofer, the transition from a "being" to an "ought" is not difficult. 
The "natural rational expectation", as mentioned above, from one A/ssein to 
another necessarily generates a request which is to commit an act in accordance 
with the expectations of another A/ssein, that is, to act properly as an A/ssein 
(ibid., S. 166f.). This request is an ontological rationale for natural rational duties. 
When we act as an A/ssein, we recognise that these duties playa vital role as a 
standard for controlling our actions. We also know that to obey such duties is to 
determine whether our actions toward others are appropriate (ibid.). Therefore 
we would conclude that duties are ascribed to each A/ssein (ibid.). 
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(5) Existence and "ought" 
According to Maihofer, "from being to ought" can be explained in the following 
way (ibid., S. 167-168). In nearly all circumstances, we place ourselves in roles 
and situations that involve other people, and on that basis, we ask ourselves a 
question: what do we as an Alssein expect of another Alssein and therefore what 
do we request of them as a justifiable action? Take for example a teacher and a 
pupil. A pupil asks him/herself a question: what do I, the pupil, expect as "a 
necessary action" from a teacher and therefore what does the pupil expect of or 
from an action such as being right"? This leads us to a command, an instruction 
or rule governing how we should act in cases where a request is legitimate to all 
who exist within similar roles and situations. As a fundamental rule of order, the 
request can gain legitimacy. At the same time it can raise itself to a legitimate 
duty in accordance with the request. Maihofer contends that this refers to the 
Categorical Imperative that Kant called the Supreme Principle of Morality. 
Maihofer would conclude that we are subject to a moral rule based upon a proper 
expectation, interest, claim, and duty justified in terms of our particular social 
roles and situations within society (ibid., S. 171 f.). 
4.4.5 The concept of "being-as" 
If Maihofer's argument is credible, our perspective cannot concur with 
Engelhardt's claim that fetuses and patients in an irreversible coma can be 
necessarily categorised as "persons in diverse social senses". For if it is right to 
presume that social characteristics are of central significance to human existence 
in society, the fetus, for example, has a social characteristic as a fetus, and 
likewise the patient in an irreversible coma has a social characteristic as a patient 
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in an irreversible coma. Their characteristics have a central meaning to the 
substance of their existence. It would follow from this point that our treatment of 
both the fetus and the patient should not be regarded in the same as the way in 
which Engelhardt regards the status of fictitious persons. Both the fetus and the 
patient have social roles, social status and even authority 109 on the ground of 
"being-as". 
Nonetheless some will be dissatisfied with the above view. It would seem 
to suggest that the social characteristics, as a sort of role theory, are about filling, 
holding or playing roles. However, some doubt how it can be the case that a 
fetus can playa role as a fetus. It is a fetus, and only a fetus, it is its "being". 
They would argue that this cannot be called holding, filling or playing a role. 
Equally the patient in an irreversible coma can hardly be said to be filling a role. 
To do so surely requires an active aspect to it. In other words the criticism of the 
"social characteristics" perspective would be that being in an irreversible coma is . 
a very passive existence. 
A role that a fetus holds is one of numerous roles in society. However, the 
attributions of a fetus that, for example they cannot speak, claim or do what a 
person can do, would not necessarily support a criticism that the role of a fetus is 
very passive. Its role is formed by being a fetus. Therefore in its role it is not 
passive. Or rather, we can regard the role of a fetus as a distinctive one that 
cannot be substituted by others. Likewise, a patient in an irreversible coma holds 
his/her own distinctive role as a patient of that kind. The role can be clearly 
differentiated from other roles. 
109 There are some cases in which "messages" uttered by fetuses and patients in an 
irreversible coma (e.g., the heart beats of fetuses and the regular breathing of patients in a 
coma) can be spontaneously understood by their family and doctors. Their authority refers 
to that a meaning. 
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Before discussing the concept "as a fetus" using the concept Alssein or 
"being-as", we will review the argument that one could appeal to a concept of 
potentiality in order to claim that embryos and fetuses will be moral agents in the 
future; they are potentially a person, and they therefore should be given the 
rights and standing of a person. Engelhardt's criticism of this position is: 
"[I[f X is a potential Y, it follows that X is not a Y. If fetuses are potential persons, 
it follows that clearly that fetuses are not persons. As a consequence, X does 
not have the actual rights of Y, but only potentially has the rights of Y. If fetuses 
are only potential persons, they do not have the rights of persons. To take an 
example from S. I. Benn, if X is a potential president, it follows from that fact 
alone that X does not yet have the rights and prerogatives of an actual president" 
(1996,142). 
In Englehardt's argument, supplemented by the explanation of probability and 
potentiality, that "the value of zygotes, embryos, and fetuses is to be primarily 
understood in terms of the values they have for actual persons", it could be 
suggested that, even if fetuses are physically harmed, the action can be 
justifiable because it does not harm a person but only a potential person. Thus 
we have to return to the concept: "as a fetus" (ibid.). For our purposes, an 
understanding of the concept "as a fetus" can explicate that, whilst an action of 
harming a fetus is not to harm a rational agent, it is to harm the social 
characteristics of a fetus, which are the substance of being a human. 
Generally, we involve ourselves in diverse correspondences within society. 
It is worth noting that these correspondences link us to the meanings associated 
with society, which pre-exist us as individuals and give us our roles. We can 
identify a person as acting out or filling a role amongst his/her many available 
roles according to that particular role .. 
For instance, let us presume my neighbour, who is a judge, is at the same 
time my landlord and is therefore, as my landlord, involved with me not as a 
judge but as my landlord. In the courtroom he is, as judge, associated with the 
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suspect, equally the suspect is, as defendant, associated with the judge. In that 
way, diverse relationships can be established on the ground of "being-as". As for 
a legal relationship, for example, a person as a tenant is associated with the 
judge as their landlord in the regard of rights and duties to their rental contract. 
On the other hand, he as a judge, is associated with the regulations in the 
courtroom. We can apply the same mode of reasoning to cases regarding 
fetuses. Irrespective of whether or not fetuses have consciousness, they can be 
also, as a fetus, associated with their society. 
4.4.6 Ascription and governance 
However, it may be inappropriate to use the term "correspondence" in order to 
state the relation between fetuses and their rights. Although it would be an 
answer to express the relation by "correspondence", when we accept that, 
irrespective of whether or not fetuses have consciousness, they hold rights. 
However, it would be permissible to say that the rights belong to the fetuses. 
Jean Dabin (1977, 111-120), a French lawyer, identifies that relation with 
appartenance in French. Its literal meaning is "membership" in English. 
Appartenance may be interpreted as "ascription". According to Dabin, rights 
present themselves in a form of ascription between a subject and his/her object. 
Dabin contends that the concept "ascription" is a substance of relations between 
a subject and his/her object (ibid.). 
Therefore, when the concept is applied to a human who has no capacity of 
intention or will, it would be plausible to say that even if a human has no legal 
representatives they nevertheless hold rights, the reason being that s/he has 
diverse kinds of interests which they ascribe to his/herself. That is to say, it is 
220 
possible for a person to unconsciously have a right, as being that it is possible for 
the person to have interests without possessing an actual knowledge of them. 
These can be involved in the being of themselves in their various roles, acted out 
or potential. If the concept of "ascription" were accepted as valid as a substance 
of rights, then Rudolf von Jherings's argument that rights are always enjoyed 
would be infallible, although it still remains that interests can justify rights (ibid., 
112-113). Dabin explains a right in the following way: 
"Those who hold a right are neither those who desire it, or who know it, or 
who act, still less those who are harmed. They are those who hold it ipso 
facto it is what each person holds. A right can be identified by holding, that 
is, based upon the existence of the entitled holder or upon his/her capacity of 
action ascribed to the right" (ibid., 114) [my translation]. 
Although fetuses cannot be moral agents in their mother's wombs, they have the 
benefit of being a subject of the right. One pertinent example would be that they 
have a right to receive medical benefits on the grounds of or in accordance with 
the ascription that they intrinsically hold as a fetus. Supported by the concepts 
"being-as" and "ascription", fetuses have rights even if they have neither any 
necessary contact with their intention or will nor are able to express their will to 
other persons. Insofar as the object of the right is ascribed to fetuses, fetuses 
hold their right. 
Moreover where law forbids abortion, and even if consideration for a 
mother's life is a main justification for the acting against the law, we cannot deny 
that fetuses have the right not to be aborted on the ground of being a fetus. This 
means that fetuses are a subject of rights, interests or a relationship between 
rights and their ascription. To restate thus, we have not been maintaining, in this 
discussion, a view that a subject of interests can be identified with a subject of 
rights. Rather, it has been argued that, apart from a fetus's mother receiving the 
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benefit of rights for the sake of the fetus, the fetus merely has its own interests 
on the grounds of social correspondence and the relationship of ascription. 
Stated in this way, the concept "being-as" can be identified with a form of 
legal capacity and of governance. Borrowing Dabin's words, since an object for a 
right is ascribed to the subject, i.e., the person, the person has a power and is 
master of that power (ibid., 120). Ascription here means attributes that are 
connected to the subject by the bond of being assigned. "Being-as" and 
governance are further attributes associated with those who ascribe their 
entitlement to the object ascribed by the subject. 
This interpretation would be useful when answering the following question: 
"is it right to say that, in a case where a guardian for a patient in an irreversible 
coma is appointed and executes a right for the patient's sake, the guardian can 
be entitled to the right because they execute the right for the sake of the patient, 
but the patient can nevertheless reject it?" No one would think of this as correct. 
For a right and its subject can be justified by ascription, and "being-as", legal 
capacity and governance does not function if there is lack of ascription. 
If a patient is in an irreversible coma where s/he has no consciousness, 
s/he still has governance of objects or a right to own objects. The reason is that 
the objects are ascribed to the patient and therefore "being-as" and governance 
are a consequence of that ascription. In other words, rights that are the 
relationship of ascription and that of "being-as" and governance exist for the 
patient. So even if the actual execution of the rights is exercised by the guardian, 
the object of the execution i~ no less than for the patient's rights partly included in 
the guardian's vocational duties. 
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4.4.7 Roles in social characteristics 
Our next task is to identify the power of "being-as". So far as humans live in 
society, they have a power of governance of "being-as". Whether or not it is 
permissible as a right is a matter we will examine later, we argue here that the 
objective attributes of "being-as", which is an attribute associated with objects 
ascribed, are social characteristics. That is to say, we claim that social 
characteristics are an essence of the existence of humans who live in any 
society. Therefore, why is it possible that the argument-social characteristics 
refer to the substance of the existence of humans who live in society-leads to a 
further claim that the concept of social characteristics per se contain the 
concepts of rights and duties? Our understanding and definition of social 
characteristics are the roles that a person plays in society and from which it is 
justified to demand performance in certain circumstances, based on the 
stipulations of a moral "ought". Therefore the answer to the above question 
would require an explanation that illustrates that the central concept "roles" does, 
in terms of its intrinsic attributes and contents, contain rights and duties. We will 
therefore employ role theory 110 as a key concept to explicate the concept of 
social characteristics as used in this thesis 111. 
110 Although B. J. Biddle and E. J. Thomas's Role Theory: Concepts and Research 
(1966) obviously does not cover the development of role theory after 1966, the book is 
available as a reliable reference for reviewing role theory. It is worth reading because there 
is limited evidence in the current writings on role to suggest that contemporary thinking on 
role is basically different to that which emerges from the analysis conducted before 1966. 
For reviews of various versions of role theory since 1966, Montgomery (1998, 97-104) 
provides us with an outline on the concept of "embedded ness". . 
111 It is not denied that, as other writers have done, we are also using "role" as an 
adjective to modify such concepts as behaviour, relationship, network, conflict, etc. 
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In general, the concept of role in sociology is discussed as a social role. 
The writings of Mead, Merton and Linton 112 made contributions to establishing 
role-both as a term and as a concept. The concept of "role" which despite 
strong criticism 113 has progressed, been refined and been elaborated upon can 
be roughly divided into branches. Our focus in this SUb-section will be, based on 
the greatest common measure of the concept of role provided by the three 
authors named above, to explicate the grounds for the presupposition that role 
includes rights and duties. 
Primarily, the school of thought which prescribes the import of role in the 
dynamic process of the development of personality. This school has two 
streams: one position stems from Mead's (1934) perspective and views role as a 
fundamental element in the process of socialisation; the second position stems 
from T. Parsons (1952) and focuses on role as a cultural pattern. A second 
school prescribes the functional aspect of role from the angle of the whole 
society. It includes such anthropologists as Ruth Benedict (1946). A third school 
112 Proposing a distinction between status (position) and role in his book The St~dy of 
Man (1936), Ralph Linton, anthropologist, makes some notable comments: "A status, as 
distinct from the individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties. 
Since these rights and duties can find expression only through the medium of the individual, 
it is extremely hard for us to maintain a distinction in our thinking between statuses and the 
people who hold them and exercise the rights and duties which constitute them ... A role 
represents the dynamic aspect of a status. The individual is socially assigned to a status 
and occupies it with relation to other statuses. When he puts the rights and duties which 
constitute the status into effect, he is performing a role. Role and status are quite 
inseparable, and the distinction between them is of only academic interest. There are no 
roles without statuses or statuses without roles. Just as in the case of status, the term role is 
used with a double Significance. Every individual has a series of roles deriving from the 
various patterns in which he participates and at the same time a role, generally speaking, 
which represents the sum total of these roles and determines what he does for his society 
~nd what he can expect from it" (ibid., 113-114) [original italics]. Linton's concept of 
Inseparability of status and role regarding rights and duties does assume, at least, that status 
and role includes the concepts of rights and duties. 
113 E.g., Collins (1994, 266) criticises "role theory" as follows: "[r]ole theory continues 
to work toward an advanCing scientific model, but it has cut down its scope to the fairly 
narrow question of the self is embedded in social roles. This not only loses the dynamic side 
of the individual, which Mead had stressed, but also it becomes only partial theory of the 
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focuses on role from the viewpoint of particular groups in society. This school 
includes Merton (1968), and Berger and Luckmann (1967). Although it would not 
be practicable here to analyse the arguments of these different schools in detail, 
at least three points can be identified and abstracted as common to all three 
schools and thus as common elements of role theory. 
First, almost all prescriptions of role theory contain prescriptions regarding 
an individual in a particular situation or an individual's acceptance of the group's 
prescriptions regarding a particular situation. These prescriptions can be 
employed as a basic pattern in classifying rights guaranteed by law. Second, 
whether or not role action is prescribed, the action assumes that interaction 
between symbols and communication is possible and enables us to generalise 
social behaviour. Rights can be regarded as an important means for controlling 
society. At the same time they contribute to generalising social behaviour, that is, 
forming and maintaining social order. Third, human action cannot be adequately 
explained or described on the basis of observations of the activities and 
behaviours of several characters or other isolated ideas. Rather it should be 
observed and then explained on the basis of systematised or integrated patterns 
of action. The conflation of these common elements suggests that rights are 
systematised and integrated in law and laws. When so understood, the three 
common elements would suggest that rights are immanent in the concept of role. 
A review of the definitions of role yields a striking diversity of definitions 
(Biddle and Thomas 1966).114 Here we will attempt to employ the most common 
self ... Role theory loses focus on this internal structure and merely points to ways in which 
the self becomes attached to one or another part of society". 
·114 E.g., Levinson (1959) capsules three specific senses of "role": (1) the structurally 
given demands (norms, expectations, taboos, responsibilities, and the like) associated with a 
given social position; (2) the member's orientation or conception of the part he is to play in 
the organization; and (3) the actions of the individual members-actions seen in terms of 
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definition: role is the mode of action attached to a position expected by a group 
and community, and acted out by the actor in that position. Therefore, role is a 
concept related to the combination of positions that are systematically associated 
within the structure of society and the personality of the actor. Role can also be 
simultaneously self-constructed in the regard that expectations of others and 
institutions of society can be learnt and obtained. 
On the other hand, according to Berger and Luckmann (1967), it would be 
possible to explain role not as an expectation or norm that prescribes individuals 
but as a category which classifies others. This perspective intends to distinguish 
itself from other role theories based on functionalism, which view role as a 
substantial entity that binds actors externally. It contends that when we 
. encounter an actor we have to interpret the actor and their behaviour, whoever 
s/he is, and that we locate the actor in role-patterned categories. For example, 
even if an action is so extraordinary that it is beyond our expectation and norms 
we can, in principle, categorise the actor as a lunatic. Put in extreme terms, this 
means of category patterning enables us to categorise things that cannot be 
categorised by other means. 
Where the contents of role that an actor performs are independent of the 
actor's personality and the role is played out artificially, the role exhibits 
independence, restraint and externality. On the other hand, where a role is 
considered as reflecting an actor's significant attitudes and attainment it is 
regarded as a process in which we can recognise the actor's attitudes and 
interpret their meanings, and is construed as a cognitive category related to the 
interpretation of significant symbols. Obtaining such a role would permit the 
their relevance to the social structure (that is, seen in relation to the prevailing norms) (ibid., 
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possibility of positively reconstructing situation prescriptions and developing the 
imagination. 
Observed in that way, a traditional definition defines a role as the mutual 
expectations that are socially recognised and standardised (Emmet 1966). It 
would be possible therefore to say a role based on such mutual expectations is 
substantially a claim at least based on social status and formally no more than 
rights and obligations. However, on occasions, roles have to moderate conflicts 
with others, conflicts which result from a lack of resources required by an actor. 
In observing the contents of roles which are constructed of mutual expectations 
and their respective actions, we recognise that the relationship between the 
expectations and actions contains both rights and duties that require an 
according reaction of a certain type that an actor can expect others to recognise, 
and duties involved in performing an action of a certain type that an actor 
believes others expect of the actor. 
The above explanation is based principally on the classical work of 
Parsons (1952, 114-121; 1954, 197-200). Parsons points out that rights and 
duties can objectify diverse facilities. According to Parsons, facilities refer to 
"possessions which are significant as means to further goals in complexes of 
instrumental orientation" (1952, 119). Therefore the criteria of a facility that he 
identifies are "intrinsic transferability between actors, individuals or collective, and 
relevance to instrumental orientation" (ibid.). The fulfilment of human desires is, 
whether the objects are physical, social or cultural, performed through the means 
of diverse facilities. Therefore, the issue of rights and duties is ascribed to 
172). 
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possession of those facilities. In this regard, Parsons classifies rights and duties 
according to the difference of the nature of the facilities. 
Where facilities are physical or cultural, the possession of the facilities can 
turn into a particular person's right because the facilities per se are limited and 
costs are incurred in their generation. However, where facilities are social 
relations, the categorisation and systematisation of rights and duties are also 
prevalent because the facilities typically function to fulfil desire-oriented 
allocations. This situation emerges mainly at the point where one's rights are 
correlative to another's duties and where the matter is dictated by their degree of 
social power. 
We have identified that when role is interpreted in the context of facilities 
then the correlative of rights and duties immanent in roles emerges. Furthermore 
our concern is that there is also a diversity of facilities because of the degree of 
whether or not the prescription of the significance is ambiguous or of whether or 
not the maintenance is strictly performed. The interrelationship of role can be 
divided into two: the first based on an inherited ascription between relevant 
persons and the second on their posterior achievement. An example of the 
former is the relationship between a husband and his wife and that of the latter 
between a doctor and his/her patient. 
Now we will return to the reference of "being-as" or Alssein that is a central 
tenet of this thesis. Earlier we pointed out that humans can co-exist as a 
col/ective entity in a certain form. This form is the social order that contains rights 
and duties. Correspondences with the social characteristics of the social 
members, such as "as a judge", "as a tenant" and "as a father", can be 
interpreted to be constituents of the social order. That is, the social order is 
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greater than any respective res or any particular human characters. It 
establishes the relation and direction of relation between the respective social 
entities. Moreover it is that which prescribes the significance of relation to 
entities relevant to each other. Its substance lies in one's relation to others: the 
correspondence that exists between mutually related things or Alssein of the 
human character. This understanding leads us to the conclusion that this 
correspondence contains the concepts of rights and duties. 
4.4.8 Rights and social characteristics 
A question that has remained to be addressed in this section is whether or not, 
even if rights can be derived from both the concepts of "rational persons" and 
"social characteristics", we can deduce rights and duties from those who are not 
rational persons but who nevertheless have social characteristics. We contend 
that it would be possible to deduce rights but not duties. If the systematisation of 
role requires explicit prescriptive or prohibitory role-expectations (e.g., laws) 
enunciated by actors (Parsons and Shils 1954, 203) and this kind of explicit 
entitlement can be viewed as a right, then we are able to deduce rights from the 
social characteristics of those who are not rational persons in the strict sense 
mentioned above, based upon Engelhardt's argument that in diverse social 
senses they are to be treated "as if they were persons". 
In his argument Engelhardt (1996) claims that considerations of 
beneficence protect infants, the profoundly mentally retarded, and those who are 
suffering from very advanced stages of Alzheimer's disease. The justification for 
their status based on his concept of their being "persons" in diverse social senses 
leads to their entitlement as right-holders (ibid.) He justifies this as follows: 
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U[I]n general secular terms a protected social role might be justifies, or at least 
established within particular formal or informal agreements, for embryos, 
infants, and others in terms of (1) the role's supporting important virtues such as 
sympathy and care for human life, especially when human life is fragile and 
defenceless. In addition, with respect to infants and other humans ex utero 
there is the advantage of (2) the role's offering a protection against the 
uncertainties as to when exactly humans become persons strictly, as well as 
protecting persons during various vicissitudes of competence and 
incompetence, while (3) in addition securing the important practice of child-
rearing through which humans develop as persons in the strict sense" 
(Engelhardt 1996,147-8). 
It follows that the considerations of beneficence are based on the 
consequentalist perspectives. 
An infant is not, in the strict sense, a moral rational agent, but a being of 
its social character. This would suggest that an infant has rights based upon its 
existence "as a successor" and "as a recipient of the benefit", "as a consumer of 
powdered milk", and so forth. The concept of A/ssein or "being-as" per se 
includes the infant's entitlement to legal claims. Likewise, a patient in an 
irreversible coma has diverse rights based upon their status "as a recipient of 
medical benefits", "as a patient", "as a father or mother or child", and perhaps "as 
a landlord or "as an unemployment person". Thus since the concept of A/ssein 
does, as mentioned, include rights and duties, the justification based on the 
considerations of beneficence by the Consquentalist viewpoint is not only 
unnecessary but incorrect. 
4.5 The succession of the social characteristics 
Presupposition 3: The dead differ from other inanimate objects in that they retain 
some aspects of their former social characteristics when they make the transition 
from life to death. 
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4.5.1 Entities which are not persons in any strict sense 
Engelhardt asserts that the following entities are not persons in any strict sense: 
infants, the profoundly mentally retarded, those who are suffering from very 
advanced stages of Alzheimer's disease, and patients in an irreversible coma. 
This entails that they are not moral agents. One cannot blame and praise them. 
However, our argument is that they can have their own characteristics on the 
ground of "being-as" ("governance" in Dabin's argument), i.e., "being as" infants, 
the profoundly mentally retarded, patients of Alzheimer's disease, and patients in 
an irreversible coma and that the "being-as" can provide the ground for their 
holding rights. But it is worthy of note that we cannot necessarily say they have 
equivalent rights to a person in the strict sense. In a case, for example, where a 
patient in an irreversible coma receives particular public benefit from the NHS, 
his/her entitlement stems not from "being as" a person but from "being as" a 
patient in an irreversible coma: that others who have no entitlement to receive 
such benefit do not possess the social characteristics of the coma patient, the 
characteristics must therefore be the substance of his/her being in society. 
The general definition of the roles that a person plays in society and from 
which it is justified to demand performance in certain circumstances based on the 
stipulations of a moral "ought" may even be applied to the social characteristics 
of patients in an irreversible coma and patients at the very advanced stages of 
Alzheimer's disease. We will avoid here discussion of the problem of the 
justification of the fact that human beings who lack the entitlement of persons in 
a strict sense are exempt from the duties that can be derived from their social 
characteristics. However, it could be argued that when the patients were persons 
as defined in the strict sense they, in certain circumstances (Le., in the state of 
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an irreversible coma or Alzheimer's disease),· accorded to the normative 
standard. That is, they exchanged expectations with others, and that, even if they 
are now in altered circumstances regarding their health, the expectation that their 
society has toward them is effective, especially in terms of the social and legal 
significance. 
Next, we have to address the question: "how are the social characteristics 
of such patients ascribed to the patients?" If the social characteristics are an 
example of objects or things, then they may be ascribed to us in the similar way 
as objects or things are allocated to us. As a matter of fact, such characteristics 
are basically, as objective reality, ascribed to the patients in an irreversible coma 
or suffering from Alzheimer's disease. Yet this ascription is irrelevant to our 
sense of autonomy or intention. This is so because, as the following example 
suggests, infants enjoy their rights to life by ascribing an object (Le., life) to 
themselves. The reason why patients hold rights on the ground of their social 
characteristics is, irrespective of intention, that they ascribe the social 
characteristics to themselves. Therefore there is no doubt that the 
characteristics presuppose they are potential or living human beings. On the 
basis of foregoing that which requires discussion, is whether presupposition 3 is 
warranted. In other words, whether it is plausible to argue that the dead, who by 
virtue of being dead, have lost the status of moral agents nevertheless have their 
own social characteristics. 
4.5.2 The character of the dead 
Suppose that a patient in an irreversible coma is pronounced brain dead in 
accordance with proper medical judgement. He/she immediately loses the rights 
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that living persons can enjoy, and obtains the position of being appropriately 
dealt with as a dead person. Irrespective of a body's warmth, the law deals 
differently with the body before and after death. 
Most of the rights that the patient lost constitute a package of fundamental 
human rights. On the other hand, after death s/he is subject to the laws 
prescribing how to deal with dead persons. Legally, dealing with the dead does 
not mean that laws deal with them in terms of the rights and duties of the dead. 
The rights and duties that pertain after death have a measure of continuity with 
the living's rights and duties. However, insofar as the concept of the social 
characteristics contains rights and duties, the concept Aissein of "being as" a 
dead person is the same as that of "being as" a patient. That is to say, the 
concept of "being as" a dead person can contain rights that are as the social 
characteristics of the dead. 
What the patient held until his/her death was a set of social 
characteristics, such as social status or social roles based on the concept of 
"being as" a patient. These are significant elements related to a legal 
relationship. They exist in the relationship with persons associated with legal 
relations. Therefore the social characteristics function as a means of the social 
interests. The social characteristics of the patient are worthy of protection, and to 
protect them is an enforcement of rights. Thus, despite losing consciousness, 
the patient is a subject in terms of medical benefit. 
Based on the above discussion, is it right to say that the patient, on death, 
lost all the social characteristics that s/he held whilst alive? If the dead lose any 
social characteristics ascribed to them, then there would be no need to examine 
whether or not the dead have rights. However, the social characteristics of a 
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dead person can survive his/her death. The characteristics are associated not 
only with the common attributes or concepts such as social status or social roles 
but also with categories such as nationality, family, class and vocation. 
If a patient in an irreversible coma dies in Britain, and yet for example he is 
a tourist of non-British nationality, then the body will be dealt with as a foreigner's 
body (Green and Green 1992). The different treatment to English bodies implies 
the deceased non-British tourist still retains its pre-death social characteristics, 
i.e., being non-British. Contrary to this, if his/her body is treated in the same way 
as bodies belonging to deceased British persons, then we can say that the dead 
non-British tourist has not retained the pre-death social characteristics. However, 
we cannot deny that the tourist's body still retains some of the social 
characteristics that s/he had whilst alive. 
In outlining the history of the development of organ transplantation, Baker 
and Hargreaves (2001) cited a classic essay "Use of the Dead to the Living", 
which T. Southwood Smith (1788-1861), a physician and Jeremy Bentham's 
friend, published to urge "expanding the supply of cadavers by appropriating the 
unclaimed bodies of the poor" (ibid., 6). What should be noted in the essay is not 
only that Smith persuaded physicians to use the unclaimed bodies of the poor, 
but also that "if the dead bodies of the poor are not appropriated to this use, their 
living bodies will and must be" (cited in ibid.). And Smith concluded "[i]t is time 
that the physicians and surgeons of England should exert themselves to change 
a system which has so long retarded the progress of their science, and been 
productive of so much evil to the community" (ibid.). This argument may suggest 
that the social characteristics which people in those times had-here, being 
poor-manifest the locus where the people were placed in society. The social 
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characteristics of the poor can be understood to have been deeply connected 
with the infringement against or disregard to their rights. 
Under strict class rules and traditional values such as loyalty to their 
master or lord, samurai displayed their social characteristics in the way of death 
(see Sat6 1995; Turnbull 1996). The way of capital punishment115 to convicted 
samurai was composed by different manners or modes (e.g., performing 
seppuku) from those of people in the inferior class (Varley 1970). In addition, 
samurai's dead bodies were treated differently to those of commoners as a 
posthumous extension of the superior samurai status. As people of humble 
social standing were treated after death as an extension of what they had been, 
so samurai were treated as noble even after death. Although, biologically, 
samurai are human beings in the same way as commoners, their status and 
social positions were inevitably related to cultural construction. 
Illness or disease as natural scientific phenomena can be converted into 
cultural meanings or implications in social structure. Even walking is often 
considered a manifestation of a walker's social characteristics. In the same way, 
Hansen's disease may be part of the social characteristics, stigma or disgrace 
branded in social structure. The disease incorporated into the characteristics has 
a special image or role that can affect the society and reflect it. In Japan, the 
sufferers' bodies manifest the discrimination and isolation under the conventional 
assumption, prejudice or misunderstanding (Shima 1988, 117-133). In May 2001 
1151n the late Edo period, there were some cases where common criminals of the 
commoners who had been publicly executed contributed their bodies to anatomical studies 
at the dawn of modern medicine. These cases evidently suggest that the antemortem social 
characteristics of the criminals deeply influence the disposal of the bodies. Since the social 
characteristics can survive death, such harsh treatment was realised. 
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the Japanese government gave up the appeal to a high court. 116 Despite the 
government's attitudes, Hansen's disease is still, in Japanese society, assumed 
to be an incurable disease. The suffered bodies have often been buried in a way 
that their characteristics influence-segregation. 
4.5.3 Do the dead have social characteristics? 
The dead are not moral agents. They can therefore be categorised as a thing or 
res. However, a dead person, through the intimate connections with their status 
as a formerly living person, retains in death part of the social characteristics they 
held while living. This is why it is justified to argue that the dead hold social 
characteristics. If this line of argument is warranted, can a further premise be 
supported that a thing that succeeds part of the dead's identity, say, the 
gravestone and ihai, also possesses the relevant social characteristics? 
(Morimura 1989, 100) 
As stated in Chapter 1, the dead as symbolised by gravestones and ihai 
are those that are recognised-presumably valued-by the living. This 
recognition is dependent upon the mutual relationships within society, 
community, family and groups. The gravestones and ihai are thus imbued with a 
meaning and significance that transcends their physical status as an object for 
commercial transactions, such as a new gravestone or ihai might be. They are a 
commemoration, an objection for religious rites, symbols for ancestor worship or 
reminiscence and a tangent of the living and the dead. The reason why 
modernised people nevertheless establish a family grave and make their 
relative's ihai is that they understand the belief that human death is far more than 
116 For understanding the Hansen's disease case, see<http://www.lawver-
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natural events or facts. In short, humans do not wish to dissolve themselves into 
the natural circulation of things but to dare to reserve themselves in tombs or 
ihai. 
However, it would not be right to say that things such as gravestones and 
ihai with cultural or religious meanings have their own social characteristics as 
. the dead person. We have to make a distinction between the continuity of a 
partial identity brought about by the linkage between a dead person and their 
status as formerly living persons, and the relation between the dead person and 
their gravestone and ihai. The difference between the two kinds of continuity lies 
in whether or not they are based on the continuity of the body. There is, in the 
former, a continuity of a body but not in the latter. Thus, part of the transfer 
process of the social characteristics from the previously living to the now dead 
person is through the memory or recognition of living persons. 
4.6 Names and Rights of the dead 
Presupposition 4: Since the dead have social characteristics and moreover 
govern them, they therefore have rights. 
4.6.1 The concept of "governance" 
On the way to establishing the rights of the dead, we induced the concept of the 
dead's social characteristics, which can survive death, from the relationship 
between the dead and society/individuals. Since the characteristics include 
rights and duties and therefore can survive death, we expanded the possibility of 
rights and duties of the dead. At last we are to explicate the fourth 
koga.jp/hansen-jb1.htm> available (in Japanese). 
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presupposition that since the dead have social characteristics and moreover 
govern them, they also have rights. 
Dabin (1977) explains rights from the ideas of "ascription" and 
"governance". According to Dabin, the ascription of rights refers to the actual 
objective facet of rights and governance to the subjective facet. Whilst the 
former is related to the facet of the rights as a subjective reality of moral agents, 
the latter is related to an objective relationship with other people. Moral agents 
who are the subject of ascribing to things can, as a master of such things, utilise 
and dispose of them. Dabin calls this situation "governance". Therefore, rights 
identified with "ascription" can exist without necessary contact with intention or 
declaration of intention. The reason why those who have strictly limited legal 
capacities of intention and no representatives for themselves can hold rights is 
that they can hold interests which they do not know or recognise the existence of. 
In other words, the essence of having a right refers to the desire made by 
intention, the perception of the objects, the enjoyment of interests, the 
performance of an action, or the suffering of damages. It refers to the fact that 
each right holder has each right as each holder. Therefore, there is not always a 
need of intention and interests in order to justify having a right. 
"Ascription" is a common feature of all rights. Using this feature, we can 
explain why the concept of property expands to incorporeal property such as 
copyrights and patents. Also, rights to life that are held naturally to the subject, 
or moral rights, e.g., reputation, that are held in connection with SOCiety are 
examples of "ascription" based on substantial norms. Economic rights or social 
rights that the present constitution of Japan forms are deeply correlated with 
"ascription". 
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On the other hand, things are governed by the autonomy of moral agents 
who are fundamentally the masters of things. To govern things is the matter of 
substance but not that of the actual function or action. "Ascription" equates to 
attributes of things that are, through the ties of "ascription", linked to the subject 
of the things. "Governance" is another attribute that correlates closely with things 
ascribed by the subject (ibid.). For example, infants and fetuses that lack the 
capacity of intention cannot use their rational morality to protect their life. 
However, the law enables them, as a master of the thing, i.e., their life, to govern 
it. The governance is a form of reality but not a matter of intention or psychology. 
Moreover the reason why, in this case, intention is not required for exercising the 
right to protection is that, for example, infants who inherit a house can live in the 
house despite their lack of intention to do so. Another aspect we should note is 
that the capacity for governance itself does not necessarily entail the capacity to 
enjoy the interest. There are some cases in which, for example, an owner of 
goods, which are subsequently stolen, remains the authentic owner and retains 
governance of them even though the goods are physically in the possession of a 
third party. Thus, in the light of "ascription" and "governance", rights do not 
necessarily need intention or interests as their requirements. However, both 
rights and their subjects exist on the side of the ascribed, so that "governance" 
does not exist in the locus where "ascription" stands. As a matter of fact, a 
person can be the subject only of interests that are ascribed to the person, but 
not to other interests. In the following sections, we will take some examples 
(e.g., names and naming) to provide further explanation of "ascription" and 
"governance" and to examine whether such· explanation can be applied to 
matters involving the dead. 
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4.6.2 Names as social characteristics 
Names of people, objects, spirits, and God emanate from a great of deal of 
interplay of religion, mythical, social and historical realities (Abraham 1962; 
Abarry 1991). Human names that we investigate in this section are based on the 
culture's expectations and identification of personality (ibid., 157), and are 
concerned with individuals' beliefs, birth order, social circumstance, social status 
and roles, and attributes (see Quartey-Papafio 1913). In this regard, names 
have not only characterised entities of individuals and groups, from ancient times 
to contemporary times, but also signified their' characteristics and attributes in 
society. By their function they have affected people and society. 
E. S. Azevedo (1980), who researched family names in Bahid, Brazil, 
recognised that the main reason why cultural anthropology has begun to question 
its methods and results "seems to be difficult in producing reliable variables from 
research material such as culture and behaviour" (ibid., 360). He defined a form 
of variable for cultural anthropological studies that he called a universal variable 
-"one that (a) needs no definition by the investigator , .. (b) is not artificially 
produced by the investigator, and (c) is naturally present in every population" 
(ibid.). Thus his conclusion is: 
"[T]he methodological value of a universal variable lies in its suitability for cross-
cultural studies, its freedom from investigator bias, and its informational 
richness. One universal variable is family names" (ibid.) 
Besides anthropology, human names have been studied in various disciplines 
such as history, sociology, law, religion, folklore, etc. The fact that the 
Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (1917) edited by J. Hastings, covered items 
on names and naming over 48 Pages is proof that theology is profoundly 
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concerned with names. In 1996 a symposium of the Japanese Comparative 
Family History Society provided animated discussion, abundant research fruits 
and published a compiled book (Ueno and Mori 1999). 
Anthropologist Sir Frazer (1936) investigated names from the viewpoint of 
taboo. Nobushige Hozumi (1926), an outstanding Japanese legal scholar, also 
paid attention to "name taboo" in Japan which refers to a custom that people 
avoid calling others by their names. In order to confirm whether the custom is 
unique in Japan, he researched folklore literature found in the Pacific islands 
extensively. The reason why he attended the study is that he thought a taboo is 
one of the early stages of a law. A. R. Radcliffe=Brown (1948), social 
anthropologist, analysed the "name taboo" in the Andaman Islanders of which 
elements were birth, marriage and death. He concluded a name to be a social 
status. Toshiaki Harada, Japanese theologist, published many articles on names 
through 1927-28, and asserted the "spirit symbol" thesis that n~mes can vest 
spirits in bodies produced by birth. Kunio Yanagida, distinguished Japanese 
folklorist, carried out the first nationwide research on the customs and practices 
of names and naming in 1935, and compiled a book (Boshi-aiiku-kai 1975). C. 
Levi-Strauss (1966) paid attention to naming, names and the system of kin from 
the viewpoint of structural anthropology, contributing a great deal to the 
development of the studies on the epistemology of names and the theory of 
symbolism. 
A brief grasp of the above references on names enables us to recognise 
that names play an important role in those times and that names signified 
differently. Names reflect the society and culture of the times when the names 
were actually used. They also reflect the character of groups, roles and statuses 
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of individuals. Additionally names show the power symbolised by themselves. In 
this way, since names have their own characteristics, connotations and roles, we 
understand that names are a reflection of the social political structure from a 
viewpoint of their function in society. 
Levi-Strauss identified two types of name: an identifying mark and a free 
creation (ibid., 181). The identifying mark "establishes, by the application of a 
rule, that the individual who is named is a member of a preordained class" (ibid.). 
Names indicate the social identification of individuals (Wilson 1998). Although in 
modern society their typical examples are surnames or family names, African 
names that Levi-Strauss uses as an example are more complicated. In an 
African tribe, stocks of names are kept in each group of a single clan. The 
newborn baby is given its name from the stock, so that the identification of the 
group that the baby belongs to can be recognised by others. Since the name 
existed before the baby was born, the name and the baby are not a united 
existence. Moreover, since others use this name after the baby's death, unlike 
the function of names in Japan and Western society, the name does not work as 
a function for identifying an individual. In addition, since the names of tribes or 
those of family express the identification of the groups, the concept "individual" or 
"self' is likely to be considerably weak. 
On the other hand, the name is "a free creation on the part of the 
individual who gives the name and expresses a transitory and subjective state of 
his own by means of the person he names" (Levi-Strauss 1966, 181) [original 
itarics]. A typical example is that in certain African tribes, names such as "In-
laziness", "Give-not" or "In-the-beer-pot" are chosen by the father's mother to 
express her antagonism towards the wife of her son (ibid., 179). 
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Ueno (1999) provides another perspective from the debate on the two 
kinds of names identified by Levi-Strauss. He frames the two models of society 
in terms of kinds of, and amounts of, names: "closed structure society" and "open 
structure society". In the former, the kinds and number of names are limited. 
From the name stock, the name is chosen for the baby according to the situation 
of its birth and the social statuses of its parent or parents. Despite deaths in the 
society, the stock of names continues to exist. In this society, there are a 
number of persons with the same family and personal names. In fact, these 
names hardly function as identification. Oka (1993) found a model of this society 
in the Inuit society, where new names are not produced. In the criterion of its 
psychological character and physical features, the Inuit baby is given its name 
from the prepared list of names. Generally it is given a dead person's name. 
"Open structure society" refers to a society where there are various kinds 
of and amounts of names, and new names are generated within family units. 
Generally the trend of names in that society is alterable. The names belong to 
individuals and have a highly individualistic function. Insofar as the names exist 
in the society, their basic character lies in creativity. Modern Japan has taken a 
policy for developing the open structure society. Although commoners were not 
always allowed to have their family names until the early Meiji period, the new 
government prompted a new policy for modernising the system of names and 
naming. Its fundamental principle was to improve individualistic functions of 
names and to smoothly run the management of national conscription, taxation 
and education. As Plutschow (1995) points out, "[e]very major political change in 
Japanese history led to new name regulations and, at the same time, to an 
extraordinary proliferation of names" (ibid., 200). The number of family names 
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that exist in contemporary Japan is presumed to be approximately 140,000. 
However, since new names are produced daily, the number could be infinite. 
The political and social change provided people with names and their identities. 
Names and society are profoundly associated with each other not only in Japan 
but also in the Western countries .. In this section, first, a question will be 
discussed "what characters do names have in the society where they are used?" 
Although family names are inherited, first names are in principle attached, 
personally, to individuals. At the time of birth, in most cases, parents give a 
name to their child and therefore, except for the special case of changing names 
in litigant, an individual is not allowed to give a name to him/herself.117 
In a case where an individual can give a specific name to him/herself, it is 
confined to some specific cases such as pennames or stage/screen names. 
Nicknames, which are generated in casual relations, are often given by others 
and changed to other names by their holders, but in a case where an individual 
has to be identified by their nickname, it would be regarded as personal and as a 
function for identifying the individual. 
The distinguishing character of names is linked to the relation between 
names and gender. If gender is defined as the cultural difference of sex, names 
very often have the difference of gender. Ueno (1999) provides four categories 
for examining the problem over names and gender. First, the difference between 
male and female names. Where a name is given after the confirmation of the 
new baby's gender, either a male or female name is chosen. Second, in the 
classification of a gender's names, the difference in the kinds of name and of the 
. 117 English contemporary law seems to recognise that a name is simply a label for 
Identification. Since English law stresses the function of the identification of names. if only 
there are reasons for the alteration of the name and the procedure is completed. the 
alteration is comparatively easy (see Josling 1985; Pearce 1990). 
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treatment of the names may exist. Female names have a higher rate of similar 
names than that of male names. Korean names have a remarkable tendency in 
the rate of difference .. This would suggest that, in Korea, female names function 
less weakly in identifying an individual than male names, and that by stressing 
classification rather than specification, the social status of women is inferior to 
that of men (Che 1999). Moreover, the fact that there are no women's names in 
genealogies of families or clans in some areas of East Asia convinces us that 
evidently, there are practices of discrimination against women in the treatment of 
their names. Third, a name custom whereby, despite the existence of female 
and male names, a female name is given to a male, or a male name to a female. 
According to a reference (Boshi-aiiku-kai 1975), there are some areas of Japan 
where people believe that if they give a female name to a male, or a male name 
to a female when they want to have a second baby with a different sex, the 
desire will be achieved. The commoner's desire for the birth of a male as a 
successor of the household seems to be entrusted in this kind of superstition. In 
addition, by giving a male name to a weak female baby at the time of birth, 
people made use of the custom for the desire for recovery of the health and for 
the long continuity of good health. Fourth, tome-na (literally stop-name) as a 
specific custom of female names. In a case where parents do not want another 
next baby, a name implying the unwillingness of birth is often given to the last 
child. These kinds of name carry connotations of the emphasis on a patriarch 
and the expectation for having a mascline labourer. 
The second distinguishing character of names is linked to the social 
structure. In a specific African society, as previously mentioned, a single group 
of a clan keeps each specified stock of names, and a name chosen from the 
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stock is given to a newborn baby. The stocked names are regarded as symbols 
of the clan and a device for the identification of the clan. In this way, names 
manifest, in a sense, part of the social structure. Names in clans basically 
function as a symbol of the single clan in Korea and China. The number of 
Korean surnames per 160,000 persons, with an estimate of 260 different names 
is much lower than that of Japanese surnames. Thus, Korean surnames can be 
understood to be a symbol of the family's identity. A single Korean clan shares 
the same surname and is composed of the same genealogy. In China, each clan 
has a line of surnames-about 25 bai tsu. They are the first and single Chinese 
character of the individual's name shared in each generation. They function as 
an indication of the order line of the large-scale generation that assumed 
ancestor worship. In the Chinese system of names, surnames indicate an 
identity of a single clan and the line of bai tsu including individual names, and 
illustrate the generation of the clan. 
The third distinguishing character of names bears the policy of the nation. 
In East Asia, including Japan, family registration was used as national policy from 
ancient to modern times. The state managed the populace's names in order to 
strengthen its control over them and to use as vital measures and institutions. 
The policy of modernising names carried out by the Meiji government, as 
previously mentioned, dramatically changed Japanese society from a "closed 
structure society" to an "open structure society". The policy concentrated on the 
simplification of names, the establishment of the freedom of naming, one name 
to one individual, and the prohibition of changing names (Ueno 1999). A problem 
of the relation of names with the nation is the compulsory changing of names as 
a measure against the ethnic minorities in the nation and/or colonialism. Miao, a 
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Chinese minority, has both its own traditional system of names and a newly 
introduced one of the Han race. In pre-War, Japan compelled Korean in the 
Japanese colonies to change their own names to Japanese ones. The 
compulsory change of names resulted in the harming of their ethnic dignity so 
strongly that the serious problem of changing names is still discussed in 
contemporary Japan in the context of Korean people's temporary Japanese 
names (Kim 1997). This problem may suggest that names are more than an 
individual's mere identification, and that they are a cultural product that functions 
as a cultural and historical symbol. 
The above reference from Frazer's to some contemporary research 
indicates that names are deeply relevant to culture and society where the holders 
act and behave, and that in most cases they can partially manifest the character 
of the holder. Whilst names are, in various aspects, confined by the nation, 
society and convention, individuals are themselves prescribed by their own 
names. The way of the prescription is that an individual is required to have 
his/her own name insofar as he/she lives in society. Having a name is a duty 
imposed by the nation or society and if an individual has no name, then the 
individual has a right to own a name. If we adopt Levi-Strauss's "ethical identity 
symbol" thesis, names function as a manifestation of the individual's character 
and that of the group the individual belongs to. Also, if we adopt Radcriffe-
Brown's "social status" thesis, names manifest social status or roles of the 
individual. Adding the Frazer and Hozumi's "taboo names" thesis, we may 
recognise that names per se function as a normative power by which our 
behaviour or acts are prescribed or regulated. 
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Going back to the case of Korean people's change of names, their ethnic 
names play the vital role of a norm by which they condemned Japan and 
regulated their acts. This kind of function of names is linked to the problem of 
the difference of gender. For, it is obvious that names that distinguish gender 
have an influential power by which holders are encouraged to behave manlike or 
womanlike. Or we may understand the norms of names or their power as a 
symbol by the superstition of "tome-na". 
The above anthropological discussion convinces us, for example, that 
holding a name overlaps with holding a right and duty. A name is a symbol to an 
individual. It is a manifestation of the society and culture that its holder has been 
involved in. Additionally, it expresses the individual's· social status or roles. By 
expressing the diverse symbolised or implied things concepts, a name manifests 
the social characteristics of its holder. In Christian culture, a believer can be 
given a Christian name by the rite of baptism and at the same time given the 
social characteristics relating to the religion. In the world of religion, a believer 
can be evaluated by the identifiable social characteristic. Thus, on the basis of 
the manifestation of social character, for example, when one's name is harmed, 
one can claim a legal action for stopping the infringement or have the right to 
seek a legal remedy for the infringement from the court. These necessary 
measures are granted by both the undeniable fact that one has one's own name, 
and the credible supposition that "having a name" accords with "having a right 
and duty". 
In English common law, however, no absolute right to a name exists (Bar 
2000, 96). The violation of the right constitutes a delict in all other European 
countries due to the fact we are individuals by virtue of our names (ibid.). The 
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relative case whereby the right to a name is violated, is that an individual 
pretends to be the person whose name he uses. Or, the case of defamation may 
be that an individual's name is "used in advertisements and commercials to give 
the impression that he recommends the relevant product" (ibid., 97). 
How do bearers have their own names acknowledged as a right? Shortly 
after its birth, a baby is given a name that will be used throughout its life and 
even after its death. An individual name may function in a separate situation 
from the individual or in ways that the person cannot predict. As far as the 
person can be identified by the name, the name is the person's own "property". 
For example, to exclude an individual who belongs to a social club is to remove 
the name from the membership list. The death of a person is also to eliminate 
the name from the registration in Japanese registration law. That is the way in 
which a name is ascribed to its bearer. At the same time the bearer governs 
his/her own name. Even if person A pretends to be person S, and use person 
B's name, person B's name is not ascribed to person A or governed by person A. 
The name is not what person A holds. The fact that a name accords with its 
holder suggests both that the name is ascribed to the subject of the name and 
that the subject has a right to use the name-Le., as a deniable fact the name is 
governed by the subject. Although using the accordance of the name and its 
holder, when we obtain information regarding the holder, this information is not 
always sent by the holder. By others using the name, the name per se often 
independently affects society. 
governed by its real holder. 
Nonetheless the name remains ascribed and 
In this way, the concepts "ascription" and 
"governance" can explain the situation in which the name is the holder's and an 
object of a right. 
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4.6.3 Names and reputation of the deceased-the harm thesis and the 
social characteristics thesis 
Our main concern here is twofold: whether or not it is possible to apply the above 
explanation of names to the dead, and how the objection against the harm thesis 
(see 2. 3, 2. 4 and 2. 5) in the discussion on harmed names, is associated with 
the social characteristics thesis and linked with rights of the dead. Our answer 
for the former is "yes". 
A person's name is very often used after the person's death. In the 
community that the person belonged to, using the "past tense", people talk about 
him/her. People use the person's antemortem name for identifying the person. 
Thus, it is plausible to say that the name survives death. The description of the 
person's ante mortem situation and the identification of the person, in practice, 
affects the' mind of others who know the person. What is identified by the name 
comes to be an object for social evaluation. The dead function as an existence 
that influences people in a similar way to the living. Therefore, a name, which 
can identify the dead, can survive death as a manifestation of the social 
characteristics. For example, a surname "Yoshida" manifests, as known from 
some examples such as "Shigeru Yoshida" (the deceased Japanese prime 
minister) and "Shoin Yoshida"(the deceased Japanese political philosopher), 
being Japanese, even if there is no blood linkage with other Yoshidas. The 
Chinese characters of the name manifest being a person with Japanese 
nationality. The first name "Masayuki" can be identified with a Japanese male. If 
a person named "Masayuki Yoshida" dies in England, his body is, as a Japanese, 
subject to English regulation (see 4. 5. 2). Thus, his name is part of his social 
characteristics that identify him with nationality and gender. That is why a 
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person's name can survive the person's death as a manifestation of the person's 
social characteristics. 
Cast the same question on the dead: how do the dead have a name? No 
one denies that a person had his/her name. Having a name was explained by 
the association of the rights with the concepts "ascription" and "governance". 
Needless to say, the dead are required to have names in order to be identified. 
Unlike kaimyo, a Buddhist posthumous name, a dead person's posthumous 
name is used as, for example, "Jones died in a traffic accident". Strictly speaking 
this expression is no more than the fact that the deceased Jones is called by his 
ante mortem name. 
When Jones is called by his name, despite the caller's perception, the 
name "Jones" manifests the identification that can survive death-the deceased's 
social characteristic-and his image kept in the survivor's memories or 
consciousness. The name is a manifestation of Jones's posthumous identity and 
can be understood to be a manifestation of being Jones per se. In short, 
although the name is a manifestation, it is firmly connected to the essence of the 
identity and its reality, and not separated from the connection. Insofar as the 
name of the dead and the identity of the dead cannot be separated, the 
manifestation of the name can be regarded as Jones per se. Therefore the 
infringement against Jones's name can be considered-even if he is dead-as 
being harmed. 
Yet, the connection between the living and their names would be different 
from that between the dead and their names. In the former relation names serve 
as a manifestation for confirming identity. For example, names are used for the 
confirmation of identity at the time of booking a hotel. It should be noted that, 
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even if a person is not a real Jones, in the process of the booking, he is regarded 
as Jones, whilst the person who pretends to be Jones can recognise who he is, 
even if no one knows it. 
However, in the case of the dead, they cannot confirm their own identity by 
themselves. Whilst the identity of the deceased Jones, as the name manifests, 
is "being Jones"; if it is not so, there is merely the fact that it is not. The dead 
Jones cannot prove it, because he is dead. 
Suppose a case where an individual's name is harmed. Novelist Jones's 
penname was harmed because of the error in typesetting such as "Janes". 
Jones can claim for correction and apology against the publisher. That is his 
exercise of rights. Since he holds his name on the basis of "ascription" and 
"governance", he can claim for a remedy against the infringement. Interests he 
can obtain exist in a correction and an apology. 
How about the deceased Jones? His name continues to serve as a social 
characteristic after his death. In the same way of the living Jones's case, the 
incorrect name is an object that requires correction and apology. His relatives or 
readers may require the correction of the error, and moreover conditions of the 
contract of copyright or law on copyright can justify the request or claim. This 
posthumous error of the deceased Jones's name is an infringement against his 
name and, at the same time, the interests Jones holds in his name. This can be 
explained by using the concepts "ascription" and "governance". 
Suppose another case where Jones's dead body was buried under a 
tombstone where the name "Jones" is carved, the date of his death, the name of 
the founder of his tomb, etc. These facts evidently suggest that this tomb is a 
place that the body of Jones is laid in. Its manifestation of this is his name as a 
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social characteristic. Therefore, the body of Smith is not laid there in place of 
Jones'. Even if Smith's corpse is wrongly buried under Jones's tomb, the grave 
is not Smith's. He does not physically have the locus of the tomb but does so on 
the basis of the concepts of "ascription" and "governance". 
It follows that it would be possible to explain the relation of the harm of the 
dead thesis and the social characteristics thesis in this way. The connection 
between the dead and their name is in essence "ascription" and "governance". 
Despite whether or not the dead can exercise rights, their interests are infringed 
and the dead are harmed. In analysing the relation of the dead and their names 
through the concept of "social characteristics", we will discuss, from the same 
viewpoint, the rights to reputation and rights to posthumous reputation. The 
question could be rephrased in this way: "in the same way that the living hold 
their right to reputation, do the dead thence govern their own pre-death 
reputation?" If it were possible for the dead to govern their posthumous 
reputation, then we would have to agree that things can govern other things. Our 
argument is that amongst numerous things only the dead, as res, have the 
capacity to do so. 
Dabin (1977) claims that such governance needs two kinds of 
requirements in the relationship with other persons. First, admitting that a certain 
thing is ascribed to a certain moral agent and that s/he is the master who governs 
the thing, there is a requirement by law for others not to intervene with the agent. 
Second, the agent has a capacity to decide whether or not s/he demands this 
requirement of others. Unless s/he gives up the decision, s/he has the possibility 
of a recourse to legal means to protect against any infringement. In association 
with the legal protection this possibility could bring about a right to employ a 
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lawsuit. Exercising this right basically requires legal capacity. However, the 
possibility of exercising the original protectable right or that of being against the 
intervention per se is no less than a legal practical demand of the governance, 
irrelevant of intention and interests. 
If the above explanation is valid, then establishing rights of the dead would 
be feasible: it is possible for the antemortem reputation to survive its holder's 
death as the social characteristics. Therefore we cannot deny that the dead 
have reputation. The reputation has to be distinguished with that of the 
bereaved's. It is the dead's own reputation (see Chapter 2). Therefore the 
reputation is ascribed to the dead who can neither take advantage of, nor directly 
protect the reputation. On the other hand, admitting that the reputation is the 
dead's, others have a duty not to defame the dead. Moreover, as the second 
requirement, the dead have a possibility of exercising a legal means against 
posthumous defamation (although this means is exercised by the living, i.e. the 
dead person's family or representatives). Thus, the second requirement can be 
feasible even after death. The main reason why the dead have such rights to 
reputation after death is that they continue to have names that were used whilst 
alive. Names enable the dead to have them by "ascription" and "governance". 
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4.7 Conclusions 
The dead hold their social characteristics. The characteristics are the dead's 
roles and statuses manifested by a real thing such as names or reputation. The 
grounds on which the protection of names infringed is required, or on which a 
remedy against the defamation is claimed, are that the social characteristics that 
a person continues to have after his/her death contain the concepts of both rights 
and duties. Thus we would suggest that the concept "social characteristics of the 
dead" will benefit the possibility of establishing rights of the dead. 
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